Relationship Properties Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Veena Ravishankar and Anr.. - However, we are of the considered view that Extension of RERA Registration of a project does not automatically mean that due date for completion are as per the signed Agreement also get extended.

 REAT Karnataka (2025.11.20) in Relationship Properties Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Veena Ravishankar and Anr.. [(2025) ibclaw.in 546 REAT, Appeal No. (K-REAT) 27/2025] held that; 

• However, we are of the considered view that Extension of RERA Registration of a project does not automatically mean that due date for completion are as per the signed Agreement also get extended. The Agreement for Sale and Construction Agreement are legally enforceable documents under Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the Promoters cannot unilaterally alter the due date for handing over unless both the parties agreed to change the due date of handing over possession. 

Excerpts of the Order;

The captioned appeal arises out of the Order dated 14.11.2024 passed by the Karnataka Real Estate Regulatory Authority (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Authority’ for short) in Complaint No.CMP/220321/0009194, whereby the Authority allowed the Complaint filed by the Respondents No.1 /Allottee (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Allottee’ for short) against the Appellant-Promoter(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Promoter’ for short) for relief of interest on delay period and rental compensation upto 18% per annum.

# 2. The brief facts gathered from the pleadings, documents on record, and the impugned order reveal that the Promoter formulated a residential apartment complex in the name and style of ‘PARKWEST’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘Project’) and had obtained the Development Plan from the BDA, and building approval from the BBMP, and constructed the Project in accordance with law. During the course of construction, the Allottee had approached the Promoter and shown her interest to purchase the Unit T4-09-10 known as Maple-B0904, on the 9th floor of ‘Maple Tower’ in the said project, with the super built-up area of 1755 Sq.ft., with single car park, for total consideration of Rs.1,33,01,900/-, exclusive of applicable taxes and accordingly, allotment was made in favour of the Allottee on 01.08.2016. Pursuant to the allotment, the Promoter executed the Agreement of Sale for Rs.50,01,580.91 and Construction Agreement for Rs.83,00,319.09, both on 25.12.2016, out of which, the Allottee had paid Rs.1,02,03,088/-.

# 3. The Promoter was supposed to handover possession of the flat by 31.12.2019, with an additional grace period of 6 months, that is upto 30.06.2020 as per Clause-2 of the Construction Agreement, subject to Clause-10 of the said Agreement i.e. variation on account of Force Majeure. In the event of non-handing over the flat in time otherwise set out in Clause-10 of the Construction Agreement, the Promoter was required to pay a sum of Rs.5/- per Sq.Ft. per month as delay compensation till the registration of the said flat at the time of handing over the possession.

# 4. Further, in the Memorandum of Appeal, it is averred that, during the course of completion of the said project in the year 2020, the project got affected by COVID-19 pandemic, due to which the construction activity had to be stopped for several months. Due to the impact of COVID-19 pandemic, the Authority had extended the project completion date till 30.09.2022. After completion of the project, the Promoter filed application before the BBMP on 12.08.2022 to issue Occupancy Certificate. As there was a delay in procurement of Occupancy Certificate, the Promoter obtained further extension from the Authority upto 31.03.2023.

# 5. As there was a delay in completion of the subject Project, the Allottee lodged a Complaint No.CMP/220321/0009194 and sought for compensation & house rent with interest @18% p.a. till date; monthly compensation with 18% rate and monthly rental for further delay; no RERA extensions and no new tower to be registered without the consent of the Allottee.

# 6. In the Statement of Objections before the Authority, the Promoter has denied all the allegations made against it and contended that the Promoter has obtained Occupancy Certificate from BBMP on 25.01.2023 and initiated the process of handing over the possession to the Allottees. The Promoter never intentionally delayed the completion of the project but only due to several reasons which are beyond the control of the Promoter including Force Majeure due to COVID-19 which considerably impacted the project completion timeline. In the meantime, the Promoter requested the Allottee to forego the delay period interest due to COVID-19, but the efforts of Promoter went in vain. The Promoter has relied on the Judgment of the M/s.Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt.Ltd. Vs. State of UP & Ors. and contended that granting of compensation at 18% & monthly rental compensation does not comes under the jurisdiction of the Authority to adjudicate.

# 7. In response to the Objections of the Promoter, the Allottee has filed written submission before the Authority stating that she has already paid 90% of the sale consideration. As the flat was not fully ready, the Allottee inspected the property on 04.07.2023 and was able to identify 108 defects, out of which 50 were major defects. The Carpet area also was found to be less by 61.31 Sq.feet and the said flat is not ready for registration. Further, the Allottee stated that the Promoter has not obtained Occupancy Certificate and only secured a Partial Occupancy Certificate before the Authority, subject to fulfillment of 20 conditions by the Promoter. But the Promoter has not produced any kind of proof before the Authority to have complied with the conditions imposed by the BBMP. However, on 06.02.2024, the Engineering team visited the Project and inspected the works done by the Promoter. The Engineering team was satisfied with the repair works completed by the Promoter as specified by the Allottee in the Complaint, which is seconded by the Allottee too.

# 8. After hearing arguments of Promoter as well as the Allottee, the Authority allowed the Complaint cited supra on 14.11.2024 which is as under:

• The Promoter is hereby directed to pay interest on delay period on the amount paid by the Allottee i.e. Rs.1,02,03,088/- to the Allottee within 60 days from the date of this Order calculated at the rate of SBI MCLR plus 2% from 01.07.2020 to 06.02.2024. Further directed to handover possession by way of execution of Sale Deed of the flat bearing No.T4-09-10 known as Maple B0904, on the 9th Floor of Maple Tower project in favour of the complainant on immediate effect on receipt of balance sale consideration if any. With regard to prayer of the Allottee for rental compensation upto 18% per annum from the Promoter, the Allottee is at liberty to file a separate complaint before the Adjudicating Officer, KRERA. The Allottee is at liberty to enforce the said order in accordance with law if the respondent fails to comply with this order. No Order as to costs.”

# 9. Aggrieved by the said Impugned Judgment, the Promoter has preferred the present Appeal. The Promoter has further contended that as the Promoter has procured the Occupancy Certificate in the month of Jan-2023 and made the unit in liveable condition after having rectified the snags identified by the Allottee on 04.07.2023, hence, the question of paying delay period interest till 06.02.2024 i.e. the date of inspection of Allottee does not arise. The Promoter has contended that as the said Project is coming under the purview of RERA Act 2016, the Promoter is liable to pay interest on delay period from the month of delay as per Sec.18(1) of RERA Act, and, similarly, the Allottee also is liable to pay the interest on delayed payment of installments by her, as per Sec.19(7) of RERA Act, 2016. The Promoter has further contended that as the Promoter has already procured the Occupancy Certificate in the month of January-2023 and made the unit in liveable condition after having rectified the snags identified by the Allottee on 04.07.2023, the question of paying delay period interest till 06.02.2024 i.e. the date of inspection of Authority does not arise.

# 10. The Promoter further contended in the Appeal that, as the completion date of the said project falls during the period of COVID-19 pandemic, the Promoter was not able to complete the project due to lockdown and the resultant shortage of manpower, machinery and materials. Accordingly, request has been made to Allottee as well as Authority to deduct the delay period interest for 9 months, but they have not deducted the interest for 9 months. From April-2023 onwards, the Promoter has been requesting the Allottee to come forward for inspection and to take possession of the subject flat as per Sec. 19(10) of the RERA Act, but the Allottee has failed in her performance. The Impugned Order passed by the Authority is manifestly arbitrary manner, erroneous, which is contrary to law, facts of the case and accordingly prayed for following reliefs:

• i) To allow the Appeal by setting aside the Impugned Order dated 14.11.2024 passed by the Authority;

• ii) To modify the date of interest from 01.07.2020 till the date of offer of possession with invoice i.e. upto 22.07.2023 on the amount paid by the Allottee i.e. Rs.1,02,03,088/- in lieu of date of interest from the period 01.07.2020 till 04.02.2024 as decided by the Authority;

• iii) To direct the Allottee to deduct the interest on delay period for 9 months as moratorium period under Covid-19 pandemic out of the interest accrued under prayer-ii;

• iv) To give direction to Allottee to pay the interest on delay for the balance sale consideration amount of Rs.51,23,445/- from 22.07.2023 till the date of realization.

# 11. In response to the notice, the Allottee appeared before the Tribunal through her counsel and filed Statement of Objections to the Memorandum of Appeal inter alia contending that the appeal is not maintainable either in law or on facts and is therefore liable to be dismissed in limine. The Appeal is barred by limitation and the reasons assigned for delay, cannot be countenanced in law, hence the Appeal deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. The present Appeal is filed with an intention to delay the handover of the apartment unit and to cause annoyance to the Allottee.

# 12. Further, it is contended by the Allottee in her Statement of Objections that she is a senior citizen aged about 64 years, has invested her life savings for securing a residential dwelling for peaceful habitation. The Allottee has also obtained loan from State Bank of India to purchase the apartment and is compelled to pay the EMIs apart from incurring monthly rental losses. She has not denied entering Agreement for Sale and Construction Agreement on 25.12.2016 with respect to the subject apartment and conditions prevailed therein. The Allottee contended that a Force Majeure clause does not permit indefinite suspension of obligations, nor does it empower one party to unilaterally modify the terms of the Agreement.

# 13. Further, it is contended by the Allottee that the apartment was not ready in all aspects neither on the date the Occupancy Certificate was applied nor on the date when the partial Occupancy Certificate was issued. The Promoter has cured the defects pointed out by the Allottee only on 06.02.2024, except the carpet area. There is a shortfall to the tune of about 29.92 sq.ft. of carpet area after duly factoring the 5% allowable variation in terms of the Agreements, which ought to be compensated by the Promoter. The Allottee further contended that she was not allowed to conduct proper inspection with the necessary tools and was only allowed to conduct inspection using measuring tape and distometer.

# 14. Insofar as the contention of the Promoter that this Allottee did not come forward to take possession of the apartment, the Allottee submitted that since the proceedings before the Authority were still being heard and the Promoter at no point of time, informed the Authority that they were ready and willing to handover the possession of the apartment to the Allottee. Since the Appellant has not complied with the Order of the Authority, a Revenue Recovery Certificate dated 28.02.2025 was issued by the Authority for execution, however, the Promoter, with the sole intention to delay the execution of the said order, filed the present Appeal on 28.03.2025 with the sole intention to harass and arm twist this Allottee for a settlement. With these contentions raised in her Objections, the Allottee prayed this Tribunal to dismiss the Appeal, with exemplary costs; award costs of this proceeding and pass such other or further Order as deemed suitable.

The oral arguments submitted by the Appellant-Promoter on 27.03.2025:

# 15. The learned Counsel for the Promoter, more or less reiterated the points made in the Appeal Memo and further submitted hat his dispute with the Order of the Authority is with regards to the dates for calculation of interest since the Authority has awarded interest from 01.07.2020 to 06.07.2024, and 06.02.2024 is neither the date of Occupancy Certificate nor the date on which the Promoter intimated the Allottee to take over the possession, but the date of inspection by the Authority, which is not relevant for the purpose of calculation of interest.

15.1. He submitted that as per Clause-2 of Construction Agreement, the due date for completion was 30.01.2019 with a grace period of 6 months. The due date for completion, therefore, was right in the middle of COVID pandemic, and the Authority has extended the project completion date initially till 30.09.2022, and subsequently till 31.03.2023.

15.2. Learned Counsel for the Promoter stated that the Promoter received the Occupancy Certificate on 25.01.2023 and sent the e-mail to the Allottee on 04.04.2023 to submit necessary data for execution of Sale Deed. Since the Allottee wanted to get the inspection done by 3rd party which is not provided in the Construction Agreement, the Promoter asked the Allottee to come for the inspection on 29.06.2023.

15.3. The invoice was sent to the Allottee to pay the balance amount to get the Sale Deed executed. The total consideration was Rs.1.53 crores, of which the Allottee had paid Rs.1.02 crores leaving the balance of Rs.51 lakhs. The Promoter offered to give discount of Rs.23.76 lakhs towards compensation for the delay and asked to pay the net balance amount of Rs.27.46 lakhs. However, the Allottee refused to avail of this offer although, all other Allottees had agreed to similar proposal.

15.4. The Allottee insisted on a second inspection which was done in the month of December 2023 on 02.12.2023. The Promoter sent an e-mail to the Allottee on 11.12.2023 to release the balance payment. Since the Allottee had filed the complaint before the Authority in the mean time, the Authority offered to get the inspection done which took place on 06.02.2024 and the Authority confirmed at para No.27 of their Order that the unit was ready for possession and the Allottee also agreed and was satisfied with the finishing work and gave her consent in writing. The Promoter wrote to the Allottee by e-mail on 07.03.2024, 25.06.2024, 26.06.2024 to take over the possession but she still raised some issues pertaining to carpet area and did not come forward to take possession. The Promoter argued that once the Occupancy Certificate is issued and an Offer letter is made, he is not liable for any delay period interest, since the delay is on the part of the Allottee and therefore, for all delays beyond the first inspection on 04.07.2023, he is not liable to pay any compensation for delay after July 2023. The Promoter claims that the Allottee has not paid the balance amount towards the total sale consideration and requested that the delay period may be calculated on 31.07.2023 when the first inspection was made and that amount may be adjusted towards sale consideration.

15.5. The learned Counsel for the Promoter submitted a circular of Maharastra RERA dated 18.05.2020, Case Law pertaining to Balaji Construction Company Vs. Chintan Mahesh Sha in the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka and an Office Order of U.P. RERA, in support of his arguments and prayed that his Appeal be allowed and the date of interest be modified from 01.07.2020 till date of Offer of Possession with invoice upto 22.07.2023 and to direct the Allottee to pay interest on delay on her part for balance sale consideration.

Oral arguments made by the Counsel for Allottee on 18.08.2025 :

# 16. The learned Counsel submitted that the Promoter has contended that the Allottee did not come forward to take over possession to which the reply of the Allottee is that the Occupancy Certificate is issued when the matter was pending before the Authority. The Promoter have stated in their argument that the interest was awarded by the Authority from 01.07.2020 to 06.02.2024 and that the Promoter is agreeable to pay interest till 31.07.2023, but is not agreeable to pay interest from 01.08.2023 to 06.02.2024. The Counsel further argued that due date for completion was pre-Covid which is 31.12.2019 with grace period additional six months, but the actual due date for handing over possession was 31.12.2019 and the additional six months period cannot be included while computing the due date for completion. The Counsel further argued that if there was any Force Majeure condition, the Promoter should have notified the Allottee about the same which he did not do. Also, that the Occupancy Certificate was issued on 25.01.2023 and Covid lockdown had not continued till that date, which goes to prove that indeed, there was delay in completing the Project.

16.1. The learned Counsel for Allottee also submitted that the Promoter sent e-mail to Allottee on 25.01.2023 informing about receiving Occupancy Certificate and again on 16.06.2023 to say that they are ready to handover property to the Allottee. Further, Allottee scheduled an inspection and three inspections were held and the defects were finally rectified beyond 26.06.2024. The Counsel disputed the stand taken by the Promoter that the Allottee had delayed the payment by stating that the Allottee has made all the payments as required, except for last installment, which was to be paid at the time of registration of the Sale Deed. The Allottee sent e-mail on 27.01.2025 offering to pay the final installment after deduction of interest on delay period. The Counsel further submitted that the Promoter has not complied with the Orders of the Authority to execute the Sale Deed and that Promoter has not given any reasoning for calculating interest till 31.07.2023.

# 17. Heard the arguments of learned counsel for the Promoter as well as Allottee. The Counsel for Promoter has a filed a Memo and produced the following documents:

i) Circular of MAHA RERA dated 18.05.2020 vide Order No.14/2020 wherein it is stated that the Force Majeure period will be treated as a “moratorium period” for the purpose of calculating the interest under Sec.12, 18, 19(4) and 19(7) of the Act.

ii) Order passed in Second Appeal No.731/2023 dated 20.02.2024 in the case of Balaji Construction Company Vs. Chintan Mahesh Shah by the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Bombay, wherein it is held that “While computing the interest payable to the Respondents at the time of delivery of possession, the period covered by the moratorium will have to be excluded. Thus, the amount of interest during moratorium period is not payable by the Appellant even in future”

iii) Order dated 18.08.2021 vide No.7225/U.P. RERA/Extension /Compliances /Order /LKO/2021-22 wherein in the representation of the CREDAI and NAREDCO, two confederations, requested that, Complete waiver of refund/interest/penalties compensation pertaining to the extended period of projects and no benefits to be passed on to the homebuyers as provided under Clause 7 of the Agreement for Sale.

# 18. On the other hand the counsel for the Allottee filed a memo along with E-mails dated 25.01.2023, 16.06.2023, 10.07.2023, 22.07.2023 and 11.12.2023.

# 19. The points that would arise for our consideration are:

• i) Whether the Appellant/Promoter is entitled for the relief claimed in the Appeal?

• ii) Whether the Impugned Order dated 14.11.2024 needs to be set aside?

• iii) What Order?

# 20. Our findings on aforesaid point No.(i)and (ii) is partly in the affirmative for the following:

REASONS

# 21. Point No.(i): To reiterate the essential facts briefly, the Allottee entered into an Agreement for Sale and Construction Agreement on 25.12.2016 to purchase Unit No. T4-09-10 on the 9th floor of ‘Maple Tower’ in the project named ‘PARKWEST’ developed by the Promoter for a total consideration of Rs.50,01,580.91 towards undivided share of the land area and Rs.83,00,319/- towards construction, totaling to Rs.1,33,01,900/-. As per the Construction Agreement, the Promoter was supposed to handover possession of the flat by 30.06.2020, which includes grace period of Six months, subject to Clause-10 of Construction Agreement regarding likely delay on account of Force Majeure. The Promoter would have to pay a sum of Rs.5/- per Sq. Ft. per month, if he failed to handover possession as per the Agreement till Registration of the said flat at the time of handing over possession.

# 22. It is the case of the Promoter that the project got affected by Covid Pandemic, as a result of which, he could file application to the BBMP for issue of Occupancy Certificate only on 12.08.2022 and the BBMP issued Partial Occupancy Certificate on 25.01.2023 after the Promoter had completed the project. The Promoter obtained extension of RERA Registration from RERA till 30.09.2022 which was further extended till 31.03.2023. As there was delay in completion of the project, the Allottee filed Complaint No.CMP/220321/0009194 and sought for delay compensation and house rent with interest @ 18% per annum. It is further case of the Promoter that delay was due to the factors beyond the control of the Promoter on account of Covid-19 and the Promoter requested the Allottee to forego the delay period interest due to Covid-19 but there was no resolution of the dispute between the Promoter and the Allottee in this regard.

# 23. The Allottee has claimed that she had almost paid 90% of the sale consideration, and eventually, when she received offer from the Promoter to inspect the property, and upon first inspection on 04.07.2023, she found several defects including some shortfall in the Carpet Area. The Allottee also argued that the Promoter had only secured Partial Occupancy Certificate, which was subject to fulfillment of 20 conditions by the Promoter. Two more inspections were done, one on 02.12.2023, and the final one on 06.02.2024 when the Engineering team from the Authority inspected the works, and the Team as well as Allottee were satisfied with the repair works undertaken by the Promoter.

# 24. Allottee’s Complaint before the Authority was allowed and the Promoter was directed to pay interest on delay period on the total amount paid by the Allottee to be calculated at the rate of SBI MCLR plus 2% from 01.07.2020, being the scheduled date of inspection, till 06.02.2024 being the date on which the Engineering Team inspected the work and reported that the repair works were satisfactorily completed, the Promoter was also directed to handover possession by executing Sale Deed immediately on receipt of balance sale consideration, if any. Aggrieved by this Judgment, the Promoter preferred the present Appeal before the Tribunal. The Promoter has contended that he obtained the Occupancy Certificate on 25.01.2023 and rectified the snags on 04.07.2023 and hence he is not liable to pay interest from 01.08.2023 till 06.02.2024. He also claimed that since there was delay in payment installment by the Allottee also, the Allottee also is liable to pay interest as per Section 19(7) of the RERA Act.

# 25. The reason given by the Promoter for delay in completion of the Project is that completion date of the project falls during the period of ‘COVID Pandemic’ and also that the Promoter has been requesting Allottee to come forward for inspection and to take possession of the flat as per Section 19(10) of the RERA Act but, the Allottee did not come forward to do so. The Allottee has also contended that Force Majeure clause does not permit indefinite suspension of the obligation on the part of the Promoter. The Allottee has also contended that the defects found out by the Allottee were rectified only on 06.02.2024, except the Carpet Area, which is still unresolved. The Allottee has submitted that since the Complaint proceedings were being heard before the Authority, she did not come forward to take possession till the matter was resolved before the Authority.

# 26. We therefore, need to examine whether the delay in completion of the project is covered under the valid grounds such as lockdown variation, etc., and if so, how much of the delay can be attributed to Force Majeure factors, and for how much delay does the promoter have to pay interest towards delay compensation. We have also need to examine with reference to Extension of RERA Registration for the project from time-to-time and whether Extension of the RERA Registration would automatically mean if due date of completion also needs extended by virtue of the Extension of RERA Registration.

# 27. We have examined Clause-19 of the Construction Agreement regarding Force Majeure in this regard. We find that in Clause Force Majeure, nine circumstances for Force Majeure have been laid down. In the said Clause, not only Force Majeure condition laid down in explanation of Section 6 of the RERA were included, but also factors such as non-availability of building materials, Labour, delays in grant of NOC from various authorities, any change in rules and regulations by any Authority, Labour strike etc., and also any other eventuality which is beyond the reasonable control of the Developer.

# 28. The Explanation at Section-6 defines “Force Majeure to mean a case of war, flood, drought, fire, cyclone, earthquake or any other calamity caused by nature affecting the regular development of the real estate project.’ The Covid Pandemic, undoubtedly, falls under the definition of Force Majeure as described in Explanation above, but for some of the other factors illustrated in Section-10, such as non-availability of men and materials, or obtaining permission and approval etc. from competent authorities are something which are the direct responsibility of the Promoter and cannot, in our considered view, be included in the Force Majeure condition to escape liability for payment of delay compensation due to these factors. Merely the fact that the Allottee has signed the Construction Agreement and Sale Agreement which included this Clause does not mean that the entitlement of the Allottee for getting delay period interest for factors which are not genuinely Force Majeure will get adversely affected. It is the direct responsibility of the Promoter to ensure availability of men and material and to get the necessary permissions, approvals and certificates within the stipulated time and he cannot take shelter from including these factors in the Agreement to be valid grounds for denying the delay period interest to the Allottee.

# 29. Next main issue that we need to examine is whether Extension of RERA Registration would tantamount automatically to extension in the project completion date as per the Sale and Construction Agreement. We have examined the extensions granted by RERA to this project as per which first Extension was granted on 08.01.2021 for a period of 9 months until 30.09.2021 and the second Extension for Registration was granted on 05.10.2021 for further period of 12 months till 30.09.2022. Section 6 of the RERA Act is relevant provision regarding Extension of Registration which reads as under:

• “6. The registration granted under section 5 may be extended by the Authority on an application made by the promoter due to Force Majeure, in such form and on payment of such fee as may be specified by regulations made by the Authority:

• Provided that the Authority may in reasonable circumstances, without default on the part of the promoter, based on the facts of each case, and for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the registration granted to a project for such time as it considers necessary, which shall, in aggregate, not exceed a period of one year:

• Provided further that no application for extension of registration shall be rejected unless the applicant has been given an opportunity of being heard in the matter.

• Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, the expression “Force Majeure” shall mean a case of war, flood, drought, fire, cyclone, earthquake or any other calamity caused by nature affecting the regular development of the real estate project.”

# 30. It is clear that Registration can be extended by the Authority due to Force Majeure based on the facts of each case and that reasons for the same should be recorded in writing. We find that no such reasons have been recorded while granting Extension. However, this is a lapse on the part of the Authority for which the Promoter not be held responsible.

# 31. However, we are of the considered view that Extension of RERA Registration of a project does not automatically mean that due date for completion are as per the signed Agreement also get extended. The Agreement for Sale and Construction Agreement are legally enforceable documents under Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the Promoters cannot unilaterally alter the due date for handing over unless both the parties agreed to change the due date of handing over possession. We are of the view that the Registration of project forms the core and substance of RERA Act, as it provides a framework for regulation. Registration process ensures that complete and accurate information is available to the buyers, thereby enhancing the transparency and credibility, and justice to both Promoter & Allottees. Registration of project reduces the risk of asymmetry of information between Seller and the Buyer and provides preventative, curable measures to all stakeholders. The mere fact that the Unit purchased by the Allottee is ready for possession does not imply that Registration of the project can be dispensed with since the promoter is required not only to complete the works pertaining to the purchased property but also to ensure that all external and internal development works in the entire project as described in Section 2(w) and 2(zb) of the RERA Act are fully completed. RERA Registration or extension of registration also allows Promoters to not only continue the development work but also to market & sell unsold units in the project which otherwise could become challenging without the assurance of a valid RERA Registration. Registration of the project establishes the legal framework which not only regulates future development but also extends its reach retroactively to projects which were not complete in all respects. While RERA Registration and its Extension allows the Promoter to continue to complete the development works and market/sale the unsold units, but it does not automatically modify date of possession which is a contractual obligation to which Promoters have to adhere to unless there are Force Majeure circumstance, and if developers failed to deliver possession at the contractual date, Allottees can approach the RERA for compensation or refund unless the Extension is on account of Force Majeure circumstance.

# 32. This brings us to the consideration of the subject as to the dates of lockdown on account of Covid Pandemic issued by RERA or any other Court of law from time-to-time. We have perused the Circular of RERA dated 04.04.2020, where in projects for which completion date expires on or after 15.03.2020, the period of validity of Registration of such projects may be extended by six months by invoking Force Majeure clause. Therefore, since this project was due for handover on 30.06.2020 which is during the Covid period, due date for completion gets extended by three months to 30.09.2020. Further extension for completion of RERA project was issued by RERA on 18.12.2020 in view of the prevailing Covid situation under which, the completion period was extended for a further period of three months. Therefore, completion period of this project on account of Force Majeure stands extended to 31.12.2020. RERA also issued another Notification dated 18.12.2020, as per which the due date of completion was extended for a further period of three months by invoking Force Majeure clause. Therefore, the due date of completion gets extended for a total period of 9 months till 31.03.2021.

# 33. The reason for extending the due date for completion from 31.06.2020, as agreed in the Construction Agreement, and not from 15.03.2020 being date of first RERA Circular as per which the validity of Registration was extended by invoking the Force Majeure clause due to Covid Pandemic, is that if the extended period permitted by the RERA Circular is computed from 15.03.2020, then the Promoter will get no additional time to complete the project on account of Covid, although the Covid Pandemic occurred during the agreed period allowed for completion of the project to the Promoter as per the Agreement. The Promoter hence is liable to pay interest to the Allottee as per RERA Act from 31.03.2021 till the date of issuance of Occupancy Certificate and intimation of the same to the Allottee for taking over possession.

# 34. It is admitted fact that the Occupancy Certificate was issued on 25.01.2023 and the Allottee was asked to come forward for inspection of the property on 29.06.2023. First inspection was conducted on 04.07.2023 in which several observations were made with regard to snags. The second inspection was undertaken on 02.12.2023 in which some of the unsolved problems were noted, after which the snags were rectified and it was noted on 06.02.2024 i.e. in the third inspection report, that all the repair works were completed to the satisfaction of the inspection team as well as the Allottee.

# 35. The report regarding Carpet area inspection was also submitted as per which the Carpet area is shown as 1232 sq.ft. as per the Agreement, but the actual measurement was found to be 1170.69 sq.ft., the difference being 61.31 sq.ft. We notice that in the order of the Authority, no direction has been given with regard to this issue and shortfall in the carpet area.

# 36. While it is admitted fact that Occupancy Certificate was given by BBMP on 25.01.2023 and the Promoter sent Email to Allottee to come for inspection on 29.06.2023 and communication was sent by the Promoter to the Allottee even after 06.02.2024, on 07.03.2024, 25.06.2024 & 26.06.2024 but the Allottee still raised some issues and did not take possession of the property. The Promoter has contended that once Occupancy Certificate is issued, though he is not liable to pay interest from the date he asked on 29.06.2023 to the Allottee to come for inspection and take possession. He is, however, agreeable to pay interest till 31.07.2023 after the first inspection report on 04.07.2023 when he claimed that he rectified the defects.

# 37. We are of the considered view that once Occupancy Certificate has been issued, and the intimation has been sent by the Promoter to the Allottee informing her about the same, it is the responsibility of the Allottee to take the possession and if the Allottee has any grievance with regard to defects etc. she can claim compensation for the defects but, cannot indefinitely delay in taking over possession for one reason or the other. An Allottee cannot refuse to take possession of a property solely on the grounds of snags or defects once the Occupancy Certificate has been issued. The Occupancy Certificate is considered as conclusive proof of project completion under RERA and while the Allottee is entitled to claim compensation for the defects or deficiencies but cannot claim interest for delay in handing over possession once the Occupancy Certificate is issued and intimation is sent to the Allottee to take over the possession.

# 38. In this case, however, since several defects which were pointed out in the First Inspection Report which were subsequently rectified to the satisfaction of the inspection team and the Allottee on 06.02.2024, we consider it acceptable to make an exception and held that the Promoter is liable to pay interest for the delay period from 31.03.2021 till 06.02.2024. With regard to the Carpet area, since no finding has been given by the Authority in its Order, the Allottee may approach the Authority for compensation in this regard if she wishes to do so.

# 39. We have considered Citations given by the Promoter regarding RERA Circulars for treating Force Majeure period as moratorium period for the purpose of calculating interest and the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay where it is laid down that the ‘moratorium period’ will have to be excluded while computing interest. We are of the view that the above Citations are relevant to the matter at hand.

# 40. With the above observations, we answer the point (i) & (ii) partly in the ‘affirmative’ and proceed to pass the following:

ORDER

• 1) The Appeal is partly allowed;

• 2) The impugned order dated 14.11.2024 passed by the 2nd Respondent-Karnataka Real Estate Regulatory Authority in Complaint No.CMP/220321/0009194 is hereby set aside;

• 3) The Promoter is directed to pay interest on delay period on the amount paid by the Allottee of Rs.1,02,03,088/- at the rate of SBI MCLR plus 2% from 31.03.2021 till 06.02.2024.

• 4) The Registry is directed to release the amount entitled to be paid to the Allottee as per Direction No.3, from out of the amount of Rs.36,20,769/- deposited by the Promoter, by issuing bankers cheque/DD in favour of the Respondent No.1-Allottee, after the expiry of the appeal period and by following the due procedure;

• 5) The Registry is directed to release the remaining amount, if any, in favour of the Appellant-Promoter, by issuing the bankers cheque/DD in the name of the Appellant.

• 6) The Promoter is directed to handover possession by way of execution of Sale Deed in favour of the Allottee with immediate effect on receipt of balance sale consideration;

• 7) The Allottee is at liberty to file Complaint before the Authority with regard to the prayer for shortfall in the Carpet area and rental compensation;

• 8) In view of disposal of the main appeal, pending I.As., if any, shall stand disposed of, as they do not survive for consideration;

• 9) Registry is hereby directed to comply with the provision of Section 44(4) of the Act and to return the record to RERA, if received.

There is no order as to costs. 

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Mantri Developer Pvt Ltd vs Mr Snil Pathiyam Veetil - we make it clear that the amount which has been determined and refundable to the allottees/homebuyers either by the Authority or the adjudicating officer in terms of the order is recoverable within the ambit of Section 40(1) of the Act.

 HC Karnataka (2025.10.31) in Mantri Developer Pvt Ltd vs Mr Snil Pathiyam Veetil [WRIT PETITION No. 17821 OF 2025 (GM-CPC)] held that; 

• we make it clear that the amount which has been determined and refundable to the allottees/homebuyers either by the Authority or the adjudicating officer in terms of the order is recoverable within the ambit of Section 40(1) of the Act.

• It is settled principle of procedure that recovery of land revenue cannot be pursued through an execution petition before a civil Court, it lies within the province of the jurisdictional Revenue Authority, ordinarily the Tahsildar.

• The Allahabad High Court enunciates that the order passed by RERA whether emanating from the Adjudicating Officer or the Appellate Tribunal, does not partake the character of a decree, within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the CPC and therefore, cannot be executed through the procedural avenue of Order XXI of the CPC.

• A reading of the aforesaid provision itself makes it clear that by creating a legal fiction, the order of the Appellate Tribunal has been recognised to be a decree only for limited purpose of execution but not for the purposes of filing an appeal against it.

• Therefore, for the purposes of appeal under Section 58 of the R.E.R.A. the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal would remain to be an order simpliciter and would not be a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the CPC.

• The order passed by Real Estate Regulatory Authority or by the Appellate Tribunal on Appeal arising out of such proceedings maybe executable as a decree of a civil court but the Appellate Tribunal will have all the powers of the civil court only in respect of execution of its orders.

• All the judgments of different High Courts in one singular voice holds that the order of the Adjudicating Officer, the Authority or the Appellate Tribunal under the Act is not a decree, as obtaining 2(2) of the CPC.

Excerpts of the Order;

The petitioner, in the batch of these petitions, is common and the respondents are different. The issue that is projected in these petitions is also common. It is therefore these petitions are taken up together and are considered by this common order.

# 2. Facts adumbrated are as follows:

The petitioner is the judgment debtor before the Executing Court in different execution petitions pending before the concerned Court. The Execution Petition reaches the Executing Court on a particular circumstance. The respondents, in all these cases, are homebuyers. They approach the Real Estate Regulatory Authority (‘RERA’ for short) seeking certain relief. The RERA passes an order granting certain benefits to the respondents on 30-06-2023 and

03-08-2023 respectively. In order to enforce the orders, the respondents would approach the Civil Court seeking execution of the said order by registering different execution petitions. Before the Executing Court, the petitioner files an application invoking Section 47 of the CPC to terminate the execution proceedings on the score of lack of jurisdiction to execute the decree or the order passed by RERA. The said applications comes to be rejected by the concerned Court, which has led the petitioner to this Court, in all these petitions.

# 3. Heard the learned senior counsel Sri M.S.Shyamsundar appearing for petitioner and Sri Srinivas V, learned counsel appearing for respondents in all these petitions.

# 4. The learned senior counsel Sri M.S.Shyamsundar appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the trial Court has no jurisdiction to execute an order that is passed by RERA through an execution petition preferred by the beneficiaries of the order who call themselves decree holders. It is his contention that Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (‘RERA Act’ for short) is a self contained code and has within itself provisions for enforcement of an order. He would further contend that Section 79 of the RERA Act bars any civil Court to have jurisdiction to entertain any petition concerning RERA. The learned counsel would also rely on Rule 26 of the Karnataka Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2017 (‘RERA Rules’ for short) to contend that manner of implementation is also depicted under the Rules and therefore, the civil Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain execution proceedings of an order of RERA. The learned senior counsel places reliance upon certain judgments of the Apex Court, which would all bear consideration qua their relevance in the course of the order.

# 5. Per-contra, the learned counsel representing the respondents, in all these cases, would vehemently refute the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner in contending that the execution petition is undoubtedly maintainable, as an order passed by RERA is a decree and a decree can be executed by the competent civil Court of the jurisdiction. He would seek to place reliance upon certain judgments of the coordinate bench of this Court to buttress his submission that the execution petition is maintainable.

# 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused the material on record.

# 7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The issue lies in a narrow compass of statutory interpretation. The issue is, 

• “Whether the order passed by the RERA or the RERA Appellate Tribunal can be executed by a competent Civil Court by filing an execution petition?”

# 8. To consider the said issue, it becomes necessary to notice certain statutory provisions of the Act. Section 40 of the RERA Act reads as follows:

• “40. Recovery of interest or penalty or compensation and enforcement of order, etc.—

• (1) If a promoter or an allottee or a real estate agent, as the case may be, fails to pay any interest or penalty or compensation imposed on him, by the adjudicating officer or the Regulatory Authority or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, under this Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder, it shall be recoverable from such promoter or allottee or real estate agent, in such manner as may be prescribed as an arrears of land revenue.

• (2) If any adjudicating officer or the Regulatory Authority or the Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be, issues any order or directs any person to do any act, or refrain from doing any act, which it is empowered to do under this Act or the rules or regulations made thereunder, then in case of failure by any person to comply with such order or direction, the same shall be enforced, in such manner as may be prescribed.” (Emphasis supplied)

Section 40 deals with recovery of interest or penalty or compensation and enforcement of an order, inter alia. Section 40(1) clearly indicates that, it is recoverable from such promoter or

an allottee or a real estate agent, in such manner as may be prescribed as arrears of land revenue. Section 79 of the RERA Act reads as follows:

• “79. Bar of Jurisdiction.—No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the Authority or the adjudicating officer or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be  aken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.” (Emphasis supplied)

Section 79 bars jurisdiction of a civil Court to entertain any suit, in respect of any matter which concerns the Authority or the Adjudicating Officer or the Appellate Tribunal. In furtherance of the Act, the RERA Rules are promulgated. Rule 26 of the RERA Rules is germane to be noticed. It reads as follows:

• “26. Manner of implementation of order, direction or decisions of the adjudicating officer, the Authority or the Appellate Tribunal.— For the purpose of sub-section (2) of Section 40, every order passed by the adjudicating officer, regulatory authority or Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be, under the Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder, shall be enforced by the adjudicating officer, regulatory authority or the Appellate Tribunal in the same manner as if it were a decree or order made by the principal civil court in a suit pending therein and it shall be lawful for the adjudicating officer, regulatory authority or Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be, in the event of its inability to execute the order, send such order to the principal civil court, to execute such order either within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the real estate project is located or in the principal civil court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the person against whom the order is being issued, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain.” (Emphasis supplied)

Rule 26 deals with manner of implementation of order, direction or decisions of the Adjudicating Officer, the Authority or the Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, the RERA Act and the RERA Rules framed thereunder are undoubtedly a complete code by itself.

# 9.1. The Apex Court in the case of NEWTECH PROMOTERS AND DEVELOPERS PRIVATE LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS1, has held as follows:

• “116. The further submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants that Section 81 of the Act permits the Authority to delegate such powers and functions to any member of the Authority which are mainly administrative or clerical, and cannot possibly encompass any of the core functions which are to be discharged by the Authority, the judicial functions are nondelegable, as these are the core functions of the Authority. The submission may not hold good for the reason that the power to be exercised by the Authority in deciding complaints under Section 31 of the Act is quasi-judicial in nature which is delegable provided there is a provision in the statute. As already observed, Section 81 of the Act empowers the Authority to delegate its power and functions to any of its members, by general or special order.

• 117. In the instant case, by exercising its power under Section 81 of the Act, the Authority, by a special order dated 5-12-2018 has delegated its power to the Single Member of the Authority to exercise and decide complaints under Section 31 of the Act and that being permissible in law, cannot be said to be dehors the mandate of the Act. At the same time, the power to be exercised by the adjudicating officer who has been appointed by the Authority in consultation with the appropriate Government under Section 71 of the Act, such powers are non- 1(2021)18 SCC 1  delegable to any of its members or officers in exercise of power under Section 81 of the Act.

• 118. That scheme of the Act, 2016 provides an inbuilt mechanism and any order passed on a complaint by the Authority under Section 31 is appealable before the Tribunal under Section 43(5) and further in appeal to the High Court under Section 58 of the Act on one or more ground specified under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, if any manifest error is left by the Authority either in computation or in the amount refundable to the allottee/homebuyer, is open to be considered at the appellate stage on the complaint made by the person aggrieved.

• 119. In view of the remedial mechanism provided under the scheme of the 2016 Act, in our considered view, the power of delegation under Section 81 of the Act by the Authority to one of its member for deciding applications/complaints under Section 31 of the Act is not only well defined but expressly permissible and that cannot be said to be dehors the mandate of law. …. …. ….

• Question 5 : Whether the Authority has the power to issue recovery certificates for recovery of the principal amount under Section 40(1) of the Act? 

• 137. To examine this question, it will be apposite to take note of Section 40 that states regarding the recovery of interest or penalty or compensation to be recovered as arrears of land revenue, and reads as under: 

• “40. Recovery of interest or penalty or compensation and enforcement of order, etc.—(1) If a promoter or an allottee or a real estate agent, as the case may be, fails to pay any interest or penalty or compensation imposed on him, by the adjudicating officer or the Regulatory Authority or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, under this Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder, it shall be recoverable from such promoter or allottee or real estate agent, in such manner as may be prescribed as an arrears of land revenue. 

• (2) If any adjudicating officer or the Regulatory Authority or the Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be, issues any order or directs any  person to do any act, or refrain from doing any act, which it is empowered to do under this Act or the rules or regulations made thereunder, then in case of failure by any person to comply with such order or direction, the same shall be enforced, in such manner as may be prescribed.”

• 138. The submission of the appellants/promoters is that under Section 40(1) of the Act only the interest or penalty imposed by the Authority can be recovered as arrears of land revenue and no recovery certificate for the principal amount as determined by the Authority can be issued. If we examine the scheme of the Act, the power of Authority to direct the refund of the principal amount is explicit in Section 18 and the interest that is payable is on the principal amount in other words, there is no interest in the absence of a principal amount being determined by the competent authority. Further, the statute as such is read to mean that the principal sum with interest has become a composite amount quantified upon to be recovered as arrears of land revenue under Section 40(1) of the Act.

• 139. It is settled principle of law that if the plain interpretation does not fulfil the mandate and object of the Act, this Court has to interpret the law in consonance with the spirit and purpose of the statute. There is indeed a visible inconsistency in the powers of the Authority regarding refund of the amount received by the promoter and the provision of law in Section 18 and the text of the provision by which such refund can be referred under Section 40(1). While harmonising the construction of the scheme of the Act with the right of recovery as mandated in Section 40(1) of the Act keeping in mind theintention of the legislature to provide for a speedy recovery of the amount invested by the allottee along with the interest incurred thereon is self-explanatory. However, if Section 40(1) is strictly construed and it is understood to mean that only penalty and interest on the principal amount are recoverable as arrears of land revenue, it would defeat the basic purpose of the Act. 

• 140. Taking into consideration the scheme of the Act what is to be returned to the allottee is his own life savings with interest on computed/quantified by the Authority becomes recoverable and such arrear becomes enforceable in law. There appears some ambiguity in Section 40(1) of the Act that in our view, by harmonising the provision with the purpose of the Act, is given effect to the provisions is allowed to operate rather running either of them redundant, noticing purport of the legislature and the abovestated principle into consideration, we make it clear that the amount which has been determined and refundable to the allottees/homebuyers either by the Authority or the adjudicating officer in terms of the order is recoverable within the ambit of Section 40(1) of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court holds that the scheme of the RERA Act provides an in-built mechanism for appealing any order passed on a complaint by the Authority under Section 31 of the Act and orders passed by the Authority or the Adjudicating Officer for payment of certain amounts are enforceable and recoverable under Section 40(1) of the Act.

# 9.2. Further, the High Court of Calcutta in the judgment rendered in the case of DEEPAK MAWANDIA V. SHREE RSH PROJECTS PVT LTD., [FMAT 97 OF 2024] has held as follows:

• “The cumulative effect of the aforementioned provisions lead to an inescapable conclusion that the said Act is a self-contained code containing an exhaustive provision relating to a real estate project and the obligations and liabilities of the promoter, allottee and the real estate agent as well as their respective obligations. A complete mechanism is provided for redressal of the grievances of the dispute not only to the allottee but also of the promoter and the real estate agent and therefore, equilibrium is created amongst the respective rights of the parties. By virtue of Section 11(4)(f) it is obligatory on the part of the promoter to execute a registered conveyance deed of the apartment, plot and building in favour of the allottee along with the undivided proportionate title in the common areas to the association of the allottees or he competent authority which is further reiterated under Section 17 in the following:........” (Emphasis supplied)

The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observes that the RERA Act is a self contained code containing exhaustive provisions for redressal of the grievances of disputes not only with respect to the allottee, but also with respect to the promoter and real estate agents.

# 10. The pivotal question now would be, whether an rendered by RERA or its Appellate Tribunal may, in the contemplation of law, be regarded as a decree within the meaning ascribed to the expression under the CPC. Subsection (2) section 2 of the CPC defines a decree as a formal expression of an adjudication made by a competent Civil

Court, conclusively determining the rights of the parties to the lis. Order XXI of the code in turn, delineates the procedure for execution of such decree. An order passed by RERA however, cannot by any stretch of legal interpretation be equated with a decree, so as to invite execution created under the machinery of Order XXI. The Act itself prescribes a distinct and self contained mode of enforcement – the recovery be effected as, arrears of land revenue from the defaulting promoter or allottee. It is settled principle of procedure that recovery of land revenue cannot be pursued through an execution petition before a civil Court, it lies within the province of the jurisdictional Revenue Authority, ordinarily the Tahsildar.

# 11. Jurisprudence is replete with various High Courts across the country, which have examined this very question, albeit, often in the context of orders issued by the Appellate Tribunal under the Act. Those Authorities illuminate the settled position that the machinery of civil execution has no application to orders passed by the Tribunal, as the Act itself has its own efficacious remedy. It is only when there is complete failure after all the efforts taken by the  aggrieved party to get it executed before the Tahsildar as arrears of land revenue, the aggrieved can knock at the doors of the executing Courts, but those would be only on exceptional circumstances.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION:

# 11.1. The Allahabad High Court in the case of SUPERTECH LIMITED v. SUBRAT SEN [2018 SCC OnLine All 5629], has held as follows:

• “21. The ‘decree’ has been defined under Section 2(2) C.P.C. to mean a formal expression of an adjudication which conclusive determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or of any of the matters in controversy in the suit. Section 2(2) of the C.P.C. is as under:

• “decree” means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 144, but shall not include-

• (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or  (b) any order of dismissal for default. 

• Explanation-A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final;

• 22. In the definition of the ‘decree’ three words are important namely adjudication, court and suit. The use of the said words conclusively show that adjudication by the court in a suit only results in a decree. It is also necessary to note that the suit commences with a plaint and ends when a judgement and order is pronounced which culminates into a decree. The decision or the order of the Appellate Tribunal or that of R.E.R.A. do not conform to any of the above requirements of a decree as defined in Section 2(2) C.P.C.

• 23. The definition of a ‘decree’ contained in the above provision brings-forth the three essential conditions viz.

• (i) the adjudication must be in a suit;

• (ii) the suit must start with a plaint and end in a decree; and

• (iii) the adjudication must be formal and final by the court.

• 24. The proceedings before the R.E.R.A. are not in the nature of a suit instituted by filing a plaint rather on a complaint. Accordingly, proceedings before the R.E.R.A. cannot be termed as a suit. Thus the decision or order of R.E.R.A. or by the Appellate Tribunal on an appeal arising out of such proceedings would not be a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) C.P.C.” (Emphasis supplied)

The Allahabad High Court enunciates that the order passed by RERA whether emanating from the Adjudicating Officer or the Appellate Tribunal, does not partake the character of a decree, within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the CPC and therefore, cannot be executed through the procedural avenue of Order XXI of the CPC. The reasoning in the said judgment has accorded persuasive value in subsequent cases before different High Courts.

# 11.2. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of KHILLA COLONIZERS v. SUBHASH JAIN [2021 SCC OnLine MP 6044], has held as follows:

• 3. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Registry of this High Court has wrongly pointed out the objection regarding maintainability of this appeal. The proceedings of RERA are of a summary nature to which the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable. The order of Appellate Tribunal may not betermed as a ‘decree’ under Section 2(2) of the CPC andtherefore, the instant appeal would be maintainable against the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. He also read the provision of Section 58 of RERA and submits that it provides for an appeal against the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal but here does not use the word ‘Second Appeal’ as used in Section 100 of the CPC. It only provides that the appeal can be preferred on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 100 of the CPC. but it does not mean that only Second  Appeal would lie. It is further argued by the counsel that for filing a Second Appeal, the condition precedent is the decree passed in appeal and that too by any Court Sub-ordinate to the High Court. The Appellate Tribunal of RERA is not a Subordinate Court to the High Court and order passed by Appellate Tribunal is not a decree, therefore, Second Appeal would not lie against the said order. In support of his contention, he relied upon the order passed by Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Supertech Ltd. v. Subrat Sen, reported in 2018 SCC OnLine All 5629 : AIR 2019 All 19. He prays for maintainability of this appeal.

• 10. As above noted, the learned counsel for the appellant raised the argument that the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal is not a decree, moreover he argued that the Appellant Tribunal is not a Sub-ordinate Court to the High Court. He has also produced the copy of order passed by Allahabad High Court in the case of Supertech Ltd. (supra) wherein the Bench of Allahabad High Court has considered the relevant provisions of Court Fees Act, RERA as well as Code of Civil Procedure. The Bench found that the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal is not a ‘decree’ for the purposes of filing an appeal under Section 58 of me RERA before the High Court. Before reaching this conclusion, the Bench of Allahabad High Court has also discussed the applicability and scope of Section 57 of RERA wherein it is prescribed that the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal shall be executable as a ‘decree’. After quoting the relevant provision, the Bench has held as under:—

• “26. A reading of the aforesaid provision itself makes it clear that by creating a legal fiction, the order of the Appellate Tribunal has been recognised to be a decree only for limited purpose of execution but not for the purposes of filing an appeal against it. It is settled law that in applying legal fiction one should not travel beyond the limits for which it has been created. In Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 : JT (2006) 10 SC 41 : AIR 2007 SC 168 the Supreme Court in paragraph 36 of the above decision observed that a legal fiction must be limited to the purpose for which it was created. Therefore, for the purposes of appeal under Section 58 of the R.E.R.A. the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal would remain to be an order simpliciter and would not be a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the CPC.”

• 11. The Allahabad High Court further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Diwan Brothers v. Central Bank of India, Bombay, reported in (1976) 3 SCC 800 : AIR 1976 SC 1503, and has held as under:—

• “40. In Diwan Brothers v. Central Bank of India, Bombay, (1976) 3 SCC 800 : AIR 1976 SC 1503 the court was ceased with a matter of payment of court fees in an appeal before the High Court arising from the order of the Tribunal appointed under the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951. In the said case also the question that fell for consideration was whether or not the decision given by the Tribunal under me aforesaid Act could be said to be a decree within the meaning of Article 11 of Schedule II to the Act for the purposes of payment of court fee. 

• 41. The court observed that the Tribunal under the Act cannot be called a court as there is clear distinction between a Tribunal and the Court. The proceedings before the Tribunal do not start with a plaint and as such would not culminate into a decree.

• 42. The mere description of the decision of the Tribunal to be a decree for the limited purpose would not make the decision a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the CPC.”

• 12. Now, it becomes undisputed that the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal under RERA cannot be termed as a ‘decree’ under Section 2(2) of the CPC even though Section 57 of said Act makes the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal executable as a ‘decree’. The order passed by the Bench of Allahabad of High Court is in consonance with the law.” (Emphasis supplied)

# 11.3. The High Court of Allahabad again in the case of PSA IMPEX PRIVATE LIMITED v. REAL ESTATE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL LKO., [2021 SCC OnLine All 215] has held as follows: 

• 78. In Messers Supertek Ltd. v. Subrata Sen, Second Appeal (Def) 341 of 2018, decided on 01.10.2018 by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court was deciding a Reference under Section 5 of the Court Fee Act. 79. The Court has observed that the proceedings before the Real Estate Regulatory Authority are summary in nature to which the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable. The order of the Appellate Tribunal is not a “decree” under Section 2(2) of the C.P.C. This court considered the objects of Real Estate (Development and Regulation) Act and observed that it is a special Legislation which provides for the regulation and promotion of Real Estate by promoting sale of Real Estate in an efficient and transparent manner. It proposes to protect the interest of the purchaser of the real estate and to provide a speedy adjudicating mechanism of the disputes in matters connected therewith. In substance while promoting real estate, it endeavours to protect and safeguard the interest of the investors in real estate. It is, therefore, a kind of beneficial Legislation for the protection of the investor/purchaser of the real estate. The Appellate Tribunal is not a Court subordinate to the High Court and the order of the Appellate Tribunals is not a “decree” as defined under Section 2(2) of the C.P.C. which means “a formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all orany of the matters in controversy in the suit”. 

• 80. The Court observed that in the definition of decree as given under the C.P.C., three words are important namely; adjudication, court and suit. The suit commences with the plaint and ends when the judgement or order is pronounced which culminates into a decree, the order of the Tribunal does not conform to any of the above requirements of a decree as it is rendered on a complaint and is not the result of adjudication in a suit.  The proceeding before Real Estate Regulatory Authority is not in the nature of a suit instituted by filing a plaint. Real Estate Regulatory Authority derives jurisdiction on the complaint. Proceedings before it are not governed by strict Rules of Evidence as in a civil Suit. The order passed by Real Estate Regulatory Authority or by the Appellate Tribunal on Appeal arising out of such proceedings maybe executable as a decree of a civil court but the Appellate Tribunal will have all the powers of the civil court only in respect of execution of its orders. Sometimes, it may also send its orders to a civil court having local jurisdiction for execution in case the person or the property of the Promoter or builder or real estate agent is situated within the local jurisdiction of that Civil Court.

• 81. The Supreme Court has observed in Paramjit Singh Patheja v. I.C.D.S. Ltd., JT (2006) 10 SC 41, in paragraph 36 that a legal fiction must be limited to the purpose for which it was created. In applying a legal fiction, one should not travel beyond the limits for which it has been created. Therefore the order of the Tribunal can only be considered to be a decree to facilitate its execution. It is otherwise similar to Income Tax Appeals filed under Section 260 of the Income Tax Act, which are not to be characterised as Second Appeal even if they are arising out of an Appellate order.

• 82. This Court in Messers Supertek Ltd. (supra), was considering whether orders passed by the Tribunal could be said to be a “decree” and found that unlike regular Civil Court's adjudicating civil suits, the decision on a complaint by an allottee against a Promoter or a real estate agent cannot be said to be arising out of a plaint in a Suit, wherefore the order of the Tribunal cannot be termed to be a “decree”.” (Emphasis supplied)

The said judgment is affirmed by the Apex Court in a judgment in the case of PSA IMPEX PRIVATE LIMITED v. REAL ESTATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY AND ANOTHER reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4664.

# 11.4. The High Court of Rajasthan in the case of TREHAN APNA GHAR BUILDWELL PRIVATE LIMITED V. MUNISH RANJAN SAHAY [2022 SCC OnLine Raj 3257], has held as follows:

• “8. The RERA Act, 2016 has been promulgated by legislatures to establish Real Estate Regulatory Authority for regulation in promotion of real estate sector and to ensure sale of plot, apartment or building, as the case may be, or sale of real estate project, in an efficient and transparent manner and to protect the interest of consumers in real estate sector and to establish an adjudicating mechanism for speedy dispute redressal and also to establish the Appellate Tribunal to hear appeals from the decisions, directions or orders of the Rea! Estate Regulatory Authority and the adjudicating officer and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

• 9. The Appellate Tribunal established under the RERA Act, 2016 is judicial form and creature of a special statute. It is well known principle of law that the Tribunal established under any special Act cannot be called a Court like Civil Court as* there is a clear distinction between the Tribunal and the Court.

• 10. The term decree” is not defined under the of the Act of 2016 and nor it is defined under any other statue including General Clauses Act, 1897 and for that the Court has to consider definition of decree as defined under Section 2(2) of the Act of 1908. As per Section 2(2) of the Act of 1908, the decree means a formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines rights of parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. Though, the definition also includes rejection of plaint and order passed under Section 144 but here this Court is not concerned with that aspects of decree.

• 11. According to procedure prescribed under the RERA Act, provision of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 are not strictly applicable. Further proceedings under the RERA Act are initiated either suo moto or on complaint/representation. Such proceedings under the RERA Act may not be treated in the nature of civil suit instituted before Civil Court by way of filing a plaint which ultimately after adjudication on merits culminates into passing a decree. Further it may be notices that adjudicating officer, the RERA Authority or the Appellate Tribunal may pass any order or decision on the dispute or appeal brought before them which may be either may be of an interim or final nature. Although under Section 58 of the RERA Act, the order or decision of Appellate Tribunal has not been termed as decree, however, by virtue of section 57 of the RERA Act, the order or decision passed under the RERA Act is executable and enforceable as a decree of Civil Court. Even if, it is assumed for a moment that final order or decision either passed by the adjudicating officer, RERA Authority or Appellate Tribunal under the RERA Act, if determines the rights of parties and partake a character of decree then also, the issue before this Court for consideration is about to consider the category and nature of appeal preferred before the High Court against the order or decision of Appellate Tribunal under the RERA Act, hence, a elaborate discussion about the aspect that the final order or decision under RERA Act falls within category of decree or not, is not required to be made, to decide the issue involved herein.

• 21. This Court finds support from the judgment passed by Allahabad High Court in case of Supertech Ltd. v. Subrat Sen [AIR 2019 All 191, which has been followed and affirmed by Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Khilla Colonizers Pvt. Ltd. v. Subhash Jain, [AIR 2021 MP 165].” (Emphasis supplied)

All the judgments of different High Courts in one singular voice holds that the order of the Adjudicating Officer, the Authority or the Appellate Tribunal under the Act is not a decree, as obtaining 2(2) of the CPC.

# 12. On a coalesce of the judgments noted above, what would unmistakably emerge is, the order of the Adjudicating Officer or the order of the Appellate Tribunal, constituted

under the Act, does not assume the mantle of a decree, within the contemplation of Section 2(2) of the CPC. Therefore, such an order/orders cannot traverse the path of execution delineated under Order XXI of the CPC. The Courts have, in the afore-quoted judgments have illuminated that the proceedings before the RERA are not conceived in  the mould of a civil suit, though the Act provides the procedure to be followed, as if it is a civil Court and therefore, cannot culminate in a decree in the classical sense. In that light, the applications so filed by the petitioner invoking Section 47 of the CPC to hold that the concerned Executing Court did not have jurisdiction was in tune with law. The order rejecting those applications and holding that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the execution petition runs foul of law, therefore requires appropriate interference, which would lead to the obliteration of the proceedings, leaving open all the remedies available in law.

# 13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

ORDER

(i) Writ Petitions are allowed.

(ii) Impugned order dated 17-04-2025 passed on I.A.No.V in Execution Petition Nos.227 of 2024, 228 of 2024 and 231 of 2024 pending on the file of XVI Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore stands quashed.

(iii) It is needless to observe that the respondents would be at liberty to avail of such remedy as is available in law.

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