Friday, 8 December 2023

Ms. Amita Saurabh Bihani and Ors. Vs. E&G Global Estates Ltd. and Ors. - It becomes abundantly clear that Home Buyers can vote for or against the Plan only as a class and if there are some Home Buyers pitted against the Resolution Plan, who are otherwise in minority, they have absolutely no locus to oppose the Plan in the capacity of dissatisfied or dissenting Home Buyers.

  NCLAT (05.12.2023) in Ms. Amita Saurabh Bihani and Ors. Vs. E&G Global Estates Ltd. and Ors. [Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 1214-1215 and 1217-1218 of 2023] held that.

  • If related parties are allowed on the CoC, it is sufficient to render the constitution of CoC illegal and their decisions null and void. Submitting that a resolution plan approved by a wrongly constituted CoC is invalid and non-est in the eyes of law,

  • That individual home buyers constituting the financial creditors cannot object to the resolution plan once such resolution plan has been approved by the requisite majority of the homebuyers.

  • It becomes abundantly clear that Home Buyers can vote for or against the Plan only as a class and if there are some Home Buyers pitted against the Resolution Plan, who are otherwise in minority, they have absolutely no locus to oppose the Plan in the capacity of dissatisfied or dissenting Home Buyers.

  • When the statutory scheme clearly states that it is the duty of Resolution Professional to determine the nature of such transactions and file an appropriate application before the Adjudicating Authority, neither the Appellants-1 being home buyers themselves nor the GSC as unsuccessful resolution applicant are entitled on their own to file applications seeking avoidance of transactions.

  • The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Jaypee matter has emphasized that the democratic principles of a determinative role of majority opinion have been enshrined in the statutory construct of the IBC and hence the minority homebuyers have to necessarily sail with the majority within the class. Once the CoC has approved the resolution plan by requisite majority and the same is in consonance with applicable provisions of law, the same cannot be a subject matter of judicial review and modification.

  • Section 26 of IBC further provides that application for avoidance of transactions is not to affect CIRP proceedings and therefore such applications can continue even after completion of the CIRP. Section 26 of the IBC clearly stipulates that the pendency of any avoidance application shall not come in the way of the approval of the resolution plan.

  • CIRP and avoidance applications are, thus by their very nature, a separate set of proceedings. The former is time bound whereas the latter requires a proper discovery of suspect transactions that are time consuming. The scheme of the IBC reinforces this difference and thus adjudication of an avoidance application is independent of the resolution of the corporate debtor and can survive CIRP.

  • Recently, a division bench of the Delhi High Court in Tata Steel BSL Limited v. Venus Recruiter Private Limited and Others [(2023) SCC OnLine Del 155] has held that avoidance applications which are initiated by the RP shall continue irrespective of the finalisation of the Resolution Plan and the conclusion of the CIRP.

  • In view of the above reasons, we are of the considered opinion that simply because the Appellants have raised the issue of avoidance application, it does not stand to reason that the approval of the resolution plan needs to be put on hold or kept in abeyance. We also find that the present resolution plan also provides that recovery under Section 43, 45, 50 and 66 of the IBC would be the exclusive rights of the CoC of the Corporate Debtor. We therefore affirm the approval of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority.


Excerpts of the Order;    

These two sets of appeals have been filed challenging the impugned orders dated 11.08.2023 passed in I.A. Nos. IA No.1777, 1150 and 1609 of 2021 by the Adjudicating Authority in CP (IB) No.2995/MB/2019. The first set of appeal filed under Section 61 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC” in short) by the Appellants/Homebuyers (hereinafter referred to as ‘Appellants-1’) arises out of the Order dated 11.08.2023 (hereinafter referred to as “First Impugned Order”) passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench-V) in IA No.1777 of 2021 in CP (IB) No.2995/MB/2019. By the first impugned order, the Adjudicating Authority dismissed the challenge raised by the Appellants-1 to the constitution of the Committee of Creditors (“CoC” in short) for the purposes of initiating Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’ in short) against the Corporate Debtor. These Appellants have also challenged another Order dated 11.08.2023 (hereinafter referred to as “Second Impugned Order”) passed by the said Adjudicating Authority in IA No.1150 of 2021 in the same company petition at supra by which the resolution plan of the Successful Resolution Applicant has been approved. The second set of appeal filed by M/s. G.S. Constructions (hereinafter referred to as ‘Appellant-2’) also arises out of the Order dated 11.08.2023 (hereinafter referred to as “Third Impugned Order”) in I.A. 1609 of 2021 wherein the same Adjudicating Authority dismissed the challenge raised by this Appellant to the constitution of the CoC. This Appellant has also challenged the second impugned order passed by the same Adjudicating Authority in IA No.1150 of 2021 approving the resolution plan of the Successful Resolution Applicant.


# 4. It was further submitted that the RP admitted the claims of these illegitimate home owners who had committed irregularities by way of fraudulent transactions and gave them access to the CoC at a time when in IA 107 of 2021, the RP had himself prayed for reconstitution of the CoC. Further the RP not only allowed their entry into the CoC but also allowed these illegitimate home buyers to discuss and approve the resolution plan. Had the votes of the illegitimate home owners been excluded, the results of the voting on the resolution plan of SRA would have been different. It has, therefore, been contended that when the composition of the CoC itself is under cloud and the question of reconstitution of CoC was still pending in IA 107 of 2021, the approval of the resolution plan of the SRA by the Adjudicating Authority was against the fundamental tenets of IBC. The Appellants have relied on the judgment of this Tribunal in Jayanta Banerjee v. Shashi Agarwal and Anr. in CA (AT) (Ins.) No. 348 of 2020 (‘Jayanta’ in short) which has held that if the constitution of CoC is a nullity in the eye of law, the entire CIRP process is vitiated. In support of their contention, they have also relied upon the judgment of this Tribunal on similar lines in Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Hirakud Industrial Works Ltd. & Ors. in CA (AT) (Ins.) No. 42 of 2022 (‘Hindalco’ in short) in that if related parties are allowed on the CoC, it is sufficient to render the constitution of CoC illegal and their decisions null and void. Submitting that a resolution plan approved by a wrongly constituted CoC is invalid and non-est in the eyes of law, it was also articulated that the resolution plan of the SRA was commercially less viable than the plan submitted by another resolution applicant, namely, GSC.


# 5. The Learned Counsels appearing for the SRA and suspended directors of the Corporate Debtor have opposed the submissions made by both set of Appellants. Since their submissions largely overlap, the same have been clubbed together. It has been contended that IA 1777 of 2021 was filed by the Appellants-1 challenging the constitution of CoC only after the rejection of the resolution plan of GSC as an after-thought. Prior to the approval of the resolution plan of the SRA, the Appellants never raised any objections to the constitution of the CoC and had in fact participated in the voting process without any protest or demur. That the Appellants-1 in IA 1777 of 2021 had also prayed for approval of the resolution plan of GSC manifests their motive which was to revive the rejected resolution plan of GSC though it had failed to secure the requisite majority votes in favour. This shows that their motives are not bona fide in that they aimed only to derail the CIRP process and to somehow manage approval of the resolution plan of GSC.


# 6. It was also contended that the grounds of non-joinder of necessary parties cited by the Adjudicating Authority in rejecting IA 1777 of 2021 was also right as the alleged suspect/fraudulent homebuyers whose removal from the CoC was sought had not been impleaded by the Appellants-1. Even the RP had been kept away from the list of parties. Even the Appellant-2 in IA1609/2021 had sought the removal of certain alleged fraudulent home buyers from the CoC but failed to implead them as parties to its application. It had only arrayed the RP and the Authorized Representative as parties before the Adjudicating Authority. It was also argued that the alleged suspect home buyers have been impleaded only at the appeal stage without seeking leave of this Tribunal to implead additional parties who were not parties in the application before the Adjudicating Authority.


# 7. In support of their contention, the Learned Counsel for the SRA has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Moreshar Yadaorao Mahajan v. Vyankatesh Sitaram Bhedy LR & Ors. (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1307 wherein it has been held that in the absence of a necessary party, in whose absence no effective decree could be passed by the Court, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed.


# 8. It was also contended that in terms of Section 25(2)(j) of the IBC, it is the duty of the RP to file applications for avoidance of transactions. The Appellants-1 being homebuyers of the Corporate Debtor and Appellant-2 being an unsuccessful resolution applicant are not entitled to file such avoidance applications. Hence on this count itself the IA 1777 was not maintainable. Further even if the issue of avoidance application merits consideration, in terms of Section 26 of IBC, there was no requirement to put the process of approval of the resolution plan into abeyance.


# 9. It has also been contended that the Appellants being individual home buyers who by themselves constitute only a minority of the entire financial creditor in class cannot object to the resolution plan of SRA once it has been approved by the requisite majority of the homebuyers. It is also submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association and Ors. Vs. NBCC (India) Ltd. and Ors. (2022)1 SCC 401 (‘Jaypee’ in short) has categorically held that individual home buyers constituting the financial creditors cannot object to the resolution plan once such resolution plan has been approved by the requisite majority of the homebuyers.


# 10. We have duly considered the arguments advanced by the Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the records carefully.


# 11. We propose to start with the tenability of the first impugned order of the Adjudicating Authority in IA 1777/2021. It is the contention of the Appellants-1 that they are legitimate owners of Holiday Homes developed by the Corporate Debtor and that they are part of CoC with 16.53% vote share. The Appellants-1 claim that they have reasonable grounds to feel aggrieved as the RP had admitted the claims of certain illegitimate home owners who had committed irregularities which amounted to fraudulent transactions and made them part of the CoC. It was asserted that in IA No. 1430 of 2020, the Adjudicating Authority was convinced of dubious transactions undertaken by the suspended directors of the Corporate Debtor with the illegitimate home owners which had led to ordering of forensic audit of the books of account of the Corporate Debtor. The FAR had clearly set out the fact that fraudulent and circuitous transactions were actually carried out by some home owners and suspended directors.


# 12. It is also the case of the Appellants that in view of the clear findings of the FAR, the RP had filed IA No. 107/2021 for fraudulent transactions under Section 66 of the IBC and IA No. 149 of 2021 for preferential transactions under Section 43-45 of IBC and prayed that the illegitimate home owners be removed from the CoC and their voting rights cancelled. Submitting that the IA 107/2021 was still pending, the Adjudicating Authority without deciding on the said IA should not have dismissed IA No. 1777 of 2021 filed by them praying for removal of alleged illegitimate home owners from the CoC and to disregard the votes cast by them during CoC meetings as well as to reconstitute the CoC with genuine home buyers. Under such circumstances, where 17 out of 53 home buyers had irregularly and illegally gained access to the CoC, it has been the contention of the Appellants-1 that the constitution of CoC was clearly rendered illegal and decisions taken by the said CoC is invalid.


# 13. Before we delve into the sustainability of the first impugned order of the Adjudicating Authority in IA 1777/2021, it would be constructive to note the status of IA 107/2021 as filed by the RP seeking reconstitution of the CoC. It is the claim of the Appellants-1 that the Adjudicating Authority in its order dated 17.11.2021 in IA 107/2021 had removed the alleged fraudulent home buyers from the CoC. On the other hand, it is the counter claim of the Respondents that the said order was challenged by the expelled home buyers before this Tribunal in CA(AT)(Ins)No 26 of 2022 and was set aside by this Tribunal on 08.03.2022 and the matter remanded back for reconsideration by the Adjudicating Authority. Perusal of the said order of this Tribunal clearly shows that in para 8 it has held that the Adjudicating Authority had passed the orders on 17.11.2021 under the wrong impression that the entire money invested by the suspect home buyers was routed back, which obviously not being the position, the same ought to have been cleared by the Resolution Professional before the Adjudicating Authority. This Tribunal had accordingly set aside the order of the Adjudicating Authority without expressing any opinion on merits and remitted the matter for reconsideration of the Adjudicating Authority after hearing the parties afresh. Thus, we hold that the earlier order of the Adjudicating Authority on IA 107/2021 removing certain home buyers from the CoC having been set aside does not hold good.


# 14. Coming to the tenability of the first impugned order, it is the contention of the Appellants-1 that the impugned order in IA 1777/2021 reflects non-application of mind by the Adjudicating Authority. Though grave allegations were raised by them on the constitution of the CoC, and IA 107 was still pending, these facts were disregarded by the Adjudicating Authority without examining the merits of the same or providing reasons for negating the same. The CoC was illegally constituted with illegitimate home buyers who had entered into collusive arrangements with the suspended directors of the Corporate Debtor and voting undertaken for approval of the resolution plan with a CoC comprising of such illegitimate home buyers. If the votes of the illegitimate home owners were excluded, which should have been the right course of action on the part of the RP, the results of the voting on the resolution plan of SRA would have been different. Relying on the judgments of this Tribunal in Jayanta and Hindalco supra, it was contended that the RP by allowing related parties of the Corporate Debtor to become members of the CoC made the constitution of CoC illegal and rendered decisions undertaken by such an irregularly constituted CoC to be null and void.


# 15. It may be useful at this stage to notice the first impugned order and would like to extract hereinunder the relevant observations and conclusions arrived therein:

  • “14. It has further been observed by this Bench that the Resolution Professional, who has admitted the claims of the homebuyers under challenge has not been made a party in the present Interlocutory Application. Further, the allottees, whose claims have been challenged in the present IA, are also not made a party in this IA. In the given situation no order can be passed at the back of such allottees without providing them an opportunity of being heard.

  • 15. This bench has further observed that the present application is filed by the owners of holiday homes/villas in the Project collectively having 25.55% voting share in the COC out of which 2 applicants namely Applicant nos. 3 & 4 having 2.85% and 3.17% voting share have already sought removal of their names form the present application which had been allowed by this Bench vide daily order dated 04.05.2023. Furthermore, the individual homebuyers who have been sought to be removed from the list of home buyer/ Committee of Creditors constitute just about 12% voting share in the COC. Therefore, assuming if their names are excluded, even that would not alter the final outcome and the plan of Mrs. Asha Sanap would still fetch more than 66% of voting share. Even otherwise, the applicants as the Home Buyers do not have any locus to agitate as to which plan should be approved especially when the Home buyers as a class having 79.60% voting share have voted in favour of the Resolution Plan submitted by Mrs. Asha Sanap.

  • 16. Even otherwise, the Applicants being the individual home buyers, as per the terms of Section 25-A(3-A) of IBC, can vote only through the Authorised Representative who is required to cast the vote on behalf of the Creditors in class after taking into account majority percentage of the Homebuyers against or in favour of a particular Resolution Plan. The relevant extract of Section 25-A(3-A) of IBC is as under:

  • 25A. (1) The authorised representative under sub-section (6) or sub-section (6A) of sect 21 or sub-section (5) of section 24 shall have the right to participate and vote in meetings of the committee of creditors on behalf of the financial creditor he represents in accordance with the prior voting instructions of such creditors obtained through physical or electronic means.

  • (3A) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sub-section (3), the authorised representative under sub section (6A) of section 21 shall cast his vote on behalf of all the financial creditors he represents in accordance with the decision taken by a vote of more than fifty per cent of the voting share of the financial creditors he represents, who have cast their vote:

  • 17. In the instant case, the class of creditors (i.e. Home Buyers) have voted in favour of Resolution Plan of Mrs. Asha Snap with 42.03% voting which represents more than 50% of the total voting strength of their class i.e.79.60%. Therefore, the entire vote (i.e. 79.60%) would be considered to have been cast in favour of the plan submitted by Mrs. Asha Sanap, as required in terms of provisions of the Code.

  • 18. In view of the above, the objections raised by the Applicants in an individual capacity as a home buyer are inconsequential as they represent homebuyers in minority and are thus bound by the decision taken by the majority within the class of homebuyers. In this regard, reliance can be placed as the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association and Ors. Vs. NBCC(India) Ltd. and Ors.(2022)1 SCC 401 wherein it was held that when Homebuyers as a class have voted in favour of the Resolution Plan, any particular constituent of that class cannot be heard in opposition to the Resolution Plan by way of objection as there is no concept of dissenting homebuyers within Creditors in class. The relevant extracts of this judgement are reproduced below:-

  • “164.4 Having regard to the scheme of IBC, and the law declared by this Court, it is more than clear that once a decision is taken, either to reject or to approve a particular plan, by a vote of more than 50% of the voting share of the financial creditors within a class, the minority of those who vote, as also all others within that class, are bound by that decision. There is absolutely no scope for any particular person standing within that class to suggest any dissention as regards the vote over the resolution plan. It is obvious that if this finality and binding force is not provided to the vote cast by the authorize representative over the resolution plan in accordance with the majority decision of the class he is authorized to represent, a plan or resolution involving large decision of the class he is authorized to represent, a plan or resolution involving large number of parties (like an excessively large number of homebuyers herein) may never fructify and the only result would be liquidation, which is not the prime target of the Code. In the larger benefit and common good, the democratic principles of the determinative role of the opinion of majority have been duly incorporated in the scheme of the Code, particularly in the provisions relating to voting on the resolution plan and binding nature of the vote of authorized representative on the entire class of the financial creditor/s he represents.

  • 170. To sum up this part. of discussion, in our view, after approval of the resolution plan of NBCC by CoC, where homebuyers as a class assented to the plan, any individual homebuyer or association cannot maintain any challenge to the resolution plan nor could be treated as carrying any legal grievance.

  • 171. Once we have held that these dissatisfied homebuyers and associations are not entitled to put up any challenge to the resolution plan contrary to the decision of the requisite majority of their class, all their objections are required to be rejected outright….”

  • 19. In the light of what has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the afore-cited judgment it becomes abundantly clear that Home Buyers can vote for or against the Plan only as a class and if there are some Home Buyers pitted against the Resolution Plan, who are otherwise in minority, they have absolutely no locus to oppose the Plan in the capacity of dissatisfied or dissenting Home Buyers. It is also abundantly clear that such dissenting minority segment within the class of Home Buyers cannot arrogate themselves to be dissenting Financial Creditors.


# 16. It is an undisputed fact that the Appellants-1 had only impleaded the suspended directors of the Corporate Debtor as parties in IA 1777/2021 and not included the suspect home buyers or even the RP. We therefore find sound logic in the dismissal of IA 1777/2021 by the Adjudicating Authority on the ground that the alleged illegitimate home buyers had not been impleaded in the said IA at a time when their ouster from the CoC was being agitated. Any decision by the Adjudicating Authority to remove these home buyers from the CoC without hearing them would have caused deep prejudice to their interests and been unfair, unequitable, unjust besides running contra to the principles of natural justice. That apart we notice that no objections were ever raised earlier by the Appellants-1 to the constitution of the CoC or on the participation of the suspect home buyers in the voting process until the 7th CoC meeting. Even the Appellants never raised any objections to the appointment of the Authorised Representative or in the latter’s participation in the voting process in CoC. It was only after the resolution plan of the SRA was approved that the Appellants approached the Adjudicating Authority by way of filing an IA 1777/2021 and challenging the constitution of the CoC. If the Appellants were genuinely aggrieved with the constitution of the CoC, we fail to comprehend as to what prevented them from objecting to the constitution of the CoC and participation in the CoC meetings at any stage prior to the 8th CoC meeting. This clearly shows that the Appellants sprang into action only after the resolution plan of GSC was not approved.


# 17. During the course of making oral arguments, the Learned Senior Counsel of the Appellants-1 handed over a chart containing revised calculations of the shares of the home buyers post the removal of the suspect/fraudulent homebuyers. We also notice that the FAR observations with respect to related party transactions have been placed by Appellants-1 at pages 134-136 of Appeal Paper Book (‘APB’ in short), preferential transactions at page 137 of APB, undervalued transactions at pages 138-139 of APB, besides other suspicious transactions at pages 140-144 of APB. Be that as it may, it would be misplaced to place any reliance on the list of fraudulent home buyers as furnished by the Appellants in the absence of unequivocal findings of fraud against these parties.


# 18. It is also noticed that while the RP in IA 107 of 2021 had impleaded only 4 home buyers, the Appellants-1 have included other parties as suspect home buyers than those named in IA 107 of 2021. We now proceed to examine whether the Appellants-1 being a set of home buyers falling in a class of creditors can decide on other home buyers falling in the same class of creditors as suspect/fraudulent/illegitimate home buyers.


# 19. The statutory construct of IBC clearly puts the onerous responsibility of pursuing avoidance applications on the RP. In terms of Section 25(2)(j) of the IBC, it is the duty of the RP to file appropriate applications for avoidance of transactions which fall under the ambit of preferential, fraudulent, undervalued or extortionate transactions. When the statutory scheme clearly states that it is the duty of Resolution Professional to determine the nature of such transactions and file an appropriate application before the Adjudicating Authority, neither the Appellants-1 being home buyers themselves nor the GSC as unsuccessful resolution applicant are entitled on their own to file applications seeking avoidance of transactions. The ratio of the Jayanta case also cannot come to the aid of the Appellant-1 since in that case the RP without verifying the claims submitted by the Financial Creditors had allotted voting share. Further, the RP had not prepared the Information Memorandum and the CIRP proceedings were conducted without any valuation of the Corporate Debtor. Neither was there any publication of Form G inviting Expression of Interest. Moreover, in that case the CoC had rushed into liquidation of the Corporate Debtor. We therefore cannot commend such unilateral addition of names in the list of suspect home buyers by the Appellants-1.


# 20. This brings us to the second impugned order passed by the Adjudicating Authority in IA No. 1150/2023 approving the resolution plan of the SRA. This order has been assailed by both Appellants-1 and Appellant-2 on more or less similar grounds that the Adjudicating Authority failed to take cognizance of the fact that the decision of the CoC to approve the resolution plan stood vitiated since the constitution of the CoC itself was a nullity. The question before us is whether the CoC in the facts of the present case could lawfully consider approval of the resolution plan when the constitution of the CoC is claimed by both the Appellants to be tainted.


# 21. It is the contention of the Appellants-1 and 2 that the CoC was illegally constituted with illegitimate home buyers who had entered into collusive arrangements with the suspended directors of the Corporate Debtor. 16 out of 17 such suspect home buyers had voted in favour of the resolution plan of the SRA. Such a resolution plan approved by related parties is therefore liable to be set aside. It is therefore their case that the decision of CoC in the present set of facts cannot be validated on the pretext of exercise of commercial wisdom as the commercial wisdom of CoC cannot condone material irregularities in the conduct of CIRP.


# 22. We find that the Adjudicating Authority while considering at length the IA 1150 filed by the RP for approval of the resolution plan, held in the second impugned order, that the plan meets the requirements of Section 30(2) of the IBC and Regulations 37, 38, 38(1A) and 39(4) of the CIRP Regulations. It also held that the resolution plan was feasible and viable which balances the interests of the all the stake-holders and is in accordance with law and does not contravene any of the provisions of Section 29(A) of the IBC. Further when we see paras 15 to 18 of the first impugned order as extracted at Para 15 above, we find that the Adjudicating Authority has clearly held that the home buyers as class of creditors have cast their votes in favour of the resolution plan submitted by the SRA. The Adjudicating authority has also spelt out in para 15 of the impugned order the vote share of the Appellants-1 and that of the alleged suspect home buyers and that even if the names of the suspect home buyers are excluded, the plan of the SRA had fetched more than the requisite percent of votes. Thereafter the Adjudicating Authority has relied on law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaypee supra and held that objections raised by a set of home buyers as a minority constituent of the same class of creditors does not hold ground.


# 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Jaypee matter has emphasized that the democratic principles of a determinative role of majority opinion have been enshrined in the statutory construct of the IBC and hence the minority homebuyers have to necessarily sail with the majority within the class. Once the CoC has approved the resolution plan by requisite majority and the same is in consonance with applicable provisions of law, the same cannot be a subject matter of judicial review and modification. We are therefore not convinced with the plea raised by the Appellants that the Adjudicating Authority had committed an error in approving the resolution plan.


# 24. This brings us to the third impugned order passed by the Adjudicating Authority dated 11.08.2023 in I.A. 1609 of 2021 and IA No. 1150/2021 in CP(IB) No. 2995/MB/2019 which has been challenged by Appellant-2/GSC who is an unsuccessful resolution applicant.


# 25. In IA 1609 of 2021, the Adjudicating Authority has dismissed the prayers of GSC to quash and set aside the CoC of the Corporate Debtor under CIRP. The prayers are similar to those raised by Appellants-1 in IA 1777/2021. In the present IA 1609/2021 too, the prayers of the Appellant-2 have been rejected and the grounds are amplified by the Adjudicating Authority at paras 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 of the third impugned order which is as reproduced below:

“5.3 This Bench is of the opinion that, once the majority of CoC decide on one of the Resolution Plan, the decision of the CoC attains finality. It is observed by the Bench that, in the present case, since the CoC comprising of SIDBI and the home buyers approved the Resolution Plan presented by Mrs. Asha Sanap, the Unsuccessful Resolution Applicant has no locus to challenge the commercial decision of the CoC. Further, the prayer of the Applicant recalling the order dated August 18, 2020 passed by this Tribunal appointing Respondent No. 2 i.e. Mr. Jitender Kothari as the Authorised Representative of the Home Buyers of the Corporate Debtor on the ground that the same is vitiated by fraud perpetrated by the Fraudulent Home Buyers, has no merit in view of the above discussion by this Bench.

5.4 It is observed by the Bench that, the Applicant who himself was Prospective Resolution Applicant had submitted its Resolution Plan. At no stage, the Applicant challenged the constitution of the CoC. The Applicant is seeking relief to set aside and quash the CoC only after his plan not approved with the requisite voting of the CoC. Moreover, no concrete evidence has been given by the Applicant that transactions of some Home Buyers (i.e. 14 Home Buyers) are fraudulent in nature. The question of some of the Home Buyers as fraudulent was also raised by the Applicant after the Plan of the Applicant was not approved with the requisite voting of CoC.

5.5 This Bench has further observed that, the Proprietor of the Applicant i.e. Mr. Sushil Uttarwar, was an ex Director of the Corporate Debtor and in an Application being IA No 1148 of 2020 in CP 2995 of 2019, filed by M/s G S Constor & Infra Pvt. Ltd. for making M/s GS Constor & Infra Pvt. Ltd. part of CoC was rejected by this Tribunal on the ground of being a Related Party and the said decision was also confirmed by the Hon’ble NCLAT in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 587 of 2021. Hence, the Applicant has no locus to challenge the CoC at this when the CoC has already approved the Plan submitted by Mrs. Asha Sanap.”

Since we have already recorded our reasonings in the preceding paragraphs affirming the dismissal of IA 1777/2021, we have no reasons to take a different stand and therefore uphold the third impugned order of the Adjudicating Authority dismissing IA 1609/2021.


# 26. In IA No. 1150/2021, the Adjudicating Authority has approved the resolution plan of the Corporate Debtor. The issues challenged by the Appellant-2 in IA 1150/2021 being the same as those challenged in the first and second impugned orders by the Appellants-1 we do not propose to discuss them again as they have already been dealt in the foregoing paragraphs. We would only like to touch upon the argument proffered by Appellant-2 that the resolution plan could not have been approved by the Adjudicating Authority since applications under Sections 43, 44 and 66 of IBC as contained in IA 149 were still pending before the Adjudicating Authority.


# 27. We are not inclined to agree with this contention of the Appellant-2 in view of the statutory construct of IBC. The IBC stipulates the conclusion of CIRP in 330 days. Within this prescribed timeline, often the RP is unable to identify avoidable transactions and apply to the Adjudicating Authority to reverse them. We also notice that the avoidance applications are not statutorily bound by time as is the resolution process. Section 26 of IBC further provides that application for avoidance of transactions is not to affect CIRP proceedings and therefore such applications can continue even after completion of the CIRP. Section 26 of the IBC clearly stipulates that the pendency of any avoidance application shall not come in the way of the approval of the resolution plan. CIRP and avoidance applications are, thus by their very nature, a separate set of proceedings. The former is time bound whereas the latter requires a proper discovery of suspect transactions that are time consuming. The scheme of the IBC reinforces this difference and thus adjudication of an avoidance application is independent of the resolution of the corporate debtor and can survive CIRP. Recently, a division bench of the Delhi High Court in Tata Steel BSL Limited v. Venus Recruiter Private Limited and Others [(2023) SCC OnLine Del 155] has held that avoidance applications which are initiated by the RP shall continue irrespective of the finalisation of the Resolution Plan and the conclusion of the CIRP. In view of the above reasons, we are of the considered opinion that simply because the Appellants have raised the issue of avoidance application, it does not stand to reason that the approval of the resolution plan needs to be put on hold or kept in abeyance. We also find that the present resolution plan also provides that recovery under Section 43, 45, 50 and 66 of the IBC would be the exclusive rights of the CoC of the Corporate Debtor. We therefore affirm the approval of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority.


# 28. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are satisfied that no cogent grounds have been raised in either of the two appeals which would warrant any interference with the impugned orders passed by the Adjudicating Authority. In result, both the appeals are dismissed. No costs.

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Wednesday, 15 November 2023

Sabari Realty Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sivana Realty Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. - We, thus, are of the view that different treatment of two sets of homebuyers in view of the allotment to the homebuyer with/without NOC of the Mortgagee has rational for separate treatment and the submission of the Appellant cannot be accepted that all homebuyers should be treated in the same manner in the Resolution Plan.

NCLAT (02.11.2023) in Sabari Realty Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sivana Realty Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.1162, 1178 and 1179 of 2023] held that;

  • We, thus, concur with the view of the Adjudicating Authority that Appellant as a class of homebuyers cannot be allowed to challenge the Resolution Plan which has received approval of class of homebuyers on the basis of majority of votes of homebuyers.

  • The distinction has been made between allottees with NOC from the Mortgagee and allottees without NOC of the Mortgagee. When the Mortgage Deed especially provide for NOC by the Mortgagee, any allotment made in breach of such mortgage condition could not have been ignored by the Resolution Professional and the Committee of Creditors in its commercial wisdom has decided to deal with homebuyers who had allotment with NOC of LIC Housing Finance Ltd. and those who does not have NOC, the said treatment by the Committee of Creditors cannot be said to be in violation of provisions of Section 30(2)(e) of the I&B Code.

  • The submission of the Appellant that both categories of homebuyers who were given allotment with NOC of LIC and those who were given allotment without NOC of LIC has to be treated as member of one class and were entitled to similar treatment in the Resolution Plan. 

  • In a real estate project when the class of creditors consist of homebuyers and when the project spread into several units and several projects which are at different stages of construction the CoC in its commercial wisdom can take appropriate decision to satisfy the claim of class of creditors in a reasonable and fair manner.

  • We, thus, are of the view that different treatment of two sets of homebuyers in view of the allotment to the homebuyer with/without NOC of the Mortgagee has rational for separate treatment and the submission of the Appellant cannot be accepted that all homebuyers should be treated in the same manner in the Resolution Plan.


Excerpts of the Order;    

These three Appeals between the same parties’ challenges order dated 19.07.2023 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal), Mumbai Bench, Court -5. Order under challenge in these three Appeals although of the same date are different orders passed in different applications in CP (IB) – 3169/MB/2019. Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.1179 of 2023 has been filed against order dated 19.07.2023 passed in I.A. No. 933 of 2022 which was filed by the Appellant (Applicant) praying for rejection of the Resolution Plan submitted by M/s Kabra Estate & Investment Consultants (Successful Resolution Applicant), the Respondent No.2 herein. Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.1178 of 2023 has been filed against order dated 19.07.2023 passed in I.A. No. 533 of 2022 by which application the Applicant has sought rectification of the Register of Member of the Corporate Debtor which application was dismissed by the Adjudicating Authority by the impugned order. Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.1162 of 2023 has been filed against order dated 19.07.2023 by which I.A. No. 2981 of 2021 filed by the Resolution Professional seeking approval of the Resolution Plan submitted by Respondent No.2 has been allowed. The Resolution Plan was approved by 99.96% voting share of the members of the Committee of Creditors which stood approved by the impugned order dated 19.07.2023 passed by the Adjudicating Authority. The Appellant aggrieved by the above three orders have filed these three Appeals.


# 2. We now proceed to note the facts and sequence of events giving rise to these three Appeals. The Corporate Debtor earlier known as Sunshine Housing Private Ltd. is a real estate company which owned two projects namely ‘Samriddhi Garden’, (Phase-1 project) and ‘Sunshine Oakwood’, comprising of Wing ‘A’ and ‘B’ (Phase-2 project). In the year 2008, Appellant alongwith its sister concern – ‘Sabari Developers LLP’ acquired 11.31% and 26.38% share of the Corporate Debtor, respectively. Appellant also advanced a loan of Rs.7 Crores to the Corporate Debtor. A mortgage deed was executed on 15.09.2017 between the Corporate Debtor and the LIC Housing Finance Limited. The Corporate Debtor mortgaged Wing ‘C’ and ‘D’ of the Phase-I and project Phase-II in its entirety in favour of LIC Housing Finance Ltd. As per the mortgage deed, the Corporate Debtor was required to take prior written permission of LIC before sale or creation of any third-party rights over the aforesaid mortgaged properties. In the year 2017, certain disputes arose between the minority shareholders namely Vira Group and Sunshine Housing and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. who was the majority shareholder of the Corporate Debtor. A petition under Section 241-242 of the Companies Act, 2013 was filed by the Vira Group against Sunshine Housing and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (SHIPL). Orders passed in the proceedings were carried to the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 4247 of 2018. Allotment letter dated 05.04.2018 was issued by the Corporate Debtor to the Appellant allotting an area of 12515.09 sq. ft. in the project Sunshine Oakwood for a total consideration of Rs.18,77,20,000/- only. Letter further stated that amount of Rs.14,64,98659/- shall be appropriated from the loan taken by the Corporate Debtor from Appellant and balance amount of Rs.4,12,21,341/- shall be paid on possession and upon obtaining occupation certificate. 25 premises were allotted by the said letter dated 05.04.2018. In Civil Appeal No.4247 of 2018, Hon’ble Supreme Court on 06.08.2018 directed the parties i.e. Vira Group and SHIPL to go to the mediation centre of the Bombay High Court to settle the pending disputes. A Memorandum of Settlement dated 31.10.2018 was entered between the Vira Group and SHIPL where the shareholders of the Corporate Debtor including the Appellant as part of a larger settlement agreed to transfer their entire shareholding in favour of the Vira Group. To give effect to the Memorandum of Settlement, a Share Purchase Agreement dated 31.10.2018 was entered between the Appellant, Jayesh Shantilal Vira, father of Respondent No.3 and the Corporate Debtor. A joint application was also preferred before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court by order dated 03.12.2018 disposed of the Appeal in terms of the settlement arrived between the parties. On 16.10.2019, Appellant issued a notice to Vira Group alleging failure to issue Allotment letter and failure to pay Share Purchase consideration. The legal notice was replied by Vira Group on 28.11.2019. On 11.08.2020 CIRP was initiated against the Corporate Debtor on an application filed by ‘Spartan Engineering Industries Pvt. Ltd.’. Mr. Manish Jaju (Respondent No.2) was appointed as the Resolution Professional. On 11.01.2021, the Appellant filed its claim in Form CA as Homebuyers/Allottees/ Financial Creditors in a class in respect of 25 flats in the project of the Corporate Debtor. In the Form the Appellant mentioned itself as related party. Appellant’s claim was not initially accepted by the Resolution Professional, hence, I.A. No. 1485 of 2021 was filed by the Appellant seeking direction against the Resolution Professional for acceptance of the claim. The Resolution Professional by email dated 06.07.2021 admitted the Appellant’s claim as Homebuyers/Allottees/ Financial Creditors in a class in respect of 25 flats. Objections were raised by LIC Housing Finance Ltd. as well as Forensic Auditor appointed by the Resolution Professional regarding admission of the claim. LIC objected to the claim of the Appellant on the ground that LIC has mortgage over the property and for any allotment consent of the LIC was required, which was not taken in regard to allotment in favour of the Appellant. Authorised Representative of the Homebuyers also informed the Appellant that in view of the mortgage deed, NOC of LIC was required for effecting any sale/allotment to flats in the project. A Request was made by the Appellant seeking documents pertaining to CIRP and requesting permission to participate in the voting in the CIRP. Vira Group sent an email dated 03.08.2021 informing that Memorandum of Settlement dated 31.10.2018 has been revoked and cancelled in view of the fact that there was neither any transfer of consideration amount nor any transaction documents were lodged with the Company for transfer of shares. Appellant sent an email dated 06.08.2021 requesting Vira Group to withdraw email dated 03.08.2021. Resolution Professional communication a clarification to the Appellant that Appellant is a related party and could not be permitted to participate in the CIRP. Resolution Plan submitted by Respondent No.2 was approved by the CoC with 99.96% voting share. With regard to creditors in a class, Resolution Plan has classified them in two categories ‘affected allottees’ and ‘unaffected allottees’. Voting result regarding approval of the Resolution Plan was announced on 22.11.2021. On 18.12.2021, Appellant filed I.A. No. 933 of 2022 objecting to the Resolution Plan. I.A. No. 533 of 2022 was filed by the Appellant for rectification of Register of the Corporate Debtor. Resolution Professional filed I.A. No. 2981 of 2021 for approval of the Resolution Plan immediately after voting result was declared. The Adjudicating Authority by order dated 19.07.2023 allowed I.A. No. 3981 of 2023 approving the Resolution Plan. By separate order dated 19.07.2023, I.A. No. 933 of 2022 filed by the Applicant has been rejected and by order of the same date I.A. No. 533 of 2022 has also been rejected. Challenging the aforesaid three order, these three appeals have been filed.


# 8. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.


# 9. From the submissions of learned counsel for the parties following are the issues which arise for consideration:

  • (i) Whether the Appellant is not a related party and was entitled to vote in the Committee of Creditors?

  • (ii) Whether the Vira Group being related party consequently Respondent No.3 was also related party and as Director of Kalpataru Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. could not be member of the Committee of Creditors or voted in the Committee of Creditors?

  • (iii) Whether the Appellant is entitled to challenge the Resolution Plan which was approved by majority of creditors in class i.e. homebuyers?

  • (iv) Whether the categorization of the homebuyers in class as ‘Affected’ and ‘Unaffected’ homebuyers is violative of Section 30(2)(e) and the Resolution Plan deserve to be set aside on this ground alone?


Issue No.1

# 10. The Appellant has questioned non-inclusion of the Appellant in the Committee of Creditors. It is undisputed fact that the Appellant holds 11.31% shareholding of the Corporate Debtor and in the CIRP of Corporate Debtor Appellant filed its claim vide Form CA dated 08.01.2021. In the declaration which was filed alongwith the claim form in Para 5 following has been declared:

  • “5. We are a related party of the corporate debtor, as defined under section 5(24) of the Code.”


# 11. In the financial statement of the Corporate Debtor, Appellant has been reflected as shareholder on the date of commencement of the CIRP. The Registrar of Companies has not recorded transfer of shares as per the Share Purchase Agreement. Share Purchase Agreement dated 31.10.2018 after the Settlement Agreement between the parties could not be implemented, which is a fact on record. The Appellant itself has filed application for contempt against the Vira Group before the Hon’ble Supreme Court alleging the violation of order of Hon’ble Supreme Court which contempt was permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to the Appellant to take such proceedings as may be advised. Filing of contempt itself recognises that Memorandum of Settlement dated 31.10.2018 was breached. We are of the view that in this proceeding it is not necessary for us to express any opinion as to who is responsible for breach of settlement. Suffice it to say that settlement could not be implemented resulting in non-implementation of Share Purchase Agreement and shares of Appellant and others could not be transferred in favour of Vira Group. The Resolution Professional proceeded to classify the Appellant as related party on account of declaration of the Appellant itself in the claim form that it is a related party. The shareholding of the Appellant still continues in the Corporate Debtor which is not yet been transferred as per the Settlement Agreement. We do not find any error in the decision of the Resolution Professional classifying the Appellant as related party and not giving the Appellant a seat and voting share in the Committee of Creditors.

Issue No.1 is answered accordingly.


Issue No.2:

# 12. The case of the Appellant is that Kalpatru Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. (KASPL) is a voting member of the Committee of Creditors. His submission is that KASPL holds 16% shareholding of the Corporate Debtor and Mr. Pratik Jayesh Vira was Director of Corporate Debtor from 01.01.2010 to 19.02.2019 and is also Director of KASPL. Learned counsel for the Appellant has relied on Section 5(24)(d) to submit that KASPL is a related party. According to own case of the Appellant, Mr. Pratik Jayesh Vira who was Director of the Corporate Debtor as well as KASPL resigned on 19.02.2019. Learned counsel for the Appellant has relied on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Phoenix ARC vs. Spade Financial Services, (2021) 3 SCC 475”. However, there is no material on record that resignation of Respondent No.3 was with intend to be member of the Committee of Creditors. There being no material or pleading to come to the conclusion that KASPL still continues to be related party by virtue of Section 5(24)(d) whereas after 19.02.2019, Mr. Pratik Jayesh Vira does not continue as Director of the Corporate Debtor and CIRP against the Corporate Debtor commenced on 11.08.2020, more than a year after such resignation. With regard to 16% shareholding of KASPL, learned counsel for the Respondent No.3 has submitted that to attract Section 5(24)(j), the KASPL had to control more than 20% of voting rights in the corporate debtor on account of ownership or a voting agreement. It has only 16% shareholding in the Corporate Debtor, hence, cannot be held as related party as per Section 5(24)(j). The submission of the Appellant objecting participation of KASPL on the basis of its shareholding which in view of the definition clause 5(24)(j) does not fulfils it to be related party, hence, participation of KASPL in voting cannot be faulted. As noted above, transfer of shareholding in favour of the Vira Group could not materialise.


Issue No.3

# 13. The Adjudicating Authority by the impugned order has rejected the objection filed by the Appellant challenging the Resolution Plan on the ground that Appellant being a part of the class of creditors i.e. homebuyer who has voted for Resolution Plan cannot be allowed to challenge the Resolution Plan. The Adjudicating Authority in holding that Appellant as an individual cannot oppose the Resolution Plan has relied on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association & Ors. Versus NBCC (India) Ltd. & Ors., (2022) 1 SCC 401”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above case has categorically held that where homebuyers as a class has assented to the plan any individual homebuyer and Association cannot raise challenge to the Resolution Plan. In Paras 218 and 226 of the judgment following has been laid down:

  • “218. To sum up this part of discussion, in our view, after approval of the resolution plan of NBCC by CoC, where homebuyers as a class assented to the plan, any individual homebuyer or association cannot maintain any challenge to the resolution plan nor could be treated as carrying any legal grievance.”

  • “226. For what has been discussed above, we hold that the homebuyers as a class having assented to the resolution plan of NBCC, any individual homebuyer or any association of homebuyers cannot maintain a challenge to the resolution plan and cannot be treated as a dissenting financial creditor or an aggrieved person; the question of violation of the provisions of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 does not arise; the resolution plan in question is not violative of the mandatory requirements of the CIRP Regulations; and when the resolution plan comprehensively deals with all the assets and liabilities of the corporate debtor, no housing project could be segregated merely for the reason that the same has been completed or is nearing completion.”


# 14. From the facts which have been brought on the record, it is clear that homebuyer as a class have approved the Resolution Plan. Voting results on the plan have been brought on the record which clearly shows that the homebuyers as a class had approved the Resolution Plan. Appellant, who is a dissatisfied minority, a single homebuyer has to sail alongwith the view of the majority in terms of the scheme of IBC. We, thus, concur with the view of the Adjudicating Authority that Appellant as a class of homebuyers cannot be allowed to challenge the Resolution Plan which has received approval of class of homebuyers on the basis of majority of votes of homebuyers.


Issue No.4

15. The Resolution Plan is sought to be attacked by the Appellant on the ground that the homebuyers in class have been given different treatment under the heading ‘Affected Homebuyers’ and ‘Unaffected Homebuyers’. We may for this purpose first notice certain clauses of the Resolution Plan. Clause 7.1.10 deals with proposal for ‘Affected Homebuyers’ and Clause 7.1.11 deals with proposal for ‘Unaffected Homebuyers’. It is useful to extract clause 7.1.10 of the Resolution Plan:

  • “7.1.10 Proposal for affected home buyers.

  • 7.1.10.1 The affected allottees have been allotted a total area of approx. 83,000 sq. ft. for a total consideration of Rs. 132 crores. Out of this, they have paid against their units a total sum of approx. Rs. 93 crores and amount of Rs. 39 crore is payable by them. LIC HFL has raised objection to allotment / sale of such units since NOC of LIC HFL was not obtained towards their allotment / sale. It is also noticed that some of the affected parties are shareholders of the Company and they have been classified as a related party by the RP and the RA has proposed the same treatment for them as other affected parties.

  • 7.1.10.2 In order to resolve the Corporate Debtor, it is proposed that allotment of such units where NOC was not obtained, their allotments / sale shall stand cancelled vide this resolution plan. The affected homebuyers will have to execute cancellation agreements within 30 days of the trigger date. In case they fail to do so, then the Resolution Applicant shall be entitled to do a one side cancellation agreement for the same under the Resolution Plan.

  • 7.1.10.3 Against the aforesaid cancelation the RA proposes to allot fully paid-up units as per Annexure I & J as full and final settlement against their allotment or the amounts paid to the corporate debtor by such unit holders or the amounts credited to their account as paid by the corporate debtor against the aforesaid units. Accordingly, such units shall no longer be liable to pay the balance consideration of Rs. 39 crores as mentioned above and LIC HFL will be deemed to have given its NOC in respect of such allotment to these affected allottees and these units shall be released from the mortgage on approval of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority. The details of such allotment is given in Annexure I & J hereto. Such unit holders who have executed the cancellation agreement will be given fresh allotment letters showing the revised area allotted to them and the consideration adjusted against the same.

  • 7.1.10.4 The number of units coming to the share of each affected homebuyer is given in Annexure I hereto and if the same is not possible to be allotted due to the RERA carpet area of the units being higher or lower, then for the difference in area the concerned homebuyer shall either make payment or be entitled to a refund calculated at the rate of Rs.24,500 per sq. ft . The payment of the said additional consideration for the additional area shall be made as per the schedule given in the agreement for the respective unit to be entered into with the affected allotee after approval of the plan. It is pertinent note that plans for phase 2 have not yet been approved by MCGM and fresh plans have to be submitted for approval by RA and hence allotment of units in phase 2 to affected units shall happen only after the plans are approved by MCGM. It shall be the endeavor of the RA to allot units to the affected allottees as per the areas mentioned in list attached hereto as Annexure I.

  • 7.1.10.5 The units to be allotted to the affected home buyers shall be fully paid up as regards the sale consideration is concerned, but they will have to pay the stamp duty, registration charges, GST, and other applicable taxes and charges including electricity meter deposit, development charges, society formation charges, membership fees of the society, etc. as are applicable to all other unit buyers.

  • 7.1.10.6 The affected allottees of phase 1 shall also be liable to pay an escalation charge of Rs. 2850 per sq.ft. of Rera carpet area in the manner provided here in below:

  • a) 30% within 60 days of the trigger date.

  • b) 30% within 6 months of the trigger date.

  • c) 20% within 9 months of the trigger date.

  • d) 20% within 12 months of the trigger date.

  • Such escalation charges are at par with the escalation charges provided for unaffected allottees.

  • The affected allottees of phase 2 shall also be liable to pay an escalation charge of Rs. 8500 per sq.ft. of Rera carpet area in the manner provided hereinbelow.

  • a. 30% within 60 days of the CC of phase 2.

  • b. 15% within 6 months of the CC of phase 2.

  • c. 15% within 12 months of the CC of phase 2.

  • d. 15% within 18 months of the CC of phase 2.

  • e. 15% within 24 months of the CC of phase 2.

  • f. 10% within 30 months of the CC of phase 2.”


# 16. We have noticed above that Project-II was mortgaged to LIC Housing Finance Ltd. by Mortgage Deed dated 15.09.2017. The Mortgage Deed provided that the Corporate Debtor was required to take prior consent of LIC before creating of any third party rights over the mortgaged property. It is undisputed fact that allotment in favour of the Appellant on 05.04.2018, which is subsequent to the Mortgage Deed, was made without taking NOC from the LIC Housing Finance Ltd. The allotment in favour of the Appellant was made by the Corporate Debtor and Allotment Letter indicate that consideration for the allotment was substantial part of the amount of the loan which was taken from the Appellant and rest of the amount was to be paid at the time of handing over of possession. The Resolution Plan states that such allotment for which no NOC was obtained shall be considered cancelled and Affected party has to execute cancellation agreement and by the same plan the Resolution Plan proposes to allot fully paid-up units as full and final settlement against allotment and the amount paid to the Corporate Debtor by such unit holders or the amounts credited. There is a clear demarcation line between Affected and Unaffected homebuyers. The distinction has been made between allottees with NOC from the Mortgagee and allottees without NOC of the Mortgagee. When the Mortgage Deed especially provide for NOC by the Mortgagee, any allotment made in breach of such mortgage condition could not have been ignored by the Resolution Professional and the Committee of Creditors in its commercial wisdom has decided to deal with homebuyers who had allotment with NOC of LIC Housing Finance Ltd. and those who does not have NOC, the said treatment by the Committee of Creditors cannot be said to be in violation of provisions of Section 30(2)(e) of the I&B Code.


# 17. From the relevant clauses of the Resolution Plan, as extracted above, it is clear that those homebuyers who were given allotment without NOC and from whom amount were received or credited have been offered allotment, of course of the reduced area. The submission of the Appellant that both categories of homebuyers who were given allotment with NOC of LIC and those who were given allotment without NOC of LIC has to be treated as member of one class and were entitled to similar treatment in the Resolution Plan. In a real estate project when the class of creditors consist of homebuyers and when the project spread into several units and several projects which are at different stages of construction the CoC in its commercial wisdom can take appropriate decision to satisfy the claim of class of creditors in a reasonable and fair manner.


# 23. We, thus, are of the view that different treatment of two sets of homebuyers in view of the allotment to the homebuyer with/without NOC of the Mortgagee has rational for separate treatment and the submission of the Appellant cannot be accepted that all homebuyers should be treated in the same manner in the Resolution Plan. We may further notice that present is not a case where there is distribution of any amount as per the Resolution Plan to a class of creditors. Learned counsel for the Appellant has also relied on judgment of this Tribunal in “Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 1148 of 2022, Akashganga Processors Pvt. Ltd. vs. Shri Ravindra Goyal, decided on 13.07.2023”. In the above case this Tribunal took the view that distribution to the Operational Creditor has to be in the same proportion and there can be no discrimination in payment of Operational Creditors. This Tribunal noticing that there was discrimination in payment to the Operational Creditors inter se, has directed that Operational Creditors be paid the same amount. In the above case, the Adjudicating Authority has rejected the Resolution Plan on the ground that there is differentiation in payment of Operational Creditors inter se. The Appeal was allowed by this Tribunal and Resolution Plan was upheld subject to direction that Operational Creditors be made payment to the equal effect. In Para 8, 9 and 10 following has been held:

“8. As far as the submission that payment was made to Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and Surat Municipal Corporation to keep the Corporate Debtor as a going concern, the said payment can very well be made by the Corporate Debtor but not in the manner as adopted in the Resolution Plan. In the present case, the Resolution Plan was approved by the CoC on 06.08.2021 with 99.84% vote share, however, the Adjudicating Authority rejected the plan by the impugned order. It is also to be noticed that none of the Operational Creditors i.e. State Tax, Government of Gujrat and Central Excise, Government of India have come up in appeal.

9. The Punjab National Bank (Financial Creditor) has also filed an Additional Affidavit in pursuance of order dated 31.03.2023 indicating reason to accept the amount as allocated in the plan. We are satisfied that the said reason makes reasonable decision taken by the Bank to accept the plan. Under the Plan the Financial Creditor has conceded amount of Rs.32,78,102/- to Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and Surat Municipal Corporation.

10. In the facts of the present case, we are of the view that ends of justice be served in disposing of this appeal in directing that the amount of Rs.32,78,102/- be distributed to all the four Operational Creditors so as to save the plan from being invalidated. We, thus, are of the view that the Adjudicating Authority having found that there is discrimination in payment of Operational Creditors could have directed for compliance of provision of the Code by distribution of Rs.32,78,102/- without affecting the other terms and conditions of the plan. By this modification the plan shall be able to sail and implemented, which is approved by CoC with 99.84% vote share. The plan need to be implemented with modification as directed above.”


# 24. The above judgment does not help the Appellant in the present case since in the above case the question was distribution of amount under the Resolution Plan to the Operational Creditors inter se and this Tribunal directed payment of amount to the Operational Creditors in the same proportion to uphold the Resolution Plan. The present is not a case of distribution of any amount rather Resolution Plan provides for ways and manner to complete the project and handover units to the allottees. Allottees have been classified in two groups – ‘Affected’ and ‘Unaffected’, as noted above, and we have found the classification justified in the treatment of claims. Learned counsel for the Appellant has failed to point out any violation of any provision of law by aforesaid classification of ‘Affected’ and ‘Unaffected’ homebuyers. We, thus, are of the view that the Resolution Plan does not violate any provision of law.


# 25. We are conscious that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited Through Authorised Signatory vs. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 531” has laid down that there can be difference in payment of the different category of creditors. In Para 88 of the judgment following has been held:

“88. By reading paragraph 77 (of Swiss Ribbons) dehors the earlier paragraphs, the Appellate Tribunal has fallen into grave error. Paragraph 76 clearly refers to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide which makes it clear beyond any doubt that equitable treatment is only of similarly situated creditors. This being so, the observation in paragraph 77 cannot be read to mean that financial and operational creditors must be paid the same amounts in any resolution plan before it can pass muster. On the contrary, paragraph 77 itself makes it clear that there is a difference in payment of the debts of financial and operational creditors, operational creditors having to receive a minimum payment, being not less than liquidation value, which does not apply to financial creditors. The amended Regulation 38 set out in paragraph 77 again does not lead to the conclusion that financial and operational creditors, or secured and unsecured creditors, must be paid the same amounts, percentage wise, under the resolution plan before it can pass muster. Fair and equitable dealing of operational creditors’ rights under the said Regulation involves the resolution plan stating as to how it has dealt with the interests of operational creditors, which is not the same thing as saying that they must be paid the same amount of their debt proportionately. Also, the fact that the operational creditors are given priority in payment over all financial creditors does not lead to the conclusion that such payment must necessarily be the same recovery percentage as financial creditors. So long as the provisions of the Code and the Regulations have been met, it is the commercial wisdom of the requisite majority of the Committee of Creditors which is to negotiate and accept a resolution plan, which may involve differential payment to different classes of creditors, together with negotiating with a prospective resolution applicant for better or different terms which may also involve differences in distribution of amounts between different classes of creditors.”


# 26. What was emphasised in the judgment is that there shall be fair and equitable treatment in dealing dues of Operational Creditors and further there can be difference in payment to the Financial Creditor and the Operational Creditors. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment has held that commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors cannot be substituted. In Para 144 and 147 following has been held:

“144. What is important to note is that when one reads the above mentioned judgment, it is a majority of 66% of the Committee of Creditors who has exercised the discretion vested in it under the Code in this particular manner, which has then correctly not been disturbed by the NCLT and NCLAT. Far from helping Shri Sibal’s client, the principle that is applied in such a case is that ultimately it is the commercial wisdom of the requisite majority of the Committee of Creditors that must prevail on the facts of any given case, which would include distribution in the manner suggested in Orissa Manganese (supra). It is, therefore, not possible to accept the argument that the Adjudicatory Authority and consequently the Appellate Authority would be vested with the discretion to apply what was applied by the Committee of Creditors in the Orissa Manganese case (supra). This submission is also devoid of merit and is, therefore, rejected.”

“147. The NCLAT judgment which substitutes its wisdom for the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors and which also directs the admission of a number of claims which was done by the resolution applicant, without prejudice to its right to appeal against the aforesaid judgment, must therefore be set aside.”


# 27. We, thus, are of the view that commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors, which has approved the Resolution Plan under which different treatment has been given to ‘Affected Homebuyers’ and ‘Unaffected Homebuyers’, cannot be faulted. We, thus, are of the view that there are no grounds made out to challenge the approval of the Resolution Plan. Further, the Adjudicating Authority has also rightly rejected the objections filed by the Appellant by I.A. No. 933 of 2022.


# 30. In view of the foregoing discussion and conclusions, we do not find any error in orders dated 19.07.2023 approving the Resolution Plan and rejecting I.A. No. 533 of 2022 and I.A. No. 933 of 2022. In result, all the Appeals are dismissed.


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