Shalimar Corp. Ltd. Vs. Mr. Rizwan Ahmad and Anr. - The demand would be defective and incomplete, in the event, promoter does not comply its statutory obligation by computing and incorporating/adjusting the delay interest due and admissible to the allottee for the delayed period. The allottee, in such an event, can refuse to accept the offer of possession, until the accounts is settled legally in terms of proviso to Section 18(1).

 UP-REAT (2026.02.03) in  Shalimar Corp. Ltd. Vs. Mr. Rizwan Ahmad and Anr.  [Appeal No. 76/2023,] held that;

• Section 18(1) of Act 2018 provides that if promoter fails to complete or is unable to give possession of an apartment, he shall be liable to the allottee to pay interest for the delayed period till handing over possession, in the event, allottee does not intent to withdraw from the project.

• However, since the computation/demand along with the offer of possession was invalid and defective by not incorporating the interest payable to the allottee for the delayed period, it cannot be said that the allottee was in default, rather, the promoter by raising invalid demand was resisting possession of the unit, hence, would be liable to pay interest till handing over possession of the unit.

• As per the scheme of Act 2016, it is obligated upon the promoter to complete the project and handover possession of the unit to the allottee, on or before the promised date. On failure of the promoter, allottee is entitled to interest at the prescribed rate for the delayed period. The proviso to Section 18(1) of Act 2016, is unconditional and casts a mandatory obligation on the promoter to pay the interest to the allottee. The expression, ‘shall pay,’ makes it payable compulsorily to the allottee without demand of the allottee.

•  On completion of the project, promoter is required to settle the accounts of the unit, thereafter, raise final demand of the outstanding dues, if any. The demand would be defective and incomplete, in the event, promoter does not comply its statutory obligation by computing and incorporating/adjusting the delay interest due and admissible to the allottee for the delayed period. The allottee, in such an event, can refuse to accept the offer of possession, until the accounts is settled legally in terms of proviso to Section 18(1).

• In other words, promoter resists possession of the unit, unless the invalid demand raised is satisfied by the allottee.

• The interest for the delayed period payable to the allottee, however, was not incorporated in the computation. The demand is, therefore, defective and not as per Section 18(1).

Excerpts of the Order; 

# 1. Heard Sri Anurag Singh, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Rizwan Ahmad, respondent in person and Sri Gautam Johri, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record.

# 2. The cross appeals are being heard together on consent of the parties. For the sake of convivence facts of Appeal No. 76/2023, M/s Shalimar Corp Ltd. Vs. Mr. Rizwan Ahmad and Ms. Khusboo Begum Ahmad, is being taken as leading case.

# 3. The appellant-promoter by the instant appeal seeks quashing of the impugned order and presses for charging interest on delayed payment of instalments for default of the respondent allottee.

# 4. The respondent allottee is raising challenge to the impugned order dated 09.01.2023, passed by the Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Lucknow, (for short, ‘Regulatory Authority’) in complaint no. LKO129/04/92442/2022, wherein, a direction came to be issued to the appellant-promoter to hand over possession of the unit along with the delay interest.

# 5. The allottee claims interest for the delay period in terms of Section 18 (1) of Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016 (for short ‘Act 2016’) till the date of handing over possession. He further, prays for refund/adjustment of the amount charged towards car parking, which is not permissible. Further, relief has been sought challenging the delay interest imposed by the promoter, not being as per the builder buyer agreement (BBA).

# 6. The respondent-allottee at the outset submits that he would not press for the quantum of interest imposed by the promoter for default of the respondent allottee in timely payment of instalment. In other words, respondent allottee is not aggrieved by the interest being charged by the appellant promoter, but by the charges imposed on other counts.

# 7. The short questions, on rival submission that fall for consideration are:

• (i). whether the offer of possession of the unit dated 17.03.2021 issued by the promoter was in terms of the provisions of Act, 2016, if not, its consequences.

• (ii). whether respondent allottee is entitled to delay interest till the date of physical possession of the unit, and/or, till the date of obtaining the Occupancy/Completion certificate (OC/CC) of the project/unit.

Question No. 1 and 2 are being decided together.

# 8. The facts inter se parties, are not in dispute.

# 9. On application of the respondent allottee, flat (unit) no. B-4-602 came to be allotted on 26.06.2016, in the residential project floated by the appellant, namely, “Mannat,” on Lucknow-Ayodhya, Road, District-Barabanki. The builder buyer agreement (BBA) dated 23.08.2016 was executed. The total sale consideration of the unit was at Rs.42,17,000/- to be paid as per construction linked plan.

# 10. As per terms and condition (para 11) of BBA the unit was to be handed over within 36 months, plus six months grace period, from the date of start of construction. It is not in dispute that the construction of the project commenced on 05.10.2016, the unit as per terms of the BBA was to be handed over on or before 05.04.2020.

# 11. The basic sale price of the unit came to be duly satisfied by the respondent allottee. The OC/CC of the project came to be received on 14.08.2020, pursuant thereof, the offer of possession of the unit came to be made to the respondent allottee on 17.03.2021. The construction, having regard to loss of six months of Covid-19 Pandemic, was completed within stipulated agreed time period. However, the offer of possession was withheld by the promoter for over six months for no fault of the allottee. The offer of possession dated 17.03.2021, called upon the respondent allottee to take possession subject to deposit of Rs.1,21,921/- towards delay interest for the default of the respondent allottee.

# 12. Further, pursuant to order dated 05.02.2025 passed by this Tribunal calling upon the promoter to hand over possession along with the computation of interest admissible and payable to the parties. Pursuant thereof, promoter communicated the amount chargeable from the allottee as on 20.05.2025, which includes, holding charges and maintenance charges. In the  communication it has been categorically noted that the offer of possession sent on 17.03.2021, the physical possession could not be handed over/taken by the allottee due to the non-settlement of accounts by the allottee. The allottee is aggrieved by the charges imposed other than delay interest, charged from the allottee for his default.

# 13. Learned counsel for the promoter has placed reliance on the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Supertech Ltd. Vs. Rajni Goyal,’ (AIR 2018SC5351 = (2019)17SCC681), arising from the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It is urged by learned counsel for the promoter that the allottee would not be entitled to interest beyond the date of the completion certificate i.e. 14.08.2020, as was noted and observed in Rajni Goyal (supra).

# 14. We have carefully perused the report in particular, paragraph 4 with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties. It is noted that the respondent purchaser therein failed to take possession of the unit on being offered, consequently, the Court observed, ‘the Respondent-Purchaser ought not to be allowed to reap the benefits of her own delay in taking possession.’

# 15. In the facts of the case at hand, the promoter on receiving the completion certificate for no reason whatsoever, failed to offer of the unit until 17.03.2021, it is not the case of the promoter that the allottee was in default or that the allottee resisted taking possession of the unit. Section 18(1) of Act 2018 provides that if promoter fails to complete or is unable to give possession of an apartment, he shall be liable to the allottee to pay interest for the delayed period till handing over possession, in the event, allottee does not intent to withdraw from the project. The promoter admittedly, after receiving completion certificate for the first time offered possession of the unit to the allottee belatedly on 17.03.2021. However, since the computation/demand along with the offer of possession was invalid and defective by not incorporating the interest payable to the allottee for the delayed period, it cannot be said that the allottee was in default, rather, the promoter by raising invalid demand was resisting possession of the unit, hence, would be liable to pay interest till handing over possession of the unit.

 

# 16. On query, learned counsel for appellant promoter admits that the interest for the delay period, till the offer of possession in terms of proviso Section 18(1) of the Act, 2016, was not incorporated/adjusted in the demand notice.In other words, offer of possession of the unit was not in terms of proviso to Section 18(1), meaning thereby, possession of the unit was resisted/obstructed by the appellant without any fault of the respondent allottee. In the circumstances, as per Section 18(1) of Act, 2016, respondent allottee would be entitled to delay interest till the handing over possession of the unit in habitable condition.

# 17. As per the scheme of Act 2016, it is obligated upon the promoter to complete the project and handover possession of the unit to the allottee, on or before the promised date. On failure of the promoter, allottee is entitled to interest at the prescribed rate for the delayed period. The proviso to Section 18(1) of Act 2016, is unconditional and casts a mandatory obligation on the promoter to pay the interest to the allottee. The expression, ‘shall pay,’ makes it payable compulsorily to the allottee without demand of the allottee. The provision is compensatory and not penal.

# 18. On completion of the project, promoter is required to settle the accounts of the unit, thereafter, raise final demand of the outstanding dues, if any. The demand would be defective and incomplete, in the event, promoter does not comply its statutory obligation by computing and incorporating/adjusting the delay interest due and admissible to the allottee for the delayed period. The allottee, in such an event, can refuse to accept the offer of possession, until the accounts is settled legally in terms of proviso to Section 18(1). In any case the promoter would not hand over possession of the unit until the invalid/illegal demand is satisfied by the allottee. In other words, promoter resists possession of the unit, unless the invalid demand raised is satisfied by the allottee. It is not in dispute that allottee had paid the sale consideration before offer of possession of the unit and was not in default.

# 19. Our attention has been drawn to the computation dated 02.12.2025, issued by the appellant promoter to the respondent, wherein, respondent allottee has been called upon to pay interest at Rs.1,21,921/- for default; holding charges at Rs.1,61,000/- with effect from 01.05.2021 to 30.11.2025; maintenance charges at Rs.1,92,647/- w.e.f., 01.03.2022 to 30.03.2025. The amount charged towards car parking at Rs. 1,50,000/- has been withdrawn as it is not chargeable under Act 2016. The total amount as per appellant promoter payable by the respondent allottee is at Rs.3,25,949/-. The interest for the delayed period payable to the allottee, however, was not incorporated in the computation. The demand is, therefore, defective and not as per Section 18(1). It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the promoter that delay interest component at Rs.6,86,300/- in terms of Section 18(1) has been duly deposited, before this Tribunal in compliance of the mandate of Section 43(5) of Act, 2016, duly computed in terms of the decree.

# 20. In the aforenoted backdrop, respondent allottee submits that respondent is not entitled to pay holding charges, as the unit was withheld by the appellant illegally by submitting defective and illegal offer of possession dated 17.03.2021. It is further urged that maintenance charges, as per the terms and conditions of the BBA, was duly deposited for one year, in advance. The maintenance charges due and payable by the allottee shall commence after one year from the date of taking over physical possession of the unit. In other words, it is urged by the allottee that he cannot be held liable to pay the money, being demanded by the promoter, as the promoter was in default and not the allottee. The promoter cannot take advantage of its own wrong by withholding possession of the unit at the expense of the allottee.

# 21. Having regard to the computation, on admitted facts, respondent allottee would be entitled to receive from the promoter Rs.6,58,300/- deposited before this Tribunal and Rs.1,50,000/- towards refund of car parking charges i.e. Rs.8,36,300/-. The appellant promoter would be entitled to charge delay interest from the respondent allottee at Rs.1,21,921/-. In other words, respondent allottee upon adjustment of claims is entitled to receive Rs.7,14,007/-. (Rs. 8,36,300 – Rs. 1,21,921)

# 22. Learned counsel for the allottee submits that the amount deposited in compliance of Section 43(5) in terms of the impugned order was computed for the period w.e.f. 13.08.2019 to 17.03.2021. He, however, submits that the delay period in offering possession of the unit would commence w.e.f. 14.08.2020 i.e. the date OC/CC was obtained till the date of physical

possession of the unit. The appellant promoter on being confronted, does not dispute the commencement date for computing the delay interest i.e. w.e.f. 14.08.2020.

# 23. The questions are accordingly answered-

# 24. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, both appeals (76/2026 & D 468/2023) are disposed of by passing the following orders. 

• (i). Respondent allottee shall be entitled to interest for the delayed period in terms of Section 18(1) of Act, 2016 w.e.f. 15.08.2020 till the date of handing over physical possession of the unit in habitable condition at MCLR+1 percent.

• (ii) The conveyance/lease deed of the unit to be executed by the promoter within one month from the date of uploading of this order, thereafter, physical possession of the unit in habitable condition shall be handed over to the allottee within three months thereafter. The expenses towards conveyance deed to be borne by the allottee.

• (iii) The respondent promoter shall allot stilt parking for the allotted unit in terms of builder buyer agreement dated 23.08.2016.

• (iv) The impugned order dated 09.01.2023 shall stand modified to the extent hereinabove.

• (v). No order as to cost.

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Kanakia Spaces Realty Pvt Ltd vs Mr. Subhash Mahadappa Panchgalle - We are therefore in agreement with the conclusion reached by the learned Authority that the Allottee's entitlement to interest crystallised upon the Promoter's failure to handover possession within the agreed period and it continued till actual handing over possession of the subject flat. Acceptance of possession thereafter does not amount to waiver of such accrued statutory right unless there is a conscious express relinquishment thereof, which is absent in the present case.

 REAT Mumbai (2026.08.06) in  Kanakia Spaces Realty Pvt Ltd vs Mr. Subhash Mahadappa Panchgalle   [Appeal No. AT006000000093932 of 2022 IN Complaint No. CC006000000192401] held that;

• We are therefore in agreement with the conclusion reached by the learned Authority that the Allottee's entitlement to interest crystallised upon the Promoter's failure to handover possession within the agreed period and it continued till actual handing over possession of the subject flat. Acceptance of possession thereafter does not amount to waiver of such accrued statutory right unless there is a conscious express relinquishment thereof, which is absent in the present case.

Excerpts of the Order; 

This captioned appeal arises from the impugned order dated  12th May 2022 passed b the Member - 1, Maharashtra Real Estate  Regulatory Authority (for short 'the Authority') in Complaint No.   CC006000000192401 filed by the Allottee seeking interest for  delayed possession, wherein the said complaint was partly allowed. 

# 2. For the sake of convenience, "Appellant" will hereinafter be referred  to as "Promoter" and "Respondent" will hereinafter be referred to as  "Allottee". 

# 3. The brief facts, as borne out from the pleadings, documents placed  on record, and the impugned order, revealed that the Allottee  purchased Flat No.3205 on the 32nd floor of 'C' Wing in the project  known as "Levels", situated at Malad (East), Taluka Borivali,  Mumbai. An Agreement for Sale dated 01.02.2017 was executed  between the parties for a total consideration of Rs.2,01,59,220/-,  wherein the date of possession was mentioned as on or before  October 2018, with a grace period of six months, thereby making  March 2019 as the contractual date of possession. It is an admitted  position that the Allottee has paid approximately 80% of the total  consideration amount, while the balance amount was payable at the  time of handing over possession. It is not in dispute that the  Occupancy Certificate was obtained on 10.10.2019 and possession  of the flat was handed over to the Allottee on 05.11.2019. 

# 4. Learned Advocate Mr. Vikramjit Garewal, appearing for the  Appellant/Promoter, submitted that the Respondent/Allottee filed  the complaint before the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory   Authority on 27.04.2020, nearly five months after accepting  possession of the subject flat, alleging delayed possession. According to him, once the Allottee accepted possession after making full and final settlement, without any protest, no surviving cause of action remained to claim interest for delayed possession or any other relief under the RERA Act, 2016. 

# 5. The learned Counsel for the Appellant/Promoter further submitted that the project registration under the RERA Act, 2016 was initially valid up to 31.10.2019, and was subsequently extended from time to time up to 30.04.2021. It was contended that Clause 13 of the Agreement for Sale entitled the Promoter to reasonable extension of time for handing over possession of the said flat in the event of delays caused by circumstances beyond the control of the Appellant/Promoter. It was contended that even the Respondent/Allottee had accepted the said contractual stipulation without any objection. Moreover, Section 18 of Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 would apply only when the project is incomplete, or the Promoter is unable to handover possession and therefore, once possession has been delivered to the Allottee, after obtaining Occupancy Certificate, the provisions of Section 18 cease to operate. 

 

# 6. The learned Counsel for the Appellant/Promoter further submitted that the said flat was handed over on 05.11.2019 with full and final settlement upon receipt of Occupancy Certificate. If the Allottee/ Respondent was aggrieved by alleged delay, the complaint ought to have been filed before accepting possession of the subject flat. It is evident that merely reserving the right to claim interest would not confer any enforceable cause of action after possession had been accepted. Therefore, the complaint was filed with mala fide intentions, to extract unethical money from the Appellant/Promoter. Hence, the Appellant prayed that the said impugned order should be quashed and set aside. 

# 7. Per contra, learned Advocate Mr. Aman Shukla appearing for the Respondent/Allottee submitted that the Allottee has complied with all obligations under Agreement for Sale and had paid approximately 80% of the total consideration amount well before the completionof the project in November 2019. Upon the Promoter raising final demand of 20%, the payment was paid within five (5) days by the Allottee. Notwithstanding such prompt compliance by the Allottee, the said flat possession was not given on the agreed date i.e. October 2018 or after six months grace period i.e. March 2019. Therefore, being aggrieved by the delay, the Allottee has exercised the statutory right to get interest for delayed possession and filed complaint before the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority in April 2020. 

# 8. The learned Counsel for the Respondent/Allottee placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of UP & Anr. [Civil Appeal No(s). 6745-6749 of 2021 (Arising out SLP(Civil) No(s). 3711-3715 of 2021], decided on 11th November 2021, particularly paragraphs 25 and 78, as well as the judgment of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court, in Neelkamal Realtors Suburban Pvt.  Ltd. and Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors. [writ petition No. 2737 of  2017], decided on 6th December 2017, particularly paragraphs 258  and 261. In view of the above, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held  that the right conferred upon an Allottee, under Section 18 of the RERA Act 2016, is unqualified, unconditional, and absolute, regardless of unforeseen events, including stay orders of the Court/Tribunal, or any other reasons stated to be beyond the control of the Promoter. It was further submitted that there is no bar of limitation to seek right of an Allottee to claim interest under Section 18 of RERA Act, 2016. Therefore, the contentions of the Promoter  in the present appeal are baseless and devoid of merit. 

# 9. The learned Counsel for the Respondent/Allottee further submitted  that the extension of the project completion date under RERA  registration does not rewrite or alter the contractual obligations  under the Agreement for Sale. In support of this proposition,  reliance was placed upon judgment of the Hon'ble Bombay High  Court in Neelkamal Realtors Suburban Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. vs. Union  of India and Ors. (supra) in para No. 256 of the judgment, inter alia,  held as follows: 

• "256. Section 4(2)(1)(C) enables the promoter to revise  the date of completion of project and hand over  possession. The provisions of RERA, however, do not  rewrite the clause of completion or handing over  possession in agreement for sale. Section 4(2)(1)(C) enables the promoter to give fresh time line independent  of the time period stipulated in the agreements for sale  entered into between him and the allottees so that he is  not visited with penal consequences laid down under  RERA. In other words, by giving opportunity to the promoter to prescribe fresh time line under Section 4(2)(1)(C) he is not absolved of the liability under the  agreement for sale" 

The Promoter has failed to furnish any satisfactory explanation  for the delay in obtaining Occupancy Certificate and in handing  over possession. Obtaining all statutory approvals, including  Occupancy Certificate, within the agreed timeline is the sole  responsibility of the Promoter. Delay attributable to failure in  securing such approvals cannot be shifted onto the Allottee. It  was therefore contended that the Promoter cannot escape its  statutory and contractual obligations by relying upon the  extension of project registration period under RERA Act.  Therefore, the Allottee continues to be entitled to interest for the  delayed period under Section 18 of the RERA Act, 2016. 

# 10. Learned Advocate Mr. Vikramjit Garewal appearing for the  Appellant/Promoter has placed reliance on the following judgment:  In the case of Linker Shelter Pvt. Ltd. versus Charmaine  Chougule, Adult & Anr. [Second Appeal No. 391 of 2025 with  Interim Application No. 10454 of 2024] decided by the Hon'ble  Bombay High Court on 18th July 2025. 

# 11. Learned Advocate Mr. Aman Shukla appearing for the  Respondent/Allottee has placed reliance on the following  judgments: 

• i. In the case of Park  Xpress JV Through Its Partner Mr. Shravan  D. Agarwal V/s. Sagar H. Saboo and Ors. [Second Appeal no.  180 of 2024 with Interim Application No.6716 of 2024] decided by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court on 22 March 2024. 

• i. In the case of Kalpraj Dharamshi & Anr. Versus Kotak  Investment Advisors Ltd. & Anr. [ in Civil Appeal Nos. 2943- 2944 of 2020] decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. 

• iii. In the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation mLimited and Another Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Another  [(1986) 3 SCC 156 in Civil Appeal No. 4412 of 1985] decided  by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. 

• iv. n the case of Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. Versus  Govindan Raghavan [in Civil Appeal No.12238 of 2018 (with  Civil Appeal No. 1677 of 2019)] decided by the Hon'ble  Supreme Court of India on 2 April, 2019. 

• v. In the case of Ashley Neil Serrao Vs. Propel Developers Pvt.  Ltd. (Appeal No. AT006000000052874)] passed by the  Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai on 31  January 2023. 

# 12. After considering the submissions advanced by the learned Advocate  Mr. Vikramjit Garewal appearing for Appellant/Promoter and learned  Advocate Mr. Aman Shukla appearing for Respondent/Allottee,  pleadings of the parties, impugned order and various documents  placed on record, the points arise for our consideration and findings  thereupon for the reasons to follow are as below: 

Sr. Nos.	Points	Findings
	Whether the impugned order dated 12.05.2022 passed by the Member-1,MahaRERA, in the Complaint No.  CC006000000192401 filed by the Respondent/Allottee,  warrants interference in the captioned appeal?	In the  negative
	Whether the Appellant/Promoter is  entitled to relief sought in the  captioned appeal?	In the  negative
	What Order?	As per final Order

REASONS 

# 13. On examination of pleadings of the parties, material placed on record and submissions advanced by learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties revealed that the Appellant/Promoter has developed project known as "Levels" situated at Malad (East),Mumbai. The Respondent/Allottee has booked the subject flat for a total consideration of Rs.2,01,59,220/-. As per the Agreement for Sale, possession was agreed to be handed over by October 2018, with a grace period of six months, making the agreed date of possession March 2019. It is not in dispute that the Respondent/Allottee has paid 80% of total consideration amount and possession was handed over on 05.11.2019 after obtaining Occupancy Certificate on 10.10.2019. 

# 14. It is the case of the Appellant/Promoter  that the Respondent/Allottee accepted possession of the subject flat on 05.11.2019 by making full and final settlement and thereafter filed the complaint before the learned Authority on 27.04.2020, which is much after the possession was handed over to the Respondent/Allottee. According to the Appellant/Promoter, once possession was accepted, no independent cause of action survived for claiming interest under Section 18 of the RERA Act. The moot question before us is whether the Allottee, having taken possession of the flat by making full and final settlement, is precluded from claiming interest for delayed possession under Section 18 RERA Act, 2016. 

# 15. Section 18 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 recognises the right of Allottee to claim interest for delay in handing over possession, within the stipulated time limit for taking steps to seek relief as provided thereunder. The said provision casts an obligation upon the Promoter that in case of delay in possession, it shall be liable to pay interest on the consideration amount paid by the Allottee, if the Allottee elects not to withdraw from the project. While explaining the scope of Allottee's right under Section 18 of RERA Act, 2016, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. V/s. State of UP & Anr (supra) in observed in paragraph 25 as under: 

• "Para 25. The unqualified right of the allottee to seek refund referred under Section 18(1)(a) and Section 19(4) of the Act is not dependent on any contingencies or stipulations thereof. It appears that the legislature has consciously provided this right of refund on demand as an unconditional absolute right to the allottee, if the promoter fails to give possession of the apartment, plot or building within the time stipulated under the terms of the agreement regardless of unforeseen events or stay orders of the Court/Tribunal, which is in either way not attributable to the allottee/home buyer, the promoter is under an obligation to refund the amount on demand with interest at the rate prescribed by the State Government including compensation in the manner provided under the Act with the proviso that if the allottee does not wish to withdraw from the project, he shall be entitled for interest for the period of delay till handing over possession at the rate prescribed." 

It is clearly indicated that the statutory entitlement under Section 18 of RERA is founded on the Promoter's failure to deliver possession  within the agreed timeline. The said entitlement is not extinguished because possession is subsequently offered or because the project completion date stands revised for regulatory purposes. Thus, the subsequent receipt of Occupancy Certificate or extension of the project's registration does not take away the accrued right of the Allottee to claim interest for the period of delay. 

16. A perusal of Section 18 of Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 makes it evident that the Promoter is obligated to hand over possession on the agreed date as per the Agreement for Sale. The date so specified in Agreement for Sale or in any other manner 

or form is sacrosanct and neither RERA nor Promoter can rewrite the same without the consent of the Allottees. This signifies that Section 18 of RERA would operate only when possession is handed over within the specified date however, where possession is handed over beyond the agreed and specified date, the consequences contemplated under Section 18 automatically follow. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Imperia Structures Ltd. Vs. Anil Patni & Anr. [in Civil Appeal No. 3581-3590 of 2020] has held as under: 

• "23. In terms of Section 18 of the RERA Act, if a promoter fails to complete or is unable to give possession of an apartment duly completed....... by the date specified in the agreement, the Promoter would be liable, on demand, to return the amount received by him in respect of that apartment if the allottee wishes to withdraw from the Project. Such right of an allottee is specifically made "without prejudice to any other remedy available to him" The right so given to the allottee is unqualified and if availed, the money deposited by the allottee has to be refunded with interest at such rate as may be prescribed. The proviso to Section 18(1) contemplates a situation where the allottee does not intend to withdraw from the Project. In that case he is entitled to and must be paid interest for every month of delay till the handing over of the possession. It is upto the allottee to proceed either under Section 18(1) or under proviso to Section 18(1)." 

# 17. Section 18 of RERA Act, 2016 gives an option to Allottee to claim interest on the amount paid on failure of Promoter to adhere to his contractual or statutory obligation. The provisions of RERA ensure that Allottee's money is not misutilised or unreasonably held by the Promoter, while assuring completion of project in a time-bound manner. We are therefore in agreement with the conclusion reached by the learned Authority that the Allottee's entitlement to interest crystallised upon the Promoter's failure to handover possession within the agreed period and it continued till actual handing over possession of the subject flat. Acceptance of possession thereafter does not amount to waiver of such accrued statutory right unless there is a conscious express relinquishment thereof, which is absent in the present case. 

# 18. In view of the foregoing reasons and in light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we have come to the conclusion that the learned Authority is justified in granting relief of interest to the Allottee under Section 18 of the Real Estate (Regulation and 

Development) Act, 2016. As a result, the impugned order warrants no interference in the present appeal. Consequently, we answer point Nos. 1 to 2 in the negative and accordingly proceed to pass the following order. 

ORDER 

1. Appeal No. AT006000000093932 of 2022 is dismissed. 

2. Parties to bear their own costs. 

3. Copy of this order be communicated to the learned Authority and respective parties as per Section 44(4) of the RERA Act, 2016. 

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Tejas J. Shah & Amisha T. Shah & Ors. Vs. Mantri Technology Constellations Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.,- In our view, this approach is erroneous. In the present case, Respondent No.1 alone is the corporate debtor against whom the CIRP has been initiated. No independent moratorium or independent protection operates in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 to 7. In the absence of any legal bar against continuation of proceedings qua the said respondents, the NCDRC was not justified in rejecting appellants’ prayer to proceed with the complaint against the rest of the respondents.

 SCI (2026.07.27) in  Tejas J. Shah & Amisha T. Shah & Ors. Vs. Mantri Technology Constellations Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.,  [2026 INSC 746, C.A.Nos.4289-4290 OF 2025 ] held that;

• In our view, this approach is erroneous. In the present case, Respondent No.1 alone is the corporate debtor against whom the CIRP has been initiated. No independent moratorium or independent protection operates in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 to 7. In the absence of any legal bar against continuation of proceedings qua the said respondents, the NCDRC was not justified in rejecting appellants’ prayer to  proceed with the complaint against the rest of the respondents.

• Having itself observed that the liability arising from deficiency in service are yet to be determined, it could not have simultaneously concluded that the alleged deficiency was attributable only to Respondent No. 1 and therefore no complaint could proceed against the rest.

• The question was whether, in the absence of any moratorium operating in their favour, the consumer complaint could proceed against them. In the absence of any such statutory bar, the Commission was required to adjudicate the complaint against the said respondents and determine, upon consideration of the rival pleadings and objections, whether any liability could ultimately be fastened upon them.

• It was not open to the Commission to foreclose that  inquiry at the interlocutory stage. The impugned order cannot be sustained as it declines to undertake the said exercise.

Excerpts of the Order; 

# 1. The present civil appeals arise out of the judgment and order dated 20.01.2025 passed by National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission1 in I.A. No. 15656 of 2024 and I.A. No. 14200 of 2024 in Consumer Complaint No. 13 of 2023, whereby the NCDRC rejected the applications seeking continuation of consumer complaint against Respondent Nos. 2 to 7 in view of the moratorium 1 Hereinafter referred to as NCDRC.

of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 20162, and adjourned the complaint sine die.

# 2. The facts giving rise to the present appeals are as follows:

2.1. The appellants are homebuyers who had booked residential apartments in a project namely ‘Mantri Manyata Energia’ which was being developed by Respondent No. 1, Mantri Technology Constellations Private Limited (now known as Buoyant Technology Constellations Private Limited). Respondent No. 2, Mantri Developers Pvt. Ltd. is a company alleged to have been associated with the development of the said project. Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 are alleged to be the promoters/ directors of Respondent No. 1 and 2 companies, while Respondent No.6 and 7 are the landowners of the project land. Pursuant to the transaction, construction agreements and agreements for sale in respect of undivided share in the project land came to be executed between the appellants and Respondent No. 1 in 2016. As per the terms of the agreement, possession of the apartments was to be handed over on or before 31.12.2018.

2.2. According to the appellants, despite substantial payment of the sale consideration coupled with repeated assurances regarding completion of the project, possession of the apartments was not delivered within the stipulated time. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants, along with other homebuyers instituted Consumer Case No. 13 of 2023 before NCDRC alleging deficiency in service and unfair trade practices against Respondent Nos. 1 to 7. 

2.3. During the pendency of the consumer complaint, the National Company Law Tribunal3, Bengaluru Bench, by an order dated 23.08.2024, admitted an application under Section 9 of the IBC against Respondent No.1 and initiated the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (for short, CIRP) as a result of which a moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC came to be imposed against Respondent No.1.

2.4. In view of the subsequent development, the appellants filed I.A. No. 14200 of 2024 before the NCDRC, placing the order of the NCLT and praying that notwithstanding the moratorium operating against Respondent No.1, the consumer complaint be reheard and proceeded with against Respondent Nos. 2 to 7.

2.5. Thereafter, the appellants filed I.A. No. 15656 of 2024 seeking rehearing of I.A. No. 14200 of 2024 and reiterating their prayer for continuing the hearing of the consumer complaint against the rest of the respondents.

2.6. By the impugned order dated 20.01.2025, the NCDRC rejected the aforesaid applications holding, inter alia, that the liability of Respondent Nos. 2 to 7 could not be independently examined at that stage in view of the moratorium operating against Respondent No.1, and consequently adjourned the consumer complaint sine die. 2.7. It is this order which is being assailed before us.

# 3. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. D. Seshadri Naidu, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 2, Mr. Sajan Povayya, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 6 and 7, Mr. Shekhar G Devasa, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 3, 4 and 5 and Mr. Ashutosh Dubey, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1.

# 4. After examining the material placed on record, it can be concluded that the issue involved before us lies in  a narrow compass. The limited question is whether the NCDRC was justified in rejecting the IAs filed by the appellants on account of the moratorium operating against Respondent No.1.

# 5. In order to answer that, we must begin with an understanding of Section 14 IBC. The statute provides that once the insolvency process has begun and a moratorium is declared, among other things, the continuation of pending suits and proceedings against the corporate debtor, including execution proceedings, comes to an automatic halt. The object of this moratorium is to preserve the assets of the corporate debtor during the insolvency resolution proceedings and to facilitate an orderly resolution.

# 6. The scope of the moratorium is statutory. It is not open either to the adjudicating authority or the Court to enlarge its ambit beyond what the statute contemplates. A plain reading of the provision makes it clear that the moratorium operates against the corporate debtor alone. No other category, whether it be any subsidiary company, any managers/ directors, personal guarantors etc. can be added to it unless specifically provided. This Court in P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd.4 while discussing the scope of applicability of the moratorium on Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 proceedings, noted that Section 14 applied only to the corporate debtor and that natural persons can be held liable under the Act.

# 7. Again in Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association v. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd.5 wherein a consumer complaint was filed against the developers, this Court held that a moratorium against the corporate debtor does not give protection to the promoters and directors of the corporate debtor and that proceedings can continue against them.

# 8. A similar approach is reflected in the decision of this Court in Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal.6 Though the case arose in context of Section 96 IBC, the underlying principle remains instructive. It was held that the protective sweep of a moratorium must remain in the four walls as carved out by the statute. It ought not be expanded in a manner that stultifies remedies envisaged under the Consumer Protection Act, unless expressly provided. The object of the Code is to facilitate the resolution process and not to eclipse the statutory remedies.

# 9. Viewed in this backdrop, the appellants had preferred I.A. No. 15656 of 2024 and I.A. No. 14200 of 2024 urging the NCDRC to proceed with the consumer complaint against Respondent Nos. 2-7, notwithstanding the moratorium operating against Respondent No.1, the corporate debtor.

# 10. The NCDRC, however, rejected the aforesaid applications. It observed that the liability arising from the allegations of deficiency in service was yet to be determined. At the same time, it held that the alleged deficiency pertained only to Respondent No.1 since all agreements for construction and sale were entered into between the appellants and respondent No.1. As a result of which, the proceedings could not be split up to continue against the remaining respondents.

# 11. In our view, this approach is erroneous. In the present case, Respondent No.1 alone is the corporate debtor against whom the CIRP has been initiated. No independent moratorium or independent protection operates in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 to 7. In the absence of any legal bar against continuation of proceedings qua the said respondents, the NCDRC was not justified in rejecting appellants’ prayer to  proceed with the complaint against the rest of the respondents.

# 12. The impugned order proceeds on the premise that since the alleged deficiency in service was attributable only to Respondent No.1, no independent proceedings could continue against the remaining respondents. In doing so, the Commission effectively answered the very question which was yet to be adjudicated. Having itself observed that the liability arising from deficiency in service are yet to be determined, it could not have simultaneously concluded that the alleged deficiency was attributable only to Respondent No. 1 and therefore no complaint could proceed against the rest.

# 13. The question that fell for consideration while deciding the interlocutory applications was not whether Respondent Nos.2 to 7 were liable. The question was whether, in the absence of any moratorium operating in their favour, the consumer complaint could proceed against them. In the absence of any such statutory bar, the Commission was required to adjudicate the complaint against the said respondents and determine, upon consideration of the rival pleadings and objections, whether any liability could ultimately be fastened upon them. It was not open to the Commission to foreclose that  inquiry at the interlocutory stage. The impugned order cannot be sustained as it declines to undertake the said exercise.

# 14. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants urged that this Court may proceed to allow the consumer complaint and grant the reliefs claimed therein. We are unable to accede to that submission. The respondents have raised several objections, including absence of privity of contract, maintainability of the complaint and the absence of any independent obligation under the agreements. Since all the objections are yet to be decided by the NCDRC, it would not be appropriate for this Court to undertake that exercise for the first time in the present appeal. Thus, we refrain from expressing any opinion on the merits of the rival contentions.

# 15. For the reasons mentioned above, the impugned order cannot be sustained. The appeals are partly allowed.

# 16. Accordingly, we set aside the rejection of I.A. No. 15656 of 2024 and I.A. No. 14200 of 2024. The said applications are hereby allowed. The NCDRC shall proceed to hear the Consumer Complaint No.13 of 2023.

# 17. Needless to clarify, the proceedings against Respondent No.1 shall continue to remain governed  by the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC. The NCDRC shall dispose of the complaint, insofar as Respondent Nos.2 to 7 are concerned, in accordance with law.

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