Wednesday, 26 August 2026

Om Metals Consortium Pvt. Ltd. vs Sharad Kumar Bhandari - The only litmus test to exclude the period is that if the delay attributed by the conduct of an allottee but if the delay is in either way not attributable to the allottee/homebuyer then, the promoter is under an obligation to refund the amount on demand with interest whether the promoter is defaulter or not during litigation process. The basis behind it that complainant-allottee should not be suffered for the litigation between the competent authorities and promoter without any fault on the part of allottees.

 REAT Jaipur (2026.08.25) in  Om Metals Consortium Pvt. Ltd.  vs  Sharad Kumar Bhandari [Appeal No.75/2023 In : Complaint No.RAJ-RERA-C-2022-5399] held that;

  • It is evidently clear from the verdict of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that on the basis of unforeseen events or stay orders of the court/Tribunal, the period cannot be excluded if the delay is not attributed to the allottee/homebuyer.

  • The only litmus test to exclude the period is that if the delay attributed by the conduct of an allottee but if the delay is in either way not attributable to the allottee/homebuyer then, the promoter is under an obligation to refund the amount on demand with interest whether the promoter is defaulter or not during litigation process. The basis behind it that complainant-allottee should not be suffered for the litigation between the competent authorities and promoter without any fault on the part of allottees.

  • therefore, it is appropriate to grant delay interest to the respondent-allottee from September, 2016 till filing of this appeal i.e. 06/07/2023 excluding moratorium period of 12 months due to Covid-19 Pandemic. The impugned-order dated 23/05/2023 is, therefore, required to be modified to this extent.


Excerpts of the Order

The present appeal has been filed under Section 44 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (hereinafter be referred to as the “RERA Act, 2016”) arises out of the impugned order dated 23/05/2023 passed by the Rajasthan Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as “Regulatory Authority”) in Complaint No: RAJ-RERA-C-2022-5399.


2) As per memo of appeal, the brief facts of the case are that the complainant booked a unit in Tower ‘G’ on 5th floor in the project “Pallacia” on Prithvi Raj Road, C-Scheme, Jaipur for a sale consideration of Rs.226.18 lakh. An Agreement for Sale was executed on 07/06/2013, according to which, a Construction Linked Payment Plan was agreed between the two and the possession of the flat was agreed to be given within 30 months from the date of execution of the Agreement i.e. by December 2015. The complainant deposited the entire sale consideration of Rs.227.11 lakh till December, 2015 making it 100% payment, as agreed to in the Agreement for Sale but the appellant-promoter failed to complete the project by the agreed date. In fact, more than six years have passed since the promised date of completion but the unit has still not been delivered. The entire payment was made only after an assurance given by the appellant-promoter that the unit would be completed by September, 2016. The project was lapsed as per the RERA website, no valid completion certificate has been obtained and no QPRs have been filed by the promoter after 2021. The complainant could not receive the offer of possession in a project. The project has not yet obtained a valid completion certificate thereby making serious violation of Sections 12 and 18 of the RERA Act, 2016 and, therefore, requested the court to direct the promoter to complete the project at the earliest and hand over the possession of the unit and interest from the promised date of possession till handing over of the actual possession of the flat. One Mr. Nirmal Nahata filed a writ petition, being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.15241/2013, Nirmal Nahata v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., before the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court in August 2013. The Hon’ble High Court, vide order dated 27/08/2013, restrained the Appellant from carrying out any construction in the project. Thereafter, the petitioner, Mr. Nirmal Nahata, filed an SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, bearing SLP Nos. 5800-5801/2014. However, the said SLP was withdrawn as the Hon’ble Apex Court declined to grant any indulgence. This time, JDA issued a notice dated 21/12/2013 to the Appellant intimating that design changes have been made in the staircase, lift and ramp and thereafter issued another letter dated 09/01/2014, stating that the constructions on site are against the approved plans. The notice stated that work should be immediately stopped. This notice and letter were challenged by Appellant before JDA Appellate Tribunal and the JDA Appellate Tribunal vide order dated 26/02/2014 directed Appellant to appear before JDA and directed JDA not to take action till decision is taken by JDA. JDA again issued notice dated 14/05/2014 to the Appellant Company that design changes made to staircase, lift column, ramp and therefore, the entire work of the project should be stopped immediately. Aggrieved by this notice, Appellant Company went to the JDA Appellate Tribunal. Again JDA issued notices dated 10/10/2014, intimating Company to stop work as period of temporary fire NOC had expired. Aggrieved by this notice, Company again went to the JDA Appellate Tribunal. That JDA issued another notice dated 07/04/2016 on the ground that Company had concealed that as per lease-deed issued by Jaipur State to the original owner in the year 1944, only a dwelling house could be made and as per existing bye-laws a building of more than 15-meter height could not be constructed. This notice was issued by JDA, even though the JDA not only had the entire record of the plot, but even the maps were approved by JDA itself. Further, even though these issues had already been decided by the Hon’ble High Court, in spite of that, present notice was issued and Company was directed to stop work immediately. Aggrieved by this notice, Company filed Appeal before the JDA Appellate Tribunal. Tribunal directed JDA to hear the Company before taking any action against the Company. JDA again issued another notice on 28/07/2016 and informed the Company that Building Plans approved on 18/05/2012 are cancelled. The Company again rushed to the JDA Appellate Tribunal.


The Jaipur Development Authority accepted and acknowledged the overall delay caused in continuance and completion of the project between the period 2012 to 2017 and therefore, sought permission from Department of Urban Development & Housing to extend the time period of project. The UDH Department approved the same and accordingly, issued a letter dated 24/05/2018 to JDA and Appellant Company, whereby time period for completion of construction was extended from 30/04/2019 to 12/02/2021. By this approval, a cumulative extension of 654 days was given to the Appellant Company to complete the construction, without levying any charges or penalty. The project was completed in January, 2021 and Appellant submitted a letter dated 06/01/2021 to Jaipur Development Authority intimating about completion of work and requested for issuance of Completion Certificate. JDA issued the completion certificate on 20/07/2021, which shows that construction was completed prior to 22/03/2021, as per Inspection Committee’s report. Thereafter, the Occupancy Certificate was issued on 28/04/2022. The project was duly registered with RERA with estimated finish date 17/05/2019. An extension was granted for a period of 12 months taking the end date 17/05/2020. During Covid-19, further extension was granted till 17/05/2021. Such extension was on account of force majeure. The last extension was thereafter granted on 12/08/2021, valid until 17/05/2022 (for reasons other than force majeure). Complaint No: RAJ-RERA-C-2022-5399 was disposed of vide order dated 23/05/2023. The operative portion of the said order is reproduced hereunder:-

  • “Accordingly, we direct the respondent promoter to pay an interest for every month of delay from September, 2016 till the handing over possession of the flat on the amount paid by the complainant at the rate prescribed in the Rajasthan Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2017 at SBI highest MCLR+2%, i.e., 8.60+2=10.60%. We also direct the respondent to hand over the possession of the allotted unit to the complainant without any further delay with the condition that any further delay of every month the interest on total amount paid by the complainant to respondent will continue to be paid by the respondent.

  • The prayer of the complainant regarding additional charges has also caught our attention. The demand for additional charges in addition to the amount agreed to between the complainant and the respondent in the Agreement for Sale has been opposed by the complainant stating that this was beyond the Agreement for Sale and is being attempted to be extracted from the complainant by pressuring him unnecessarily. This has neither rebutted by the respondent nor any counter argument has been made against this. This amount is unjustified and cannot be allowed to be received by the respondent as, in any case, it is not as per the Agreement for Sale and is not allowed to be charged.

  • The respondent shall make the compliance of this order within 45 days from the date of this order”.


3) Hence, this appeal with the following prayer: -

  • “In view of the facts mentioned in paragraph 5 above, Appellant prays for the following relief(s) :

  • (A) It is declared that Project “Pallacia” of the Appellant is complete and compliant of RERA requirements, as Completion Certificate and Occupancy Certificate have already been issued;

  • (B) Impugned order dated 23/05/2023 passed by the RERA Authority, Jaipur may kindly be quashed and set-aside to the extent, it imposes liability of payment of interest on Appellant Company from the year 2016.

  • (C) It be declared that Appellant is not liable to payment of interest from year 2016, as the situations were beyond its control and therefore, the interest liability be suitably calculated from the year 2020, taken to be the reasonable time of completion of project, as held by RERA Authority in the impugned-order.

  • (D) Appropriate directions be issued to RERA Authority, Jaipur for taking action against concerned persons, for showing a completed project to have “Lapsed” on website of RERA, Jaipur”.


4) Mr. S.S. Hora, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-promoter while referring to the Agreement for Sale executed between the parties, drew the attention of the Tribunal to Clause 9 thereof, relating to possession. It was submitted that subject to the occurrence of any force majeure event, the developer was required to hand over peaceful possession of the apartment to the purchaser within a period of 30 months from the date of execution of the Agreement for Sale. It was submitted that the Agreement for Sale was executed on 07/06/2012 and after taking into consideration the contractual grace period of 9 months, the stipulated period for handing over possession came to an end on 06/09/2016.


It was therefore, argued that in the absence of any force majeure event, possession was contractually required to be handed over by 06/09/2016. Learned counsel further argued that the respondent had paid the entire sale consideration in 2015, even before the same became due in terms of the agreed payment schedule. According to learned counsel, the said payment was made on the advice of a person from the Income Tax Department and was not made in accordance with the payment plan stipulated under the Agreement for Sale. It was argued that the appellant cannot be prejudiced on account of such premature payment by the respondent.


4.1) Learned counsel drew the attention of the Tribunal to two Public Interest Litigations filed before the Hon’ble High Court by which stay order granted by the learned Single Judge on 27/08/2013 was set aside by the Division Bench by a common order both, in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.895/2013 : Om Metals Consortium Pvt. Ltd. v. Nirmal Nahata & Ors. and in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15241/2013, Nirmal Nahata v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.


4.2) Learned counsel argued that the aforesaid proceedings were thereafter carried before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. During the pendency of the matter, the Jaipur Development Authority (JDA) also intervened in the matter and raised objections regarding the legality of the project and issued various notices, thereby causing substantial obstruction in the progress of construction.


4.3) Learned counsel argued that the JDA Appellate Tribunal, vide order dated 07/10/2016, allowed the appeal preferred by the appellant. The said order was thereafter challenged by the JDA before the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court by way filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos.407/2017 & 408/2017. Vide order dated 06/07/2017, the Hon’ble High Court declined to interfere with the order dated 07/10/2016 passed by the JDA Appellate Tribunal.


It was thus argued that during the period from August 2013 to July 2017, the appellant remained embroiled in various judicial and statutory proceedings and on account thereof, construction activities were repeatedly stopped. Learned counsel submitted that every time, the construction work was resumed, further proceedings or interventions resulted in its interruption, and considerable time was consequently consumed in restarting and progressing the construction. According to learned counsel, the aforesaid circumstances were squarely covered by the force majeure clause contained in the Agreement for Sale.


4.4) Learned counsel further referred to a letter dated 24/05/2018 issued by the Jaipur Nagar Nigam, wherein it was stated that on account of orders passed by the JDA and the State Government, construction work remained stopped for a total period of 654 days. It was further submitted that the appellant obtained the Completion Certificate dated 06/01/2021, which was issued by the JDA on 20/07/2021 and that the Occupancy Certificate was subsequently issued on 28/04/2024.


4.5) Learned counsel also referred to the extensions granted to the appellant on account of the COVID-19 pandemic, namely, the 1st extension from 18/05/2020 to 17/05/2021 and 2nd extension from 18/05/2021 to 17/05/2022.


4.6) Learned counsel submitted that having recorded the aforesaid finding that the litigation in respect of the project came to an end only in October 2017, the learned Authority could not have simultaneously awarded delay interest with effect from September 2016. According to learned counsel, the findings recorded in the impugned order are mutually inconsistent and render the order self-contradictory.


4.7) Learned counsel further argued that under the Agreement executed on 07/06/2013, which was a Construction-Linked Agreement, his right to receive payment arose progressively as each floor of the building was constructed. By force majeure event, the Developer will hand over peaceful possession of the said Apartment to the Purchaser within a period of 30 months from the date of execution of the Agreement of the Apartment, excluding a grace period of 9 months or such further time period as may be agreed between the parties or except in cases where physical delivery has been withheld by the Developer on ground stated elsewhere in this Agreement, subject to the Purchaser making timely payments of the instalments towards the Total Sale Price for the ultimate sale of the said Apartment, as mentioned herein above and the Purchaser duly observing all the terms and conditions contained herein. Provided that the Developer shall be entitled to reasonable extension of time for giving delivery of said Apartment on the aforesaid date, if the completion of Building in which the said Apartment are situated is delayed on account of:- 

  • (i) war, civil commotion, slowdown or strikes of workmen or labourers or other persons or agencies employed to be employed by the Developer, transport strike, riots, terrorist attack or an act of God, irresistible force or reasons beyond the control of or unforeseen by the Developer and/or 

  • (ii) any legislation of Union Parliament or State Legislature, notice, order, rule, circular, notification of Union or State Government and/or other public or other competent authority or court or injunction or stay or prohibitory orders or directions passed by any court, tribunal body or authority and/or 

  • (iii) other force majeure and vis major circumstances or conditions including but not limited to the liability of process of general shortage of energy, labour equipment, facilities, materials or supplies failure of transportation and action of labour unions or other causes beyond the control of or unforeseen by the Developer or the agents. In law, regulations, rules or orders issued by any court or government authorities or any acts, events, restrictions beyond the reasonable control.


4.8) Appellant-Om Metals Consortium Pvt. Ltd., vide its letter No.119/6/1/21 dated 06/01/2021, requested JDA regarding the issuance of the Completion Certificate and thereafter, JDA issued the Completion Certificate dated 20/07/2021. It is certified that essential facilities as mentioned in Rule No.17.1 of Model Rajasthan (Urban Area) Building Regulation, 2020, has been found on site thus the building is complete for Occupancy Certificate. Hence, the Occupancy Certificate is issued under my signature on 28/04/2022. Certificate for Extension of Registration of the Project issued by the Rajasthan Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Jaipur. The registration is extended by a period of 12 months commencing from 18/05/2021and shall be valid up to 17/05/2022 unless further extended by the Regulatory Authority in accordance with Section 6 of the Act read with Rule 7 of the Rajasthan Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Rules, 2017 or in accordance with Section 6 read with Section 7, 8 and 37 of the Act. Learned counsel therefore, prayed for allowing appeal setting aside the impugned-order.


In support of arguments, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Navin Raheja Vs. Shilpa Jain : 2020 SCC OnLine NCLAT 46, Dhanrajamal Gobindram Vs. Shamji Kalidas and Co. : 1961 SCC OnLine SC 28, In re: Cognisance for extension of Limitation : (2022) 3 SCC 117, Prakash Corporates Vs. Dee Vee Projects Limited : (2022) 5 SCC 112 and P.V. Nidhish Vs. Sivaprakash : 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 4893.


5) Per contra, Mr. Prashant Daga, learned counsel for respondent has argued that the controversy ought not to be examined merely from the perspective of whether the promoter was in default, but whether the allottee was himself in default, so as to disentitle him from claiming interest under Section 18 of the RERA Act, 2016. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance upon paragraph 25 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.


5.1) Learned counsel argued that the date of payment of the sale consideration and the stipulated date for handing over possession are admitted facts between the parties and are not in dispute. It was further submitted that, till date, no valid offer of possession has been made to the respondent. Consequently, according to learned counsel, once the stipulated period for handing over possession had expired, the consequence contemplated under Section 18 of the RERA Act followed automatically and the respondent became entitled to interest for the period of delay.


5.2) Learned counsel further referred to letters issued by the appellant in the years 2015 and 2017, wherein the appellant had represented that the construction work was progressing at full pace and that the project was being carried forward expeditiously. Reference was also made to an email dated 13/01/2018 sent by the appellant, wherein it was stated that the construction was in full swing and that the project was moving towards the finishing stage. It was submitted that the appellant had also offered interest on the additional amount paid by the respondent. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent was not satisfied merely with such representations or payment of interest on the additional amount and sought adjudication of his statutory rights, particularly his entitlement to delay interest for the entire period of delay. It was specifically argued that there was neither any formal offer of possession nor actual physical possession handed over to the respondent.


5.3) Learned counsel also placed reliance upon the judgment/order of the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal in Mr. Nimesh B. Desai v. Rare Township Private Limited in Appeal No.235101/2024, in support of the proposition that where the contractual date for possession had already expired prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the benefit of the COVID-19 period could not automatically be claimed as a force majeure event. Learned counsel further relied upon the decision of this Tribunal in Appeal No.98/2024 : Om Real Developers v. Adjudicating Officer & Anr., wherein, according to learned counsel, a similar issue was considered and the period of COVID-19 was not treated as a Force Majeure period since the stipulated date of possession had already expired prior to the pandemic.


It was, therefore, argued that the findings recorded in the impugned order dated 25/05/2023 do not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. Learned counsel contended that even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the litigation relied upon by the appellant constituted a force majeure circumstance, the appellant had failed to establish that such circumstances continued to prevent completion of the project beyond the permissible period. Accordingly, the appellant had failed to substantiate its claim of force majeure so as to avoid its liability to pay delay interest under Section 18 of the RERA Act.


5.4) Learned counsel further argued that even if the force majeure conditions claimed by the respondent in terms of litigations, is considered for a moment, there is no reason why the respondent should not or could not have completed the project by 2020.


5.5) Learned counsel referring to the Gmail letter as Annexure-5, argued that this mail relates to your subsequent full payment of the total consideration against your unit G 52, booked in project “Pallacia”. A tentative interest amounting to Rs.22,93.447/- has been calculated against the overpaid amount till 31/12/2017.


In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the complainant- respondent has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd Vs. State of UP & Ors. etc. and Utpal Trehan Vs. DLF Home Developers Ltd in Civil Appeal No.4690 of 2022, Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Ratan Buildtech Private Limited Vs. Anil Kumar : RERA Appeal No.72/2025 with other connected appeals dated 04/08/2025 and judgment dated 23/01/2024 of Bombay High Court in Second Appeal No.688/2023 : M/s. Pragatej Builders and Developers Pvt.Ltd. Vs. Mr. Abhishek Anuj Sukhadia & Anr. and judgment dated 26/06/2024 of this Tribunal in Vishal Mittal Vs. M/s.R-Tech Housing Pvt.Ltd. in Appeal No.57/2021.


6) We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record including the case law cited by the learned counsel for the respective party on the subject.


7) On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the following questions arise for consideration of this Tribunal:-

  • (1) Whether the impugned-order dated 23/05/2023 is required to be quashed and set-aside, to the extent, it imposes liability of payment of interest on appellant and/or appellant is not liable to make payment of interest for the period of force majeure when the project was delayed due to notices issued by the JDA, Courts/Tribunals proceedings and stay orders from 2013 to 2017 and Covid-19 Pandemic from March 2020 to March 2022?

  • (2) Whether the appellant is entitled for declaration that the project Palasia stands completed in the light of the Completion Certificate dated 20/07/2021 and Occupancy Certificate dated 28/04/2022?


Finding on Question No.1:-

8) It is admitted fact between the parties that the complainant-respondent booked a unit in Tower-G at 5th Floor for the total sale consideration of Rs.2.26 Crores and an Agreement for Sale was also executed between the parties on 07/06/2013 and as per terms of Agreement, possession of the flat was agreed to be given within 30 months with 9 months grace period i.e. 06/09/2016 as per clause 9 of the Agreement for Sale. It is not disputed that the entire sale consideration was paid by the respondent in advance when only 35% of the agreed consideration was required to be deposited as per agreed Construction Linked Plan for which, the appellant-promoter sent an email to the complainant-respondent for interest of Rs.22,93,447/- for the amount of over pay till 31/12/2017. It is also not disputed that the project was not completed within the stipulated time and the Completion Certificate was obtained by the appellant-promoter on 20/07/2021 and, thereafter, the Occupancy Certificate was obtained on 28/04/2022 from the empaneled architect.


9) In the above admitted factual matrix of the matter, the learned Regulatory Authority vide impugned-order dated 23/05/2023 directed the promoter to handover the possession of the unit and grant delay interest from September, 2016 (agreed date of possession) till handing over of possession at the rate of interest prescribed under the RERA Rules, 2017. The respondent-allottee does not intend to withdraw from the project. The appellant-promoter is ready to give possession of the allotted unit and one whatsapp chat dated 17/12/2021 was filed by the appellant as Anx.18 regarding offer of possession. The contention of the appellant that project was delayed firstly on the ground that multiple orders were passed by the various courts and notices issued by the JDA staying the construction work of project. The details of litigations and orders passed by the courts/Tribunals are annexed as Anx.3 to 11, which may be summarised, as under:-

  • Firstly, one DBCWP No.15241/2013 : Nirmal Nahata Vs. State & Ors. was filed in August 2013 challenging the order dated 27/08/2013 passed by the learned Single Judge restraining the appellant from carrying out any construction in the project. Appellant-Om Metals Consortium Pvt.Ltd. filed appeal bearing DBSAW No.895/2013 challenging the same impugned order dated 27/08/2013. Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court vide common order decided both, the DBCWP No.15241/2013 and DBSAW No.895/2013 by a common judgment dated 26/11/2013 (Anx.3) thereby, the ex-parte interim-order dated 27/08/2013 was set-aside. Nirmal Nahata challenged the order dated 26/11/2013 (Anx.3) before Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP but the same was withdrawn and respondents No.1 and 2 i.e. State and JDA were permitted to take a fresh decision in accordance with law vide order dated 19/03/2015 (Anx.4).

  • Secondly, one Mr. Bhagwat Gaur instituted a criminal case for offence punishable under Sections 120B, 420, 467 and 477 IPC against the appellant’s company Directors before the civil court. The complaint was dismissed vide order dated 14/11/2014 (Anx.5). Complaint Bhagwat Gaur filed a revision against the order of dismissal and this revision was also dismissed on 19/07/2017.

  • Thirdly, simultaneously the JDA issued notice dated 21/12/2013 regarding change in design in the staircase, lift and ramp and another letter dated 09/01/2014 was issued stating the construction on site is against the approved plans and work should be immediately stopped. Hence, these notices were challenged by the appellant before the JDA Appellate Tribunal and the Tribunal vide order dated 26/02/2014 (Anx.6) directed the appellant to appear before JDA and JDA was directed not to take any action till decision is taken by the JDA.

  • Fourthly, the JDA issued notice on 14/05/2014. Appellant again challenged this notice before the JDA Appellate Tribunal, which was set-aside by the Tribunal vide order dated 03/06/2014 (Anx.7) and it ordered that the JDA has given notice on the basis of presumption and if violation of building plan is found at the time of issuing of completion certificate, the JDA shall be free to take action against the appellant.

  • Fifthly, one notice dated 10/10/2014 issued by the JDA on the ground that period of temporary fire NOC had expired, was challenged before the JDA Appellate Tribunal, which set-aside the said notice dated 10/10/2014 vide order dated 17/11/2014 (Anx.8). One another notice dated 07/04/2016 issued by the JDA was challenged before the JDA Appellate Tribunal and the Tribunal vide order dated 20/05/2016 (Anx.9) remanded the matter back.

  • Lastly, vide notice dated 28/07/2016 the JDA cancelled the building plan approved on 18/05/2012 and the JDA Appellate Tribunal by a detailed order dated 07/10/2016 (Anx.10) set-aside the notice dated 28/07/2016. This order was challenged by the JDA before the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court by filing SBCWP No.407/2017, which was dismissed by the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court vide order dated 06/07/2017 (Anx.11).


10) It is revealed from the record that several notices were issued by the JDA on different counts and every administrative action taken by the JDA was turned down by the appellate forum and the last detailed order passed by the JDA Appellate Tribunal dated 07/10/2016 was upheld by the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court on 06/07/2017. It is not appropriate to comment on the administrative notices issued by the JDA on whims, which were not sustained before higher forum but looking to the nature of litigation, we may conclude that the construction of project was adversely effected during August 2013 to July 2017.


11) Learned counsel for the appellant has prayed for exclusion of this period because of competent authorities’/courts’ stay orders on construction. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dhanrajamal Gobindram (supra), wherein the meaning of “force majeure” was defined. It is noted that this judgment was not related to the RERA Act, 2016. The judgment was prior to the enactment of the Act of 2016. The definition of word “force majeure” defined under Explanation to Section 6 of the Act of 2016 may be reproduced, as under:-

  • “Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, the expression “force majeure” shall mean a case of war, flood, drought, fire, cyclone, earthquake or any other calamity caused by nature affecting the regular development of the real estate project”.


It is crystal clear from the above text of Explanation to Section 6 of the RERA Act, 2016 that only calamity caused by nature affecting the regular development of the real estate project is included in the expression “force majeure” but if the project is delayed due to some litigation or stay order passed by the competent authority, cannot be treated as a “force majeure” to exclude the period while computing the delay interest. It is further clarified by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. supra, in para No.25, as under:-

  • “The unqualified right of the allottee to seek refund referred under Section 18(1)(a) and Section 19(4) of the Act is not dependent on any contingencies or stipulations thereof. It appears that the legislature has consciously provided this right of refund on demand as an unconditional absolute right to the allottee, if the promoter fails to give possession of the apartment, plot or building within the time stipulated under the terms of the agreement regardless of unforeseen events or stay orders of the Court/Tribunal, which is in either way not attributable to the allottee/home buyer…”


It is evidently clear from the verdict of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that on the basis of unforeseen events or stay orders of the court/Tribunal, the period cannot be excluded if the delay is not attributed to the allottee/homebuyer. The only litmus test to exclude the period is that if the delay attributed by the conduct of an allottee but if the delay is in either way not attributable to the allottee/homebuyer then, the promoter is under an obligation to refund the amount on demand with interest whether the promoter is defaulter or not during litigation process. The basis behind it that complainant-allottee should not be suffered for the litigation between the competent authorities and promoter without any fault on the part of allottees. Therefore, this period from 2013 to 2017 does not qualify for exclusion.


So far as Covid-19 Pandemic situated is concerned, admittedly, it is natural disaster fall under the definition of “force majeure” as provided under Explanation to Section 6 of the RERA Act, 2016 and the Regulatory Authority issued one circular on 13/05/2020, which is issued under Section 6 of the said Act read with proviso to Rule 7 of the RERA Rules, 2017 and Section 37 of the Act. The relevant provisions may be reproduced, as under:-

  • Extension of estimated finish date and validity of registration

  • 1. An in-principle, across-the-board approval is hereby granted to extend by 12 months the estimated finish date and the period of validity of registration shown in registration certificate of all real estate projects that were registered and not already completed, lapsed or revoked as on 19.03.2020. This extension will also be available for real estate projects that have been registered after 19.03.2020 upto the date of issue of this order”.


Further, The Authority clarified in Point No.6, as under:-

  • “Moratorium on interest and compensation

  • 6. Owing to force majeure, no interest or compensation will be payable under section 12 or section 18 of the Act for the period covered by the aforesaid extension in estimated finish date of the project”.


Meaning thereby, if the project is not completed on 19/03/2020 or even lapsed or revoked then also, no interest or compensation will be payable under Section 12 or Section 18 of the Act for the period of 12 months.


It is noted that registration of the project was extended on that ground for the period of 12 months from 18/05/2019 to 17/05/2020. It is revealed from the record that from 2013 to 2017, the promoter was unable to continue with the construction work of the project due to administrative notices and litigations although this period cannot be excluded but after 2017, construction work was adversely affected by Covid-19 Pandemic. In such circumstances, the order of Maharashtra REAT in Appeal No.235101/2024 and of this Tribunal in Appeal No.98/2024 supra cannot be made applicable in the present matter. Therefore, in the light of above circular dated 13/05/2020, registration of project was extended without any stipulation then, looking to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the matter, promoter is entitled for exclusion of 12 months due to Covid-19 Pandemic.


Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court by which, 2 years limitation period was provided due to Covid-19 Pandemic but the Hon’ble Supreme Court only extended the period of limitation for fling of petitions but appellant is not entitled to get exclusion of 2 years.


In the light of above discussion, the judgment referred to in the matter of Navin Raheja supra passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal cannot be made applicable in the present matter in the light of pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of M/s.Newtech Developers and Promoters Pvt.Ltd. supra.


The Promoter failed to handover the possession of the unit within the stipulated time. Therefore, the respondent-complainant is entitled for delay interest at the rate prescribed under the RERA Rules of 2017. The complainant is not intended to withdraw from the project and appellant-promoter is ready and willing to give possession of the unit and some whatsapp chats are also available on record but admittedly, in compliance of the impugned-order, no letter offering valid offer of possession was issued by the appellant-promoter but since the delay interest granted by the Authority vide impugned-order dated 23/05/2023 has been deposited by the appellant-promoter under Section 43(5) of the RERA Act, 2016 till filing of this appeal i.e. 06/07/2023, which is preserved by this Tribunal in Fixed Deposit, therefore, it is appropriate to grant delay interest to the respondent-allottee from September, 2016 till filing of this appeal i.e. 06/07/2023 excluding moratorium period of 12 months due to Covid-19 Pandemic. The impugned-order dated 23/05/2023 is, therefore, required to be modified to this extent.


Question No.1 is answered accordingly.


Finding on Question No.2:-

So far as declaration about completion certificate and occupancy certificate are concerned, both the certificates available on records and the completion certificate was obtained on 20/07/2021 and, thereafter, occupancy certificate was obtained on 28/04/2022. It is settled proposition of law that the validity and legality of the certificates cannot be adjudicated by this Tribunal. Further, the relief of declaration not prayed for by the appellant-promoter by way of counter claim in his reply before the Regulatory Authority then, the independent claim or relief cannot be prayed for at this appellate stage. However, the appellant is at liberty to pray before Regulatory Authority to upload the same on the web portal of the Regulatory Authority, as per law if not uploaded or accepted by the Regulatory Authority.


Question No.2 is answered accordingly.


12) In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The impugned-order dated 23/05/2023 is modified. The appellant-promoter is, therefore, directed to pay to the complainant-respondent the delay interest for every month of delay on the amount deposited by the complainant from September, 2016 till the filing of this appeal on 06/07/2023 at the rate prescribed under the RERA Rules of 2017 i.e. at SBI highest MCLR + 2%, i.e. 8.70 + 2 = 10.70% excluding 12 months moratorium period within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. Rest part of the impugned-order dated 23/05/2023 is upheld.


13) The Registry is directed to transmit the amount of pre-deposit deposited by the appellant-promoter in mandatory compliance of Section 43(5) of the RERA Act, 2016 into the bank account of complainant-respondent, after expiry of limitation period of appeal, as per above order of this Tribunal.


14) The interim order or any other misc.application, if any, shall stand vacated.


15) There is no order as to costs.


16) A copy of this order be transmitted to the learned counsel for the parties and Raj-RERA, Jaipur.


File be consigned to record.


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Sunday, 23 August 2026

Kumar Housing Corporation Private Limited Vs The State of Maharashtra - The purpose of Section 4 is not that no stamp duty is payable on the transaction. The purpose is that where several instruments are used for completing the same transaction, full duty is payable on the principal instrument, while the other instruments do not attract repeated ad valorem duty in respect of the same transaction.

 HC Bombay (2026.08.20) in  Kumar Housing Corporation Private Limited Vs The State of Maharashtra [Writ Petition No.13655 of 2017] held that;

  • Thus, the submission of the Petitioner that the nomenclature of the documents is not conclusive deserves to be accepted. A document may be called an Agreement, Development Agreement or Supplementary Agreement. Only the name given to the document cannot decide the liability towards stamp duty. The contents of the document, the rights created under it, the nature of possession and the legal effect of the document are required to be seen.

  • The Section 4 applies where “several instruments are employed for completing the transaction”. Therefore, the enquiry is not limited only to finding whether all documents have the same title or whether they were executed on the same date. What is required to be seen is whether several instruments were in fact used for completing one transaction of sale, development agreement, lease, mortgage, or settlement.

  • Therefore, Section 4 cannot be understood to mean that stamp duty can be avoided. The provision protects the revenue because the principal instrument is required to bear the highest stamp duty which would be chargeable amongst the several instruments used for completing the transaction. At the same time, the provision does not permit the same transaction to be treated as separate transactions only because more than one instrument was executed for completing the same.

  • However, inconsistency in the description given by a party cannot authorise the Authorities to levy stamp duty contrary to the statutory scheme. Stamp duty is required to be determined according to the real nature and legal effect of the instrument. The liability cannot be decided only on the basis of estoppel when the document and the provisions of law require examination of its real substance.

  • The statutory definition makes the date of execution of “such instrument” relevant. Therefore, where a particular instrument is independently liable for ad valorem stamp duty, its market value has to be considered with reference to the date on which that instrument was executed, subject to the consideration stated in it being higher.

  • The purpose of Section 4 is not that no stamp duty is payable on the transaction. The purpose is that where several instruments are  used for completing the same transaction, full duty is payable on the principal instrument, while the other instruments do not attract repeated ad valorem duty in respect of the same transaction.

Excerpts of the Order

# 1. By this Writ Petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner has challenged the legality, validity, and correctness of the Judgment and Order dated 19 July 2014 passed by the Collector of Stamps, as well as the Order dated 16 March 2015 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Registration and Deputy Controller of Stamps. 


# 2. The facts which, according to the Petitioner, have resulted in filing of the present Writ Petition may be stated as follows. On 9 June 1995, the Petitioner, which was then known as Sukumar Estates Limited, entered into an Agreement with (1) PrakashPashankar and (2) Namdev Pashankar. Under the said Agreement, the Petitioner agreed to acquire all rights, title and interest in the land bearing Survey No. 138/5, admeasuring 4 H 83 A, situated at Pashan, Pune, for a total consideration of Rs. 3,12,00,000/-. A Certificate of True Value was issued in respect of the said Agreement. At that time, stamp duty of Rs. 100/- was paid. Clause 8 of the Agreement provided that possession of the property was tobe handed over to the Petitioner after measurement of the property was carried out. However, according to the Petitioner, the subsequent Supplementary Agreement confirms that actual and physical possession of the property had been handed over even before execution of the Agreement dated 9 June 1995. Thereafter, on 31 December 1999, the Petitioner entered into another Agreement with (1) Prakash Pashankar, (2) Namdev Pashankar, (3) Vadanbai Prakash Pashankar, (4) Santosh Prakash Pashankar and (5) Sandesh Prakash Pashankar. Under the said Agreement, rights, title and interest in land bearing Survey No. 138/5, admeasuring 2 H 10 A, situated at Pashan, Pune, were agreed to be conveyed in favour of the Petitioner along with Development Rights, for a consideration of Rs. 1,88,00,000/-. This Agreement was described as a Development Agreement. A Certificate of True Value was issued in respect of this Agreement and stamp duty of Rs. 100/- was paid at that time. Clause 3 provided that possession of the property would be handed over to the Petitioner after measurement. However, according to the Petitioner, the subsequent Supplementary Agreement shows that actual physical possession had been handed over before execution of the Agreement dated 31 December 1999.


# 3. The documents dated 9 June 1995 and 31 December 1999 were thereafter submitted before the Collector of Stamps under Section 31 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act for adjudication. The documents were impounded under Section 33. According to the Petitioner, stamp duty was thereafter paid on both the Agreements as follows: (i) Rs. 3,12,000/- was paid on the Agreement dated 9 June 1995, under which the total consideration was Rs. 3,12,00,000/-; and (ii) Rs. 1,88,000/- was paid on the Agreement dated 31 December 1999, under which the total consideration was Rs. 1,88,00,000/-. Thus, according to the Petitioner, a total amount of Rs.5,00,000/- was paid towards stamp duty on the two Agreements.


# 4. On 4 September 2003, Mr. Prakash Pashankar executed two separate Supplementary Agreements in favour of the Petitioner, confirming the earlier Agreements. The Supplementary Agreement bearing Registration No. 7689 confirmed the contents of the Agreement dated 9 June 1995 and recorded that possession of the property had been handed over before execution of the Agreement dated 9 June 1995. The other Supplementary Agreement, bearing Registration No. 7690, confirmed the contents of the Agreement dated 31 December 1999 and recorded that possession of the property had been handed over before execution of that Agreement. It is the case of the Petitioner that no fresh or additional consideration was paid under either of these Supplementary Agreements. On 19 March 2012, a Deed of Conveyance was executed between Mr. Prakash Pashankar and the Petitioner. According to the Petitioner, no consideration was paid under this Deed of Conveyance. The details of the amounts which had been paid under the earlier Agreements were recorded in the Conveyance Deed. The Deed referred, in its recital, to a suit which was pending before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune and which was settled on 28 July 2004. The Conveyance Deed stated that it was being executed “in full and final settlement” of all rights, title, and claims of the Vendor. The Second Schedule to the Conveyance Deed referred to an area of 57,964 sq. metres out of the total land area of 69,300 sq. metres referred to in the earlier Agreements. According to the Petitioner, the reduction in the area was because 10,750 sq. metres of land had been acquired by the Pune Municipal Corporation for road widening. The recital in the Conveyance Deed referred to the fact that possession had been handed over to the Petitioner and that the Petitioner had started development of the property. The Petitioner states that since an aggregate stamp duty of Rs. 5,00,000/- had been paid on the earlier Agreements having an aggregate consideration of Rs. 5,00,00,000/-, the Petitioner paid the balance stamp duty of Rs. 45,00,000/- at the time of execution of the Conveyance Deed. The document was thereafter duly stamped and registered.


# 5. On 7 November 2013, the Sub-Registrar, Haveli issued a Notice to the Petitioner stating that the market value of the property covered by the Conveyance Deed was Rs. 61,09,89,500/-. On that basis, it was alleged that the Petitioner was liable to pay deficient stamp duty of Rs. 2,60,49,475/-. Thereafter, on 19 July 2014, Respondent No. 4 passed an Order directing the Petitioner to pay the alleged deficient stamp duty of Rs. 2,60,49,475/- together with penalty at the rate of 2% per month. It was held that, in the beginning, stamp duty at the rate of 1% had been paid by giving the document the name “Development Agreement”. It was held that the later attempt to refer to the Agreements of 2003 as part of a conveyance was only an afterthought. It was held that, in the year 2012, after realizing that a substantial amount of stamp duty would become payable, the Petitioner paid the remaining 9% stamp duty, amounting to Rs. 45,00,000/-. The authority held that the transactions under the earlier Agreements were different in nature and, therefore, the benefit under Section 4 could not be given to the Petitioner. The authority held that though possession of the property had been handed over to the Petitioner, such possession was only for the purpose of development of the property and was in the nature of a licence. According to the authority, possession after execution of the Conveyance Deed would stand on a different footing.


# 6. On 1 December 2014, the Sub-Registrar, Haveli No. 13 issued a Final Notice once again calling upon the Petitioner to pay the alleged deficient stamp duty of Rs. 2,60,49,475/-. In the year 2014, the Petitioner filed an Appeal under Section 32B of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, being Appeal No. 22 of 2014, before Respondent No. 3. The submission of the Petitioner before the Appellate Authority was that the Agreements of 1995 and 1999 were, in substance, Agreements for Sale and that, since possession had been handed over under those Agreements, they were required to be treated as deemed conveyances. The Petitioner

pointed out that, in the year 1997, a Notice had been issued calling upon the Petitioner to pay stamp duty under Article 25, but the demand made under that Notice was not accepted by the Petitioner.


# 7. By the Order dated 16 March 2015, Respondent No. 3 dismissed the Appeal filed by the Petitioner. It was held that, after obtaining a Certificate of True Value, it was the duty of the Petitioner to pay proper stamp duty on the concerned documents. The Appellate Authority held that since the Petitioner was contending that the Agreements dated 1995 and 1999 were Agreements for Sale which were liable to be treated as deemed conveyances because possession had been handed over, stamp duty ought to have been paid on those documents under Article 25 of Schedule I to the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. It was held that the nature of the Agreements executed in the year 2012 and the Supplementary Agreements executed in the year 2003 was different. The Appellate Authority held that the property was included in the Annual Statement of Rates under the Bombay Stamp (Determination of True Market Value of Property) Rules, 1995, and that its market value was Rs. 61,09,89,500/-. Since the market value was higher than the consideration mentioned in the documents, it was held that stamp duty at the rate of 5% was payable.


# 8. Mr. Girish Godbole, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Petitioner, invited my attention to the impugned orders and submitted that both the Authorities have proceeded on a clear misunderstanding of the law. According to him, the Authorities have misdirected by proceeding on the basis that stamp duty is payable only by looking separately at each instrument and not by considering the real nature of the entire transaction. He submitted that the instruments dated 9 June 1995, 31 December 1999, 4 September 2003 and 19 March 2012 were all connected with one and the same transaction. According to him, this was one continuous transaction by which the owner of the land, namely Pashankar, conveyed the land to the Petitioner. He submitted that, once the documents are viewed in their proper sequence and in the background of the entire transaction, Section 4 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act was applicable. According to him, stamp duty on the full market value of the property had been paid under the earlier instruments. Therefore, when the Deed of Conveyance dated 19 March 2012 was executed, no stamp duty was payable on the same transaction. He submitted that the instrument dated 19 March 2012 was entitled to the benefit available under Section 4 and, therefore, the Authorities were not justified in demanding any or deficit stamp duty.


# 9. Mr. Godbole submitted that merely because a document is given a particular name, its real character does not get decided only by such name. According to him, the instrument dated 9 June 1995 was described as an Agreement and the instrument dated 31 December 1999 was described as a Development Agreement. However, what is important is the actual substance and effect of the documents. He submitted that under these Agreements, the entire right, title, and interest in the property were agreed to be conveyed and given to the Petitioner. The Petitioner was given the right to construct tenements and flats, sell them to purchasers and thereafter convey the building as well as the land to the occupiers or to their society. He submitted that actual physical possession of the property was handed over to the Petitioner under these Agreements. According to him, once possession was handed over and the Agreements in substance provided for transfer of rights in the land, the Agreements were required to be treated as deemed conveyances. Therefore, the description of the document as a “Development Agreement” was not conclusive. He submitted that the documents were in substance instruments relating to sale and transfer of the land. Since stamp duty on the full market value had been paid in respect of those instruments, the Respondents were bound to give credit and benefit of such stamp duty under Section 4 while considering the instrument dated 19 March 2012. According to him, no deficit stamp duty could therefore have been declared payable.


# 10. Mr. Godbole then referred to Section 2(na) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, which defines “market value” in relation to any property forming the subject matter of an instrument. He submitted that the definition means the price which such property would have fetched if it had been sold in the open market on the date of execution of the instrument or the consideration stated in the instrument, whichever is higher. He submitted that, in the present case, the consideration mentioned in the Agreements dated 9 June 1995 and 31 December 1999 was higher than the market value of the property on the respective dates of execution of those Agreements and the subsequent Confirmation Deeds. According to him, therefore, for the purpose of calculation of stamp duty, the consideration mentioned in the relevant documents, being higher than the market value as determined on the relevant date, was required to be taken into account. He submitted that the Authorities could not ignore the market value and consideration prevailing on the date of execution of the earlier instruments and determine the liability by applying the market value prevailing at a later point of time.


# 11. Mr. Godbole relied upon the judgment of this Court in Jitendra Manohardas Thakker and Anr. vs. The Deputy Inspector General of Registration and Deputy Controller of Stamps and Others, Writ Petition No. 2370 of 2024, decided on 16 February 2026. He relied upon the decisions in Suhas Damodar Sathe vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 576, and Thakkar Investment and Finance Company vs. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and Inspector General of Registration and Controller of Stamps and Others, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 4685.


# 12. Ms. Sulbha Chipade, learned AGP, on the other hand, supported the impugned orders. She invited my attention to Paragraph 5(g-a) of Schedule I and submitted that stamp duty is payable under Article 25 in respect of an Agreement and the records or memorandum relating to such Agreement. According to her, the different documents involved in the present case are separate instruments and are different in nature. She submitted that, for this reason, the stamp duty paid on a document described as a Development Agreement cannot be deducted against the stamp duty payable on an Agreement for Sale. According to her, since the nature and character of the documents are different, the benefit claimed by the Petitioner by way of deduction of stamp duty paid on the Development Agreement cannot be granted. 


# 13. Ms. Chipade submitted that Documents Nos. 7689 and 7690 of the year 2003 are Development Agreements, whereas Document No. 2414 of the year 2012 is an Agreement for Sale. According to her, both these documents are different and independent documents. Therefore, stamp duty is required to be determined on the market value of the property covered by the respective documents in accordance with Article 25 of Schedule I to the Maharashtra Stamp Act. She submitted that the decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 9923 of 2014, M/s Prasun Developers vs. Government of Maharashtra & Ors., decided on 30 January 2015, is applicable to the facts of the present case and supports the action taken by the Authorities.


# 14. Ms. Chipade submitted that, under the Maharashtra Stamp (Determination of True Market Value of Property) Rules, 1995, the property in question falls in the category of Department No. 20/354.1. According to her, after taking into consideration Notice No. 16 B, the applicable rate for the property was Rs. 16,800/- per square metre. On that basis, the total market value of the property was determined at Rs. 61,09,89,500/-. She submitted that this market value was required to be considered in accordance with Section 2(na) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act. Since the property was situated within the limits of a Municipal Corporation, stamp duty at the rate of 5% was payable under Article 25(B)(i) of Schedule I. According to her, on the market value so determined, the total stamp duty payable came to Rs. 3,05,49,475/-. She submitted that, after giving credit for the amount of Rs. 45,00,000/- paid by the Petitioner, the balance amount of Rs. 2,60,49,475/- remained payable. According to her, the said amount was therefore liable to be recovered from the Petitioner. She submitted that the Petitioner was liable to pay the maximum penalty, namely twice the amount of the deficient stamp duty, together with penalty at the rate of 2% per month from 19 March 2012, as provided under Section 32A(4) of the said Act.


REASONS AND ANALYSIS:

# 15. I have considered the rival submissions made by both the parties. I have gone through the Agreements dated 9 June 1995 and 31 December 1999, the translated order placed on record, the impugned orders and the relevant provisions of law to which my attention has been invited by the learned counsel. In my view, the real question is about the actual legal nature of the rights which were created under these documents. It is necessary to see whether all these instruments were used for completing one transaction and, if that is so, whether the Deed of Conveyance dated 19 March 2012 could again be subjected to stamp duty by taking the market value prevailing in the year 2012. 


# 16. The learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Petitioner submitted that the documents dated 9 June 1995, 31 December 1999, 4 September 2003, and 19 March 2012 were all part and different steps of one transaction. According to him, the transaction had started when the owners agreed to transfer their rights in the land in favour of the Petitioner and possession was handed over. The later documents were only steps for completing and recording the same transaction. On the other hand, the learned AGP supported the orders passed by the Authorities. According to her, the earlier documents were Development Agreements, whereas the document of the year 2012 was an Agreement for Sale or Conveyance. Therefore, these were different instruments and separate stamp duty liability was attracted on each of them.


# 17. Before going into these rival submissions, it is necessary to see the documents. The document dated 9 June 1995 is described as an “AGREEMENT”. The clause regarding possession records that “The direct open and vacated possession of the said property is to be given by the Giver in Writing to the Taker in Writing by taking Govt. measurement of the said property.” The same document gives substantial rights to the Petitioner in respect of development of the property. It states that “You will have full rights and authority to commence construction development on the said property by entering the said property for carrying out development and to complete the same by carrying out construction of building.” It is recorded that the rights and licence for development would continue until the full ownership rights were changed in favour of the purchasers, societies or nominees.


# 18. The Agreement dated 31 December 1999 shows that substantial rights were given to the Petitioner. The document records that “Entire rights and authority have been given to you to commence Construction development on the Said property by entering the Said property for Carrying out development and to complete the Same by carrying out construction Of building.” It records that “open and actual possession of the property described in the above para 1 has been given today by us to you for development work”. However, the same clause connects such possession with the future documents of transfer and with ownership of the property being transferred in the name of the Petitioner or its nominees. Therefore, this document cannot be understood only as an ordinary permission for doing development work. At the same time, the document says that possession was given “for development work” and refers to the right and licence continuing till the ownership rights were changed. Thus, the submission of the Petitioner that the nomenclature of the documents is not conclusive deserves to be accepted. A document may be called an Agreement, Development Agreement or Supplementary Agreement. Only the name given to the document cannot decide the liability towards stamp duty. The contents of the document, the rights created under it, the nature of possession and the legal effect of the document are required to be seen. Even the translated material placed on record shows the contention of the Petitioner that “The registered instruments are agreements of sale and not development agreements” and that actual possession had been handed over. The same material shows that merely because the registering authority treated a document as a development agreement, the real nature of that instrument was still required to be decided from its substance.


# 19. However, this by does not mean that the whole contention of the Petitioner has to be accepted as it is. The documents of the years 1995 and 1999 contain provisions relating to transfer of property, development rights and possession. Therefore, whether these documents are called agreements for sale, development agreements or documents having some mixed character, the important question in the present matter is whether they formed part of the same transaction which was completed by the Conveyance Deed dated 19 March 2012. 


# 20. In this background, Section 4 becomes important. The relevant provision reads as follows: 

  • “Section 4. Several instruments used in single transaction of development agreement, sale, lease, mortgage or settlement.—

  • (1) Where, in the case of any development agreement, sale, lease, mortgage or settlement, several instruments are employed for completing the transaction, the principal instrument only shall be chargeable with the duty prescribed in Schedule I for the conveyance, development agreement, lease, mortgage or settlement, and each of the other instruments shall be chargeable with a duty of five hundred rupees instead of the duty (if any) prescribed for it in that Schedule.”


# 21. The Section 4 applies where “several instruments are employed for completing the transaction”. Therefore, the enquiry is not limited only to finding whether all documents have the same title or whether they were executed on the same date. What is required to be seen is whether several instruments were in fact used for completing one transaction of sale, development agreement, lease, mortgage, or settlement.


# 22. Sub-section (2) provides that the parties may decide which one of the instruments is to be treated as the principal instrument. Sub-section (3) provides that if the parties do not determine the principal instrument, the Officer before whom the document is produced may determine the same. The proviso states: “Provided that the duty chargeable on the instrument so determined shall be the highest duty which would be chargeable in respect of any of the said instruments employed.”


# 23. Therefore, Section 4 cannot be understood to mean that stamp duty can be avoided. The provision protects the revenue because the principal instrument is required to bear the highest stamp duty which would be chargeable amongst the several instruments used for completing the transaction. At the same time, the provision does not permit the same transaction to be treated as separate transactions only because more than one instrument was executed for completing the same.


# 24. In the present matter, the record shows a continuous connection between the earlier transactions and the Conveyance Deed dated 19 March 2012. The translated order records that the parties had executed the Agreements dated 9 June 1995 and 31 December 1999. These were registered as Documents Nos. 7689/2003 and 7690/2003. Thereafter, the Conveyance was registered on 19 March 2012 as Document No. 2414/2012. The material on record shows that the Conveyance related to the property which was the subject matter of the earlier documents. At the time of registering the Conveyance in the year 2012, the Authorities treated the earlier documents as having connection with the Conveyance. The aggregate consideration under the earlier transactions was taken as Rs. 5,00,00,000/-. On that basis, duty at the rate of 10% was calculated at Rs. 50,00,000/-. After giving credit of Rs. 5,00,000/-, which was paid on the earlier documents, the Petitioner paid the balance amount of Rs. 45,00,000/- at the time of the Conveyance. This factual position is recorded in the material available on record.


# 25. For the purpose of registration of the Conveyance in 2012, the Authorities treated the earlier transactions as connected with the Conveyance and gave credit for the stamp duty paid. Thereafter, for making a demand, the Authorities proceeded as if the earlier transactions and the Conveyance were unrelated transactions. In my view, these two positions do not go together. 


# 26. The learned AGP has submitted that Documents Nos. 7689 and 7690 of the year 2003 were Development Agreements, whereas Document No. 2414 of the year 2012 was an Agreement for Sale or Conveyance. It is submitted that the nature of these documents is different, and the stamp duty paid on the earlier Development Agreements cannot be adjusted against the subsequent instrument.


# 27. I am unable to accept this submission in the manner in which it is made. Section 4 applies where several instruments are employed for completing a single transaction of, amongst other things, “development agreement” or “sale”. Therefore, merely because one document may have the character of a development agreement and the final document is a conveyance, that fact by cannot take the matter outside the scope of Section 4. The entire transaction is required to be examined. In the present case, the earlier documents gave extensive rights in respect of the property to the Petitioner and the question of possession was dealt with therein. The subsequent Supplementary Agreements recorded that possession had been handed over. The final Conveyance does not appear to have started a new transaction. It was executed for completing the transfer of rights which was the subject matter of the earlier arrangements. The record shows that the area conveyed was less than the area mentioned in the earlier documents because part of the land had been acquired for road widening. This circumstance shows that the final Conveyance was concerning the same original land transaction, though the area available for final conveyance had changed during the period in between. Merely because the final document covered the remaining available area, it does not create a new transaction separate from the earlier agreements. 


# 28. The Authorities have relied upon the conduct of the Petitioner. According to them, the Petitioner adopted different descriptions of the documents at different stages according to its convenience. The translated order records that the parties described the documents differently before different authorities and, according to the Authority, this resulted in avoiding stamp duty on the market value prevailing at the relevant time.


# 29. There is some substance in the criticism that the Petitioner's stand regarding the exact character of the earlier instruments has not remained consistent. The record shows that stamp duty at the rate of 1% was paid on the earlier documents under Article 5(g-a). The appellate order records that the Petitioner relied upon the documents being agreements for sale with possession, whereas at an earlier stage they were treated as development agreements for payment of stamp duty. However, inconsistency in the description given by a party cannot authorise the Authorities to levy stamp duty contrary to the statutory scheme. Stamp duty is required to be determined according to the real nature and legal effect of the instrument. The liability cannot be decided only on the basis of estoppel when the document and the provisions of law require examination of its real substance.


# 30. The appellate Authority has observed that because the Petitioner paid stamp duty under Article 5(g-a), it was not open for the Petitioner to later contend that the documents were agreements for sale. The Authority has relied upon what is described as the “Principle of Estopel”. In my view, this reasoning by is not sufficient for deciding the legal nature of the instrument. If, on proper reading, an earlier instrument attracted a particular provision of the Stamp Act, its stamp duty liability was required to be determined according to law. The description accepted earlier by the Authority or adopted by the party cannot change the character of the document.

 

# 31. Article 5(g-a), relied upon by the Respondents, relates to an Agreement “if relating to giving authority or power to a promoter or a developer, by whatever name called, for construction on, development of or, sale or transfer (in any manner whatsoever) of, any immovable property.” The duty prescribed is “The same duty as is leviable on a Conveyance under clause (b), [or (c)], as the case may be, of Article 25, on the market value of the property”. Therefore, Article 5(g-a) does not support an approach that a document called a Development Agreement can be separated from the final transfer without examining the rights created under that document. The provision deals with an agreement giving authority for development, sale or transfer of immovable property. Therefore, the real substance of the document remain important. 


# 32. The next important question concerns the market value applicable to the transaction. Section 2(na) provides: 

  • “Section 2 (na)market value” in relation to any property which is the subject matter of an instrument, means the price which such property would have fetched if sold in open market on the date of execution of such instrument or the consideration stated in the instrument, whichever is higher;


# 33. The statutory definition makes the date of execution of “such instrument” relevant. Therefore, where a particular instrument is independently liable for ad valorem stamp duty, its market value has to be considered with reference to the date on which that instrument was executed, subject to the consideration stated in it being higher. The Authorities have proceeded on the basis that the market value of the property on 19 March 2012 was Rs. 61,09,89,500/- and, therefore, stamp duty at the rate of 5% was payable on that value. After deducting Rs. 45,00,000/- paid by the Petitioner, deficit stamp duty of Rs. 2,60,49,475/- has been demanded. Such a conclusion could have been possible if the Conveyance dated 19 March 2012 was to be treated as a independent instrument involving a new transfer, with no relevance of the earlier documents under Section 4. However, that is not the factual position which comes from the record. The calculation made at the time of registration of the Conveyance shows that the earlier instruments and the consideration of Rs. 5 crore were treated as relevant for the final Conveyance and credit was given for the stamp duty paid. The first order records that the earlier documents were used as the basis for calculating stamp duty at the time of registration of the Conveyance in 2012. It records that the aggregate consideration in the earlier documents was Rs. 5 crore, the duty calculated on that amount was Rs. 50 lakh and, after adjusting the earlier payment of Rs. 5 lakh, an amount of Rs. 45 lakh was collected. 


# 34. Once this factual position is accepted, the question is whether, after registration of the Conveyance and acceptance of stamp duty on that basis, the Authorities could again treat the document of 2012 as a fresh and independent transaction and calculate duty on the market value of Rs. 61,09,89,500/-. In my view, the answer has to be in the negative, considering the applicability of Section 4 to the facts of the present case. The purpose of Section 4 is not that no stamp duty is payable on the transaction. The purpose is that where several instruments are  used for completing the same transaction, full duty is payable on the principal instrument, while the other instruments do not attract repeated ad valorem duty in respect of the same transaction. In the present matter, the Authorities proceeded on the basis of the aggregate transaction value of Rs. 5 crore and collected the balance duty after giving credit for the amount paid.


# 35. The submission of the Petitioner that the market value or consideration prevailing under the earlier instruments must be accepted cannot be accepted only because the Petitioner relies upon certificates issued under Section 269UL of the Income Tax Act. Such certificates issued by the Appropriate Authority do not determine the market value for the purpose of the Maharashtra Stamp Act. The first order correctly records that such certificates only show no objection to the proposed transfer for the apparent consideration and do not fix the market value for stamp duty purposes. Therefore, the Petitioner's reliance upon the Income Tax certificates for determining the market value is rejected to that extent. However, this does not decide the controversy against the Petitioner. The case of the Petitioner succeeds on a different basis, namely that the instruments formed part of one transaction and were required to be considered under Section 4. 


# 36. The Respondents have relied upon the Annual Statement of Rates and the rate of Rs. 16,800/- per square metre. On that basis, the market value of Rs. 61,09,89,500/- was arrived at. This calculation is based upon the assumption that the market value prevailing on 19 March 2012 was relevant for imposing full ad valorem stamp duty on the Conveyance. There is no material placed before this Court to show that the mathematical calculation based upon the applicable Annual Statement of Rates was, by, incorrect. The case of the Petitioner does not require this Court to hold that the market value of the property in 2012 was not Rs. 61,09,89,500/-. That question loses its importance once it is held that the instrument of 2012 was one amongst several instruments employed for completing the earlier transaction and was required to be considered under Section 4.


# 37. The impugned orders have proceeded on the basis that because the earlier documents and the final Conveyance were described differently, Section 4 could not apply. This approach does not consider the statutory requirement whether the several instruments were “employed for completing the transaction”. The Authorities have concentrated on the separate names and descriptions of the documents. The continuous nature of the transaction and the fact that the final Conveyance completed the transfer contemplated under the earlier arrangements has not been given proper effect. The first Authority has observed that possession under the earlier documents was only for development and was in the nature of a licence, whereas possession after execution of the Conveyance was different. It is true that the earlier documents use words concerning development rights and licence. However, the documents give substantial authority to the Petitioner to enter the property, carry out construction and development and continue such rights until the ownership rights were transferred. The document of 1999 records actual and open possession. Therefore, even if the possession under the earlier instruments was described as being for development, that fact by does not establish that the subsequent Conveyance was a separate transaction having no connection with those instruments. The later Conveyance was for completing the transfer contemplated under the earlier arrangements. Section 4 deals with such a situation where more than one instrument is used for completing one transaction.


# 38. The appellate Authority has referred to the failure of the Petitioner to register the earlier documents within the prescribed period and has treated such delay as a circumstance against the Petitioner. The material shows that the earlier agreements were executed in 1995 and 1999, whereas the Supplementary Agreements were registered in 2003. The record shows that the Authority considered the provisions of the Registration Act concerning delayed presentation. Such circumstance may have consequences under the Registration Act or in relation to the manner in which the earlier documents were dealt with. However, delay in registration cannot convert a transaction which otherwise appears to be one continuous transaction into several independent transactions for the purpose of Section 4. The question under Section 4 still remains whether the several instruments were employed for completing one transaction. That question has to be answered by considering the documents and the whole transaction together.


# 39. The Authorities have referred to a notice dated 23 December 1997. According to the record, the Petitioner was informed that the earlier document was liable to stamp duty under Article 25 as an Agreement for Sale or deemed conveyance. The appellate order records that despite this notice, the Petitioner did not pay stamp duty at that stage and paid duty at the rate of 1%. This circumstance does show that the conduct of the Petitioner in relation to payment of stamp duty cannot be said to be free from doubt. It shows that the Revenue had, at an earlier stage, considered the document from another legal angle. However, the present proceeding is concerned with the legality of the demand of Rs. 2,60,49,475/- on the Conveyance dated 19 March 2012. The conduct of the Petitioner, by, cannot justify a demand which otherwise is not consistent with Section 4. It is necessary to note that the final order directs payment of the alleged deficit stamp duty together with penalty at the rate of 2% per month from the date of execution. The appellate Authority has referred to maximum fine and recovery as arrears of land revenue. The translated order records the conclusion that the document of 2012 was under stamped by Rs. 2,60,49,475/- and directs recovery together with 2% monthly penalty. The foundation of the entire demand is the conclusion that the Conveyance dated 19 March 2012 was liable for stamp duty on the market value prevailing in the year 2012. Once this conclusion cannot be sustained because of the application of Section 4, the consequential demand of deficit stamp duty and the penalty based upon such alleged deficit cannot survive.


# 40. I am, therefore, of the view that this is not a case where the Petitioner can contend that no stamp duty at all was payable on the transaction. It is not possible to accept the Petitioner's submission that the Income Tax certificates fixed the market value for stamp duty purposes. These submissions are rejected to that extent. At the same time, the submission of the Respondents that the earlier Development Agreements and the subsequent Conveyance were separate transactions cannot be accepted. The material on record does not support such a conclusion. The documents show a continuous transaction concerning the same property, the same owners and the Petitioner. Under these documents, rights were created from time to time, possession was dealt with, and the transaction was completed by execution of the Conveyance.


# 41. On overall consideration of the material, I hold that the Agreements dated 9 June 1995 and 31 December 1999, the subsequent instruments and the Conveyance dated 19 March 2012 were several instruments employed for completing one transaction within the meaning of Section 4 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. Merely because different names were given to the documents, that by cannot change this conclusion. Consequently, the benefit of Section 4 could not have been refused only because the earlier documents were described as Development Agreements and the later instrument was described as a Conveyance or Agreement for Sale. The Authorities were required to consider the transaction as a whole and determine the principal instrument for the purpose of charging the highest duty as contemplated by Section 4. In the present case, the manner in which stamp duty was accepted by taking the aggregate consideration of Rs. 5 crore and by giving credit for the amount paid shows that the instruments were treated as connected parts of the same transaction. The later demand based upon the market value of the property as on 19 March 2012, after ignoring the earlier connected instruments for the purpose of Section 4, amounts to treating the same transaction as if a fresh and independent transfer had taken place in the year 2012. Such an approach is not in accordance with the scheme of Section 4.


# 42. For these reasons, the finding of the Authorities that the Petitioner was liable to pay deficit stamp duty of Rs. 2,60,49,475/- on the basis of market value of Rs. 61,09,89,500/- cannot be sustained. The consequential direction for payment of penalty at the rate of 2% per month and other recovery based upon the said alleged deficit cannot survive. The impugned Judgment and Order dated 19 July 2014 passed by the Collector of Stamps and the Order dated 16 March 2015 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Registration and Deputy Controller of Stamps are, therefore, required to be set aside.


# 43. In view of the above discussion, the following order is passed:

  • (i) The Writ Petition is allowed;

  • (ii) The Judgment and Order dated 19 July 2014 passed by Respondent No. 4, the Collector of Stamps, and the Order dated 16 March 2015 passed by Respondent No. 3, the Deputy Inspector General of Registration and Deputy Controller of Stamps, are quashed and set aside; 

  • (iii) The demand for alleged deficit stamp duty of Rs. 2,60,49,475/- in respect of the Deed of Conveyance dated 19 March 2012, together with the consequential penalty and other charges, stands quashed and set aside;

  • (iv) It is declared that, in the facts of the present case, the instruments forming part of the transaction are required to be considered in accordance with Section 4 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, and the Respondents could not treat the Deed of Conveyance dated 19 March 2012 as a wholly independent transaction for levying fresh stamp duty on the market value determined as on the date of execution of the said Deed;

  • (v) Rule is made absolute in the above terms.

  • (vi) There shall be no order as to costs.


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