Inspire Parking Nest Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Haryana Real Estate Regulatory Authority and Anr. - The powers exercised by the Authority (RERA) under Section 34(a) of the Act are quasi-judicial in nature. It is settled law that whenever an appeal is provided against an order, the determination becomes quasi- judicial in nature.

 REAT Haryana (2025.09.15) in Inspire Parking Nest Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Haryana Real Estate Regulatory Authority and Anr. [(2025) ibclaw.in 368 REAT, Appeal No. 547 of 2025] held that;

• The powers exercised by the Authority under Section 34(a) of the Act are quasi-judicial in nature. It is settled law that whenever an appeal is provided against an order, the determination becomes quasi- judicial in nature. 

• One of the attributes of a quasi-judicial body is that it must render a binding decision and if its decision is merely advisory, deliberative, investigatory or conciliatory in character, which has to be confirmed by another authority before it becomes binding, then such a body is administrative in character, as has been observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor.

Excerpts of the Order;

Challenge in the present appeal is to order dated 30.06.2025 passed by Chairman of the Authority1, vide which, application of the appellant for registration dated 08.04.2025 based on a Concessionaire Agreement with HSVP2 has been rejected.

# 2. The grievance raised by the appellant is that the impugned order has been passed only by the Chairman who did not constitute requisite quorum and thus the order is without jurisdiction. The next grievance of the appellant is that statutory provisions of the Act3 have been ignored while passing the impugned order, inasmuch as, definition of ‘allottee’, as specified in Section 2(d) of the Act includes transfer on lease hold basis. The appellant has made reference to the provisions of Section 2(d), 2(zk) and 2(zn) which define terms ‘allottee’, ‘promoter’ and ‘real estate project’, requirements of which are fully satisfied by the appellant and, therefore, the impugned order is illegal, warranting interference by the Tribunal.

# 3. Respondents No. 1 and 2 have filed reply. It has been admitted that the appellant applied for registration of the project on 08.04.2025. The respondents have relied upon the scope of the Act as well as the Regulations4 to contend that a conjoint reading of Sections 29, 30, 34 and the Regulations mandate expeditious disposal of the matters pending before it and in a situation where one of its Members being on leave and the second Member having recused from the case, the Chairman was competent to decide the application which is permissible under law. It may be noticed that Mr. Ashok Sangwan, one of the Members of the Authority had expressed his inability to participate in the meeting vide his letter dated 23.06.2025 and the other Member-Mr. V. K. Goyal was on sanctioned leave upto 11.07.2025. The impugned order of rejection was passed on 30.06.2025.

Analysis

# 4. On the question of jurisdiction raised by the appellant that only the Chairman of the Authority passed the impugned order, in the given circumstances though he had no jurisdiction to decide the application sitting alone.

# 5. The Authority is comprised of a Chairman and two Members. One Member was on sanctioned leave from 24.06.2025 to 11.07.2025. The application for registration was filed on 08.04.2025 on which notice was issued by the Authority on 07.05.2025. First reply was filed on 08.05.2025. The case was thereupon adjourned to 12.05.2025. Second reply was submitted on 12.06.2025 and second hearing took place on 16.06.2025. Third hearing was held on 23.06.2025 and final hearing took place on 30.06.2025 when impugned order was passed. On the date when the impugned order came to be passed, one Member, being on leave, the other Member sent a note expressing his inability to participate in the registration process. However, he clearly mentioned therein that if in any specific matter, his opinion was deemed necessary, file may be referred to him which would be promptly dealt with.

# 6. A perusal of documents mark ‘A1’ and mark ‘A2’ which were sealed on the date of hearing before this Bench and retained in the custody of the Registrar shows that had the meeting of the Authority been held on any other convenient date, same could have been with proper quorum. Even note written by Member-Mr. Ashok Sangwan shows that the same is not recusal. It appears to be an inability to participate in the registration process on 23.06.2025, however, not showing disinclination to express opinion on any specific matter referred to him; with further assurance that such file would be dealt with promptly. The said note bears endorsement dated 23.06.2025 of the Chairman that guidance of Mr. Ashok Sangwan would be sought as and when required. Thus, it appears that matter has been decided post-haste. In case, the meeting had been held on another date convenient to the Members, the matter could have been deliberated upon and decided by majority vote as per mandate of Section 29 of the Act. In such eventuality, decision would not have been open to challenge on the ground that the meeting dated 30.06.2025 lacked quorum. Besides, all data submitted by the Planning Branch, Secretary of the Authority and opinion of the Advocate General could have been considered therein. The decision taken by the Chairman sitting singly, in the absence of quorum, is unsustainable and needs to be set aside.

# 7. It would be apt to reproduce relevant paras of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. V. State of UP5. The same read as under:

• “27. Section 32 refers to functions of the authority for promotion of real estate sector and Sections 34 to 38 of the Act recognize different nature of powers and functions of the authority regarding compliance of its regulations cast upon the promoters, allottee or the real estate agents and to appoint one or more persons to make an inquiry into the affairs of any promoter, allottee or the real estate agent and to pass any interim orders, if the promoter, allottee or real estate agent is failing in discharging of its functions under the Act, rules or regulations, and to issue directions from time to time to the promoter, allottee or real estate agents, if considered necessary can impose penalty or interest if failed to carry out its obligations.

• xxx xxx

• 103. Section 21 of the Act relates to the composition of the authority which consists of a Chairperson and not less than two whole time members to be appointed by the appropriate Government but conspicuously it does not mention minimum bench strength at the same time consciously prescribes minimum bench/quorum while constituting the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal as reflected under Section 43(3) of the Act.

• 104. The emphasis of the appellants was on Section 29 of the Act which indicates the quorum of meetings of the authority. There is a specific provision that there shall be a meeting of the authority with the minimum quorum being prescribed, such business of the meeting of the authority indeed could not be delegated to a single member of the authority in exercise of power under Section 81 of the Act.

• 105. The term meeting under Section 29 of the Act does not deal with the performance of the authority in quasi- judicial matters which are referred to under Section 31 of the Act. It only refers to meetings, policy/regulatory issues that the authority is mandated to discharge under the Act. It may be noticed that Sections 32 and 33 are in the nature of policy/regulatory directions which the authority is mandated to be discharged indisputably have to be undertaken by the authority while functioning as a whole body under Section 29 of the Act.

• 106. To add it further, Section 29(3) and (4) of the Act talks about the questions before the authority which are to be disposed of within 60 days on receiving the applications. It may be noticed that there is no reference to any complaint referred to under Section 31 of the Act. To buttress it further, Section 29 and Section 81 of the Act are not in derogation to each other. To the contrary, both operate in different fields. Section 29 deals with the meetings of the authority to be held for taking policy/regulatory decisions in the interest of the stake holders and does not envisage in its fold quasi judicial functions which the Act casts upon the authority. The legislative intention as reflected from Section 29 is a recognition of the rationale that policy matters ought to be considered and decided by the entire strength of the authority so that the policy decisions reflect the acquired experience of the members and Chairman of the authority.”

# 8. The powers exercised by the Authority under Section 34(a) of the Act are quasi-judicial in nature. It is settled law that whenever an appeal is provided against an order, the determination becomes quasi- judicial in nature. One of the attributes of a quasi-judicial body is that it must render a binding decision and if its decision is merely advisory, deliberative, investigatory or conciliatory in character, which has to be confirmed by another authority before it becomes binding, then such a body is administrative in character, as has been observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor.

# 9. It is the prime obligation of the Authority to act fairly. The facts of this case show that the Chairman proceeded to decide the application of the appellant in a situation when one of the Members was not able to participate and other was on leave till 11.07.2025 which appears to have been sanctioned by the Chairman himself. The meeting could have been easily postponed to enable the Member(s) to participate and take a decision by majority of votes as per Section 29(3) of the Act. Recourse to such procedure can be taken despite the requirement of expeditious disposal as provided in the Act which, in peculiar circumstances of a case, may be considered directory in nature, of course, believing that reasons for delay would be reflected in the order.

# 10. In the peculiar facts of the case, this Tribunal is of the considered view that the order passed by the Chairman without waiting for the Members, one of whom was on leave and the other who was not able to participate on 23.06.2025, has caused prejudice to the appellant. The observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court, as reproduced above, needed to be kept in view while passing the impugned order. The same is, thus, set aside.

# 11. As this Tribunal has set aside the impugned order on the first issue itself, the second issue raised by the appellant is left open to be decided by the Authority while adhering to the quorum.

# 12. In view of above, the appeal is allowed. Matter is remitted to the Authority to be decided as per law after thorough scrutiny of the suggestions/observations of the Planning Branch, opinion of Advocate General and other material on record. Decision be taken expeditiously, preferably within six weeks of receipt of this order.

# 13. Documents mark ‘A1 to A3’ be re-sealed and forwarded to the Authority. Copies thereof be retained under the custody of the Registrar of this Tribunal.

# 14. Copy of this order be sent to the parties/their counsel and the Authority.

# 15. File be consigned to records.

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Keyana Estate LLP (Earlier Known as Kiyana Ventures LLP) Vs. Paresh Parihar & Anr. - In these circumstances, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the Appellant committed default in the delivery of the possession of the subject flat, even after the grant of O.C. At any rate, the grant of O.C. was also much beyond the agreed date of delivery of possession of the subject flat. A clear case of violation of the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, 2016 was made out.

 HC Bombay (2025.10.08) in Keyana Estate LLP (Earlier Known as Kiyana Ventures LLP) Vs. Paresh Parihar & Anr. [2025:BHC-AS:44637,  Second Appeal No. 537 Of 2025 with Interim Application No. 11757 Of 2025] held that;

• in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt Ltd Vs State of U.P. & Ors,[ 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1044.] the allottee has an unqualified right to seek the interest on the delayed handing over the possession of the flat, as agreed.

• A mere offer to deliver possession of the subject flat, without complying with the necessary conditions subject to which the O.C. has been issued, where those conditions bear upon the occupation of the subject flat as a habitable unit, cannot be considered as the compliance of the obligation of the promoter under the Act, 2016.

• Section 270A of the MMC Act, inter alia provides that no person shall occupy or permit to be occupied, or use or permit to be used, any premises or part thereof until he has obtained a certificate from the Commissioner to the effect that there is adequate supply of water to the persons intending to occupy or use such premises.

• In these circumstances, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the Appellant committed default in the delivery of the possession of the subject flat, even after the grant of O.C. At any rate, the grant of O.C. was also much beyond the agreed date of delivery of possession of the subject flat. A clear case of violation of the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, 2016 was made out.

• The submission of Mr. Dave premised on the force majeure is required to be noted to be repelled as in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Newtech Promoters and Developers (Supra) such submission cannot be readily acceded to. Even otherwise, no case of unforeseen event resulting in delay has been made out.

Excerpts of the Order;

# 1. This Second Appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 24th June 2025, whereby the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal (“Appellate Tribunal”) dismissed the Appeal No. AT006000000052700 preferred by the Appellant against an order dated 28th September 2020 passed by the learned Member, Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority (“MahaRERA”) in Complaint No. CC006000000171743, and, the consequent order whereby, the Appellate Tribunal directed the release of an amount of Rs.52,10,000/- deposited by the Appellant to the Allottees with the accrued interest thereon.

# 2. The Appellant is a promoter of a real estate project “Kalpataru Radiance”. The Respondents had booked the flats in the said project. On 29th December 2014 an Agreement for Sale came to be executed under which the Appellant had agreed to deliver the possession of the subject flat by December 2016, with a grace period of six to nine months. The development was retarded on account of stop work notice issued by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (“MCGM”). On 18th July 2017, the Appellant registered wing “A” of the project as an ongoing project.

# 3. The Respondents filed a compliant with MahaRERA asserting that the Appellant failed to deliver the possession of the subject flat within the agreed period. By an order dated 28th September 2020, the Authority allowed the complaint and directed the Appellant to pay interest at 9% from 1st July 2017 till the delivery of possession of the subject flat.

# 4. Being aggrieved, the Appellant preferred Appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. In pursuance of the order passed under Section 43 (5) of the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016 (“the Act, 2016”), the Appellant deposited the sum of Rs.52,10,000/-.

# 5. The Appellant obtained Occupation Certificate (“O.C.”) in respect of the subject project on 10th April 2023. It is the claim of the Appellant that in the month of May 2023, the Appellant offered possession of the subject flat to the Respondents. The later avoided to take possession of the subject flat on one or the other pretext. Instead the Respondents filed an Application for possession of the subject flat before the Authority. Eventually, the possession of the subject flat was accepted by the Respondents on 26th January 2024.

# 6. By the impugned order dated 24th June 2025, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the Appeal preferred by the Appellant and directed the release of the amount of Rs. 52,10,000/- to the Allottees by 16th July 2025.

# 7. Being aggrieved, the Appellant has filed this Appeal under Section 58 of the Act, 2016.

# 8. I have heard Mr. Nimay Dave, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, and Mr. Manish Gala, the learned Counsel for the Respondents. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have perused the material on record.

# 9. Mr. Dave submitted that the Appellate Tribunal committed a gross error in law in going behind the O.C. granted by the Planning Authority. In view of the provisions contained in Section 19 of the Act, 2016, theiability of the Promoter to pay interest can be enforced only for a period of two months of the grant of O.C. If an Allottee deliberately declines to accept the possession of the flat, he would not be entitled to seek interest on the ground of the delayed delivery of the flat. Thus, in the case at hand, according to Mr. Dave, the substantial questions of law, as to whether the Appellate Tribunal could have gone behind the O.C., and the Allottee could decide when to take possession of the flat, and still claim interest for the delayed period, arise for consideration. 

# 10. It was further submitted by Mr. Dave that material on record would indicate that there were force majeure circumstances which prevented the Appellant from completing the project within the stipulated period. In any event, the Respondents also contributed to the delay by not making the payment of the outstanding amount in accordance with the terms of the contract. In such circumstances, both the MahaRERA and Appellate Tribunal, were in error in saddeling the Appellant with the liability to pay interest for no fault on the part of the Appellant .

# 11. To buttress these submissions, Mr. Dave placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Linker Shelter Pvt Ltd Vs Charmaine Chougule & Anr,[SA No. 391 of 2025 with connected matters decided on 18th July 2025]  wherein it was inter alia enunciated that once the possession was offered along with O.C., Section 19(10) of the Act, 2016 starts to operate, making it necessary for flat purchaser/allottee to take a decision whether he/she wishes to. withdraw from the project or continue therewith because taking possession is inseparably connected to that decision. Offer of possession brings the case out of Section 18(1) because it is based on failure of developer to give the possession.

# 12. Reliance was also placed on a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of M/s Savita Homemakers LLP Vs Mayur Ramchandra Akade, [SA(St) No. 19304 of 2025 with connected matters decided on 15th July 2025.] wherein it was observed that the interest to which the allottes is entitled as per the provisions of Act, 2016, particularly in view of Section 19(10) read with Section 18 is still the date O.C. is issued and two months thereafter.

# 13. In opposition to this, Mr. Gala would submit that the impugned order does not warrant any interference. No question of law, much less, a substantial question of law, arises for consideration. It was submitted that, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt Ltd Vs State of U.P. & Ors,[ 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1044.] the allottee has an unqualified right to seek the interest on the delayed handing over the possession of the flat, as agreed.

# 14. Mr. Gala would urge, the offer of possession was on paper. The Respondents were relentlessly pursuing the Appellant to deliver the possession. All the payments, as demanded by the Appellant, were duly made by the Respondents and, yet, there was default on the part of the Appellant to deliver the possession of the subject flat. In these circumstances, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in dismissing the Appeal, submitted Mr. Gala.

# 15. I have perused the material on record and given anxious consideration to the submissions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the parties. The Appellate Tribunal has noted that, upon a diligent perusal of the O.C. dated 10th April 2023, it becomes evident that the said O.C. was issued subject to the condition that a Certificate under Section 270 (A) of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act 1888 (“the MMC Act”) shall be obtained before giving possession of the flat to the buyers for which the O.C. was thereby granted. Despite providing ample opportunities, the Promoter had failed to provide any details regarding the compliance of the said condition before handing over the possession of the subject flat to the Respondents.

# 16. The submission of Mr. Dave that the Appellate Tribunal could not have embarked upon an enquiry as to whether the conditions subject to which the O.C. was issued, were fulfilled or not, does not merit acceptance. A mere offer to deliver possession of the subject flat, without complying with the necessary conditions subject to which the O.C. has been issued, where those conditions bear upon the occupation of the subject flat as a habitable unit, cannot be considered as the compliance of the obligation of the promoter under the Act, 2016. Section 270A of the MMC Act, inter alia provides that no person shall occupy or permit to be occupied, or use or permit to be used, any premises or part thereof until he has obtained a certificate from the Commissioner to the effect that there is adequate supply of water to the persons intending to occupy or use such premises.

# 17. Thus, existence of adequate water supply to the project in question was a pre-condition subject to which the O.C. was granted. It is pertinent to note that, the observations of the Appellate Tribunal that the Appellant had failed to produce documents to show the compliance of the conditions could not shown to be incorrect. Only a bill for the month of April 2024, evidencing that the subject project had water connection could be placed on record. Evidently, that was after the possession was delivered to the Respondents.

# 18. It is true, there was a lengthy exchange of correspondence between the Appellant and the Respondents as regards the delivery of possession of the subject flat. However, the tenor of the correspondence indicates that the Respondents had been insisting upon the delivery of possession of the subject flat in a habitable condition with the necessary facilities and amenities, as agreed.

# 19. The claim of the Appellant that there was delay in payment on the part of the Respondents is required to be appreciated in the light of the fact that 95% of the sale consideration was paid by the Respondents by December 2017. The Respondents had also paid the outstanding interest, despite repeated requests for inspection of the subject flat with a view to take possession thereof.

# 20. In these circumstances, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the Appellant committed default in the delivery of the possession of the subject flat, even after the grant of O.C. At any rate, the grant of O.C. was also much beyond the agreed date of delivery of possession of the subject flat. A clear case of violation of the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, 2016 was made out.

# 21. The submission of Mr. Dave premised on the force majeure is required to be noted to be repelled as in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Newtech Promoters and Developers (Supra) such submission cannot be readily acceded to. Even otherwise, no case of unforeseen event resulting in delay has been made out.

# 22. In the aforesaid view of the matter, this Court does not find any question of law, much less a substantial question of law, arises for consideration.

# 23. Hence the following order:

: O R D E R :

• (i) Appeal stands dismissed.

• (ii) In view of the dismissal of the Appeal, the Interim Application stands disposed of.

No costs.

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