Tuesday, 17 September 2024

Spenta Builders Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mr. Ashlesh Gosain - Therefore, we are of the considered view that delay in granting permissions/ sanctions from various competent authorities, etc. as contended by the Promoter cannot be construed as "force majeure” The Promoter can neither expect Allottee to be aware of the likely delay nor can make Allottee bear the brunt of the failure on the part of Promoter act professionally by assessing the requisite date for possession'

 REAT Mumbai (2024.08.21) in Spenta Builders Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mr. Ashlesh Gosain .[(2024) ibclaw.in 115 REAT, Appeal No. AT00600000052402/20, Appeal No. AT00600000052942/21] held that; 

  • If the Allottee chooses to continue in the project, he is entitled only interest on delayed possession and not compensation.

  • Explanation to Section 6 of RERA which clearly clarifies that" force majeure" shall mean case of war, flood, drought, fire, cyclone' earthquake or any other calamity caused by nature, affecting the regular development of real estate project.

  • Therefore, we are of the considered view that delay in granting permissions/ sanctions from various competent authorities, etc. as contended by the Promoter cannot be construed as "force majeure” The Promoter can neither expect Allottee to be aware of the likely delay nor can make Allottee bear the brunt of the failure on the part of Promoter act professionally by assessing the requisite date for possession'


Excerpts of the Order;

1).  The captioned Appeals emanate from order dated  03.09.2020 passed by the learned Member I, MahaRERA (for short the Authority) in Complaint No.CC006000000079514 whereby the learned Authority directed the Appellant/Promoter to pay interest to Respondent/Allottee from 01.07.2017 till the date of actual possession.


21 For the sake of convenience, parties to the Appeals hereinafter will be referred to as "Allottee" and "Promoter" respectively. Since the captioned Appeals are arising out of the same Order and parties are the same, therefore, these Appeals are disposed of by this common judgment. 


3). Brief facts, culled out from the pleadings, documents on record and impugned Order are that the Allottee has purchased a flat bearing no.202 in 'A'Wing admeasuring 649.50 sq. ft. carpet area in the Promoter's project "Palazzio" situated at Mohili village, Mohili, Kurla Andheri Road, Mumbai 400072 (said Flat) bearing MahaRERA project registration no. P51800002414 (said Project)' The parties executed and registered the agreement for sale dated 15.07.2014 (said Agreement) for a total consideration of Rs.97,22,000/- out of which Allottee paid Rs.87,49,800/- to Promoter. As per the agreement for sale, the Promoter was liable to handover possession of the subject flat to Allottee on or before 31.12.2015. The Promoter obtained Occupation Certificate for the said project covering the subject flat on 14.07.2020 and subsequently handed over possession to Allottee on 31.07.2020. Thus, the Promoter failed to handover possession of the subject flat by the date specified in the said agreement for sale. Therefore, Allottee filed the captioned Complaint before the Authority and sought relief of interest on delayed possession and compensation under section 18 of RERA Act, 2016 (for short RERA).


4). The Promoter appeared in the Complaint and remonstrated the Complaint by filing reply. The Promoter contended that the said project is completed in all respects for the purpose of obtaining Occupation Certificate. Further, the application has also been submitted to the competent authority for grant of Occupation Certificate.


5).  The Promoter further submitted that the Allottee had agreed to the revised date of possession being July, 2017, which  also reflect in the minutes of the meeting dated 15.04.20L7 circulated by the Promoter by an email dated 19.04.2017. Further, the Allottee did not raise any objection to the revised date of possession. The Promoter also submitted that Clause 12 of the agreement for sale states that the Promoter shall endeavor to deliver possession of the said flat on or before December,2015 with an additional grace period of 3 months subject to force majeure or such other factors as laid down in Clause 12 of the agreement. The Promoter also submitted that certain events that caused delay in completion of the said project have occurred, which were beyond the control of the Promoter. These included delay in NOC from Airport Authority of India, delay in Environmental Clearance, ban on sand mining by mechanical equipment, etc which caused delay in completion of the project. The Promoter also submitted that since there is no intentional delay on the part of the Promoter in completing the said project, the project got delayed for the reasons mentioned above which are beyond the control of the Promoter.


6). In light of above submissions, the Promoter prayed for dismissal of the Complaint.


7). After hearing the parties, the Authority passed the Order dated 13.11.2019. While passing the said Order, the Authority took into consideration the facts and circumstances in earlier similar Complaints of flat owners in the same project for which Orders were passed on 16.03.2018 (in Complaint no CC006000000012618) and 06.08.2019 (in Complaint no CC006000000057334) whereby the Promoter was directed to pay interest to Allottees from 01.07.2017 till the actual date of possession. Further, the Authority observed that Order dated 16.03.2018 passed by the Authority has been confirmed by MahaREAT in its Order dated 08.05.2018 in Appeal No.AT006000000000240. On the similar lines, the Authority granted relief of interest and directed the Promoter to pay interest from 01.07,2017 till the date of Occupation Certificate obtained by Promoter for the project i.e. 28.02.2019 at the rate of Marginal Cost Lending Rate of SBI plus 2% as prescribed under provisions of Section 18 of RERA. The Authority further directed the Promoter to handover possession to the Allottee forthwith. It also directed that since the project is nearing completion, the actual amount payable to the Allottee towards the interest shall be adjusted with  the amount payable by the Allottee and the balance, if any, shall be paid to the other party at the time of possession. 


8). Allottee thereafter filed the Application dated 13.01.2020 for rectification of Order of the Authority dated 13.11.2019. The Allottee submitted that the subject flat has not received Occupation Certificate till date and therefore prayed for rectification to the extent that the interest should be till the possession is handed over to Allottee and not restricted to the date 28.02.2019 mentioned in the Order dated 13.11.2019. Further, Allottee submitted that he is entitled to seek relief of interest for the delayed possession from 31.12.2015, which was the agreed date of possession as per the said agreement, and not from 01.07.2017 as mentioned in the Order dated 13.11.2019. The Authority heard both the parties. The Authority observed that since Occupation Certificate was not obtained by the Promoter for the subject flat, reference to Occupation Certificate dated 28.02.2019 in the said Order to be

deleted. However, other relief sought by Allottee regarding interest from 31.12.2015 instead of 01.07.2017 was not accepted by the Authority. Accordingly, the Authority passed the impugned Order dated 03.09.2020.


9). Aggrieved by the said Order of the Authority dated 03.09.2020, Allottee filed the Appeal No.AT006000000052942 on the following grounds:

(i) the impugned Order is erroneous on the face of it and has caused grave miscarriage of justice.

(ii) the learned Authority failed to take into account the facts specific to this case of the Allottee and passed the Order which is factually incorrect and unreasoned

(iii) the learned Authority failed to take into consideration the fact that the promised date of possession as mentioned in the agreement for sale is 31.12.2015. Further, the learned Authority granted interest to Allottee from 01.07.2017 instead of 31.12.2015 and while passing the Order did not give any reasons for the said decision.

(iv) the learned Authority failed to appreciate that the facts in the cases referred to by the Authority of other allottees in the same project, on which basis the Authority determined the date from which date interest is awarded in its Order dated 03.09.2019, were different from the facts of the case of the Allottee, particularly with reference to date of possession.


10).  On these grounds, the Allottee sought relief of interest from 31.I2.2015, which is promised date of possession as per the agreement for sale, till obtaining the Occupation Certificate and handing over of possession of the said flat to the Allottee and prayed for allowing his appeal and dismissing the appeal filed by the Promoter.


11).  Aggrieved by the said Order dated 03.09.2020, the Promoter also filed the Appeal No.AT006000000052402 on the following grounds:

(i) the impugned Order has been passed in contravention of Sections 31, 71 of RERA. In terms of the said Sections, the Complaint made under Sections 12, t4, 18 and 19 of RERA mandatorily required to be heard and dealt with by the Adjudicating Officer and not the Authority. As such the Authority does not have the powers to hear the Complaint made under Sections 12, t4, 18 and 19 of RERA. Therefore, the impugned Order having been passed by the Authority, without referring it to the Adjudicating Officer, is without jurisdiction and as such is a nullity and is required to be set aside. 

(ii) The Allotted in its complaint had prayed for:

  • (a) payment of interest on the consideration amount of Rs.87,49,800/- from 31.12.2015 till obtaining of Occupation Certificate and subsequent handover of possession of the subject flat 

  • (b) compensation on account of loss of rental income due to delay in handing over of possession by the Promoter in terms of Sections 12 and 18 of RERA. 

  • (c) the payment of the amount of Rs.2,50,000/- as compensation towards mental agony and harassment in terms of Sections 12 and 18 of the Act. Thus, in addition to payment of interest, the Allottee has claimed compensation under Sections 12 and 18 of the Act and as such compensation and interest could not have been granted to Allottee by the Authority in tight of Section 71 of the Act and therefore the impugned Order is liable to be set aside.

(iii) the impugned Order neither records the arguments and submissions made by the Promoter nor does it deal with the same. Therefore, the impugned Order has been passed without application of mind and ought to be quashed and set aside. The fact that the Promoter had sought the transfer of the Complaint to the Adjudicating Officer was neither recorded nor dealt with by the Authority. Therefore, the impugned Order has been passed without application of mind.

(iv) The Authority erred in law by seeking Allottee's consent for transferring the Complaint to the Adjudicating Officer and upon Allottee's refusal to consent, continued to deal with the Complaint. Sections 31 and 71 of the Act read with Rules 6 and 7 of the Rules make it clear that any Complaint filed under Sections 12 and 18 of the Act should be adjudicated upon by the Adjudicating Officer and not the Authority.

(v) The impugned Order has not been passed on the facts of the case and but merely on the basis of Orders passed by the Authority in different Complaints by other allottees having different facts.

(vi) The learned Authority failed to appreciate the provisions in Clause 12 of the agreement which provides for a grace period of 3 months over and above the agreed date of possession i.e. 31.12.2015 to handover possession of the said flat to Allottee.

(vii) The Authority failed to appreciate that the Promoter during construction of the project suffered delays which are beyond its control. Such delays included changes in the sanctioned plan, changes in Environmental Impact Assessment, delays in  obtaining Environmental Clearance from State Level Environmental Impact Assessment Committee, etc. The construction of project came to a halt due to non-availability of Environmental Clearance which caused significant delay in completion of the Project.


12). On the grounds mentioned above, the Promoter has filed the Appeal No.AT006000000052402 and sought relief of setting aside the impugned Order dated 03.09.2020 and prayed for allowing his appeal and dismissal of appeal filed by the Allottee.


13).  We have heard learned Advocate Mr. Nilesh R. Motwani for Allottee and Advocate Ms. Sana Khan for Promoter. 


l4).  The submissions advanced by learned Advocates for respective parties are nothing but reiteration of contents of memorandums of appeals and written submissions. However, in addition, the learned Advocate for Promoter has submitted that as per terms of the agreement for sale, the said flat was to be handed over to Allottee by 31.12.2015. However, in the event the Promoter is unable to complete the construction of the project by the agreed

date of 31.12.2O15 for reasons beyond its control, the agreement provided for an extension of 3 months to handover possession of the subject flat to Allottee. The Promoter submitted that the said  delays which were on account of various factors which included delays in seeking permissions, Environmental Clearance, NOC from Airport Authority of India, Occupation Certificate, etc. should be exempted from calculating the date of handing over of possession. The Promoter submitted that the flat owners including the Allottee were made aware of the intervening circumstances from time to time. Subsequent to the execution of the agreement, a meeting was held on 15,04.2017 between the representatives of the Promoter and various flat purchasers wherein it was lnteralra discussed, and the flat purchasers were informed that the possession of the subject flat would be delivered to them after 30.06.2017. Learned Advocate further submitted that the Allottee and other flat owners were informed that the application for Occupation Certificate for the project was made in mid-May,2017 and the Occupation Certificate was expected by 30.06.2017.


15).  Learned Advocate further submitted that various flat purchasers including the Allottee agreed and consented to possession date being extended to July, 2017. As such, Clause 12 of the agreement stands amended and the possession date stands extended to July, 2017. Learned Advocate further submitted that Promoter has completed the said project for the purpose of obtaining Occupation Certificate on 26.05.2017 and accordingly made the application to competent Authority for grant of Occupation Certificate. Learned Advocate further submitted that the Promoter was not able to obtain the Occupation Certificate for the Building which covers the subject flat due to reasons beyond its control. Further, flat owners including the Allottee in these  Appeals were informed about the issues faced by the Promoter in obtaining Occupation Certificate. Learned Advocate further submitted that the Orders of the Authority dated 13.10.2017 and 16.03.2018 related to Complaints filed by other flat purchasers of the same project had been challenged by the Promoter in Hon'ble High Court in second Appeal No.677 of 2018 and 31357 of 2018 respectively which have been stayed by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court.


16). Learned Advocate for Appellant submitted that the Promoter received Occupation Certificate for the project and invited the Allottee to take possession of the subject flat vide an email dated 15,07.2020. Thereafter, the Promoter completed the formality of handing over possession by completing the payment of outstanding amount by Allottee and handed over possession to the Allottee on 31.07.2020. Learned Advocate further submitted  that the Allottee has also signed the possession letter accepting the possession of the said flat without any complaints or issues.


t7).  Learned Advocate submitted that the Promoter has fulfilled its duties and obligations towards the Allottee. The Promoter has obtained all necessary approvals, permissions and certification from the relevant authorities. The Promoter has already handed over possession of the subject flat and fulfilled all the terms of the agreement for sale between the parties. The Promoter has also formed the society of flat-owners post receipt of Occupation Certificate and Registration Certificate for the said Society has already been received. In light of above, learned Advocate for Promoter submitted that nothing in the Appeal survives and therefore prayed for dismissal of the Appeal filed by Allottee and allow the Appeal filed by the Promoter. 


18).  Learned Advocate for Allottee has submitted that the Authority has wrongly awarded the interest from the date of 01.07.2017 even though the agreement for sale clearly states that possession of the said flat will be handed over to the Allottee by 31.12.2015. Learned Advocate further submitted that the Authority has failed to give any justification for the arbitrary start date of interest of 01.07.2O17. Learned Advocate submitted that the Authority has rejected the prayer of Allottee on the ground that in similar matters by other allottees of the said project, the relief of interest was granted from 01.07.2017. However, the Authority has failed to appreciate that the agreement signed and executed by the Allottee had promised the possession at much earlier date than in other matters, which the Authority has relied upon. Further, in other matters, the Authority granted the relief of interest from the date in accordance with the promised date of possession in their respective agreements for sale. Therefore, the impugned Order is without application of mind on the part of the Authority.


19).  With these submissions, the learned Advocate for Allottee prayed for relief of interest from 01.01.2016 till the date of handing over of the possession by the Promoter to Allottee and further prayed for dismissal of the Appeal filed by the Promoter. 


20). Having considered the detailed and comprehensive submissions of the respective parties, supported by various documents, the points that arise for our consideration and findings thereon for the reasons to follow are as under:


Sr. No

Points

. Findings


Whether impugned Order dated 03.09.2020 warrantsinterference in the Appeal?

In the affirmative

  1.  

What Order?

As per final Order


REASONS

2t) On ensemble of facts as submitted above by the parties, it is not in dispute that the Allottee has purchased flat bearing no.202 in 'A' Wing admeasuring 649.50 sq. ft. carpet area in the said project of the Promoter" It is not in dispute that parties executed and registered the agreement for sale dated 15.07.2014 or a total consideration of Rs.97,22,000/- out of which the Allottee paid Rs.87,49,OOO/- to the Promoter. It is not in dispute that as per the said agreement for sale, the Promoter was liable to hand over possession of the subject flat to Allottee on or before 31.12.2015. It is also not in dispute that the Promoter obtained Occupation Certificate for the said project, covering the subject flat on t4.07.2020. It is also not in dispute that the Promoter offered the Allottee to take possession of the said flat on 15.07.2020 and Allottee took possession of the said flat on 31.07,2020 after payment of outstanding balance amount. Therefore these admitted facts reveal the Promoter has failed to handover the possession of the subject flat to Allottee by the date specified in the agreement for sale.


22). The Promoter has challenged the impugned Order dated 03.09.2020 on the ground that the same has been passed in contravention of Sections 31, 71 of RERA. The Promoter has contended that in terms of the said Sections, a Complaint which is made under Sections 12, 14, 18 and 19 of RERA is mandatorily required to be heard and dealt with by the Adjudicating Officer and not the Authority. As such the Authority does not have the power to hear the Complaint made under Sections t2, t4, 18 and 19 of the Act and therefore, the impugned Order having been passed by the Authority without having made reference to Adjudicating officer is without jurisdiction and as such is a nullity. 


23). Before examining the merits of the case, we first address the submissions made above by learned Advocate for Promoter that learned Authority has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the captioned Complaint as the powers to determine the quantum of compensation and interest vest with the Adjudicating officer appointed by the Authority in accordance with Sections 71 and 72 of RERA and therefore the impugned order is liable to be quashed on this ground.


24). It appears that the Promoter's understanding and interpretation of Section 18 of RERA is that any claim under Section 18 of RERA, including the interest of delayed possession, has to be necessarily dealt with by the Adjudicating Officer appointed under Section 71(1) of RERA and not by the Authority. Section 71 of RERA provides that appointment of the Adjudicating Officer is for the purpose of adjudicating of compensation under Sections, 12, t4, 18 and 19 of the Act. This signifies that the Adjudicating Officer is to adjudge the element of compensation and while doing so he will have due regards to various factors outlined under Section 72 of the Act. Adjudging compensation will require deeper inquires and investigations to determine the quantum of compensation. However, no Such provision of any such factors or reasons as contemplated under Section 72 of the Act is required for determining interest of delayed possession under Section 18 of the Act. For awarding such relief under Section 18 of the Act, it would be sufficient if there is element or ingredient of delay in handing over possession within the period agreed in the agreement for sale. Once the delay is made out from the facts of the case, pressing the claim of interest on the paid amount by Allottee is a simple exercise of calculation of interest at the rate prescribed under the Act. In the present Appeal, the Allottee has claimed interest on delayed possession and compensation under section 12 and 18 of RERA' However, the Authority while passing the impugned Order has granted relief only of interest on the delayed possession and rejected the claim of compensation under Section 18 of the Act withdrawing from the project. If the Allottee chooses to continue in the project, he is entitled only interest on delayed possession

and not compensation. Therefore, in this Appeal, the Authority has considered his claim limited to interest on delayed possession, therefore, no adjudication in nature of decree is involved to attract the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Officer. Therefore, the claim of interest under Section 1B of the Act for delayed possession is not in the nature of a compensation which requires deeper inquiry and  adjudication by the Adjudicating Officer as provided under Section 72 of the Act. Therefore, under Section 71 of the Act, the Adjudicating Officer primarily has jurisdiction to decide the case where the adjudication is required for awarding compensation and or interest where the interest being sought qua compensation falls under the sway of compensation. Where interest is sought as interest simpliciter and not by way of compensation per say, the Authority has necessary jurisdiction to deal with such claim under

Section 18 of the Act. Such a claim of interest for delayed possession is not in the nature of compensation. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the submissions of the Promoter and hold that the Authority has necessary jurisdiction to decide and award the interest on delayed possession under Section 18 of the Act.


25).  As discussed above, the due date of possession as per the agreement is 31.12.2015 whereas the Promoter offered the possession to Allottee after obtaining Occupation Certificate on 15.07.2020. This clearly establishes that the Promoter failed to handover the possession of the said flat to Allottee and therefore the Allottee is entitled to seek relief of interest under Section 18 of RERA.


26).  It is specific contention of the Promoter that as per provisions of the said agreement, the Promoter was supposed to handover the possession of the subject flat on or before 31.12.2015. However, the provisions in Clause 12 of the agreement provides that the Promoter is entitled additional grace period of 3 months over and above the agreed date of possession. Further, the Promoter during the construction of the project suffered delays which were beyond its control. Such delays included changes in the sanctioned plan, changes in Environmental Impact Assessment, delay in obtaining Environmental Clearance from the State Level  Environmental Impact Assessment Committee, etc. The Promoter has also submitted that the project has significantly delayed because delays in getting NOC from the Airport Authority of India, getting the Occupation Certificate from the competent Authority, etc. The Promoter submitted that these reasons for delay were beyond its control and are covered under the clause of force majeure.


27). The Hon'ble Bombay High Court, in the case of Neelkamal Realtors Suburban Pvt. & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (20L7) SCC Online Bom 9302, in para 119 has held that 

  • " while the proposal is submitted, the promoter is supposed to be conscious of the consequences of getting the project registered under RERA. Having sufficient experience in the open market, the Promoter is expected to have a fair assessment of the time required for completing the project....". 


As an experienced Promoter in the market, it is the Promoter who is well aware of the factors that may endanger the prospects of timely completion of the project. So being domain expert and considering likely time to be consumed by various activities and approvals, Promoter is the best judge to estimate the likely timeline for completion of the project. On the contrary, the purchasers have no domain knowledge, neither aware nor expected to be aware of the nature of mitigating factors which may delay the project. The Allottee executed the agreement for sale based on the commitment given by the Promoter to hand over possession by a certain date as specified in the agreement for sale.


28).  careful examination of agreement for sale reveals that certain eventualities that might cause delays as provided in Clause t2 of the agreement are routinely provided in agreements and thus cannot be considered relating specifically to this project' The clause 12 of the agreement for sale provides for a grace period of 3 months over and above the due date mentioned in the agreement or handing over possession. It further provides that the Promoter  is entitled for the extension of 3 months on account of the factors which included non-availability of building materials, water or electricity supply; war, civil commotion or act of God; any notice, order, rule, notification of the Government and/ or competent authority; any other causes beyond the control of the Promoter. It however cannot be construed that by signing the agreement for sale, the Allottee has consented to wait infinitely for completion and possession concerning all these factors that would delay the completion of the said Project.


29). The force majeure factors as demonstrated by the Promoter do not fall within the ambit of explanation to Section 6 of RERA which clearly clarifies that" force majeure" shall mean case of war, flood, drought, fire, cyclone' earthquake or any other calamity caused by nature, affecting the regular development of real estate project. None of the grounds as demonstrated by the Promoter fall within the scope of explanation to Section 6 of RERA Act, which could have justified the delay. Therefore, we are of the considered view that delay in granting permissions/ sanctions from various competent authorities, etc. as contended by the Promoter cannot be construed as "force majeure” The Promoter can neither expect Allottee to be aware of the likely delay nor can make Allottee bear the brunt of the failure on the part of Promoter act professionally by assessing the requisite date for possession'


30). considering the liability of promoter to assess the likely date of completion of the project, allottees have very limited liability of discharging their own obligations as per the terms of the

agreement for sale inter alia relating of primarily to make payments from time to time so that the project is not starved of funds to cause delay in completion. It is not in dispute that the Allottee has made a substantial payment out of the total consideration to the Promoter and paid all outstanding amounts at the time of taking possession. Allottee can be held responsible only if failure to discharge its obligation as per the agreement for sale has caused delay in completion of the project. If the Allottee is not responsible for the reasons for the delay, he is entitled to relief under Section 18 of RERA and cannot be saddled with consequences for delay in completing the project. The language employed in Section 18(1)(a) makes it clear that the Promoter is obligated to handover the possession of flat as per the agreement for sale by the date specified therein. The ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Imperia Structures Ltd. Vs. Anil Patni & Ors. [in Civil Appeal No.35B1-3590 of 2020] is that- 

  • " In terms of Section 18 of the RERA Act, if a promoter fails to complete or is unable to give possession of an apartment duly completed by the date specified in the agreement| the Promoter would be liable, on demand, to return the amount received by him in respect of that apartment if the allottee wishes to withdraw from the Project. Such right of an allottee is specifically made "without prejudice to any other remedy available to him". The right so given to the allottee is unqualified and if availed, the money deposited by the allottee has to be refunded with interest at such rate as may be prescribed. The proviso to Section 18(1) contemplates a situation where the allottee does not intend to withdraw from the Prolect, In that case he is entitled to and must be paid interest for every month of delay till the handing over of the possession. It is upto the allottee to proceed either under Section 18(1) or under proviso to Section 18(1).”


31). Even if, force majeure factors as demonstrated by the Promoter are given some consideration, we are of the view that the Promoter is not entitled to get benefit of the same for the reasons that the same are not attributable to the Allottee nor is the case of the Promoter that the Allottee in any way has caused delay in possession. Therefore, the submission of the Promoter that he is entitled to the extension on account of grace period on account of delays due to factors beyond its control as per the clause 12 of the agreement for sale is not tenable. While explaining the scope of Section 18 of RERA, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Newtech Promoter and Developers Pvt. Ltd. V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021 SCC Online 1044) dated 11 November2021 held that 

  • "Para 25. The unqualified right of the alloffee to seek refund referred under Section 1B(1)(a) and Section 19(4) of the Act is ot dependent on any contingencies or stipulations thereof. It  appears that the legislature has consciously provided this right of refund on demand as an unconditional absolute right to the allottee, if the promoter fails to give possession of the apartment, plot or building within the time stipulated under the  terms of the agreement regardless of unforeseen events or stay orders of the Court/Tribunal, which is in either way not attributable to the allottee/home buyer, the promoter is under an obligation to refund the amount on demand with interest at the rate prescribed by the State Government including compensation in the manner provided under the Act with the proviso that if the allottee does not wish to withdraw from the project, he shall be entitled for interest for the period of delay till handing over possession at the rate prescribed. 


32) It is therefore clear that there are no shackles or limitations  on exercise of right by Allottee to seek interest once there is delay in possession. However, as per the agreement for sale the Promoter has committed possession due on or before 31.12.2015. Further, it is seen from the replies filed by the Promoter that the Promoter has obtained Occupation Certificate on 14.07.2020.This clearly indicates that the said flat was not ready in all respects for handing over the possession of the same to the Allottee on 31.12.2015. This signifies that the Promoter has failed to adhere to his obligation to handover the possession of the subject flat to Allottee by specified date


33).  The Promoter has also contended that the flat owners including the Allottee were made aware of the intervening circumstances from time to time. Promoter further contended that  a meeting was held on 15.04.2017 between the representatives of the Promoter and various flat purchasers wherein it was inter alia discussed, and flat purchasers were informed that the possession of the subject flat would be delivered to them after 30.06.2017. Promoter further contended that various flat purchasers including the Allottee agreed and consented to the possession date being extended to July, 2017 and therefore Clause 12 of the agreement stipulating the possession date stands amended to that effect. However, the Allottee has denied having agreed to the extension of the date of possession as submitted by the Promoter. There is no evidence on record to suggest a consent by the Allottee to extension of date of possession as contended by the Promoter. It is pertinent to note that the date of possession as stipulated in the agreement can only be amended by consent/agreement of both the parties. Therefore, the claim of the Promoter that the date of possession stands amended to July, 2017 cannot be accepted. 


34).  While passing the Order dated 13.11.2019 (which was subsequently rectified by its Order dated 03.09.2020), the Authority observed that it has taken into consideration the facts

and circumstances in earlier similar Complaints of flat owners in the same project for which Orders were passed on 16.03.2018 and 06.08.2019 whereby the Promoter was directed to pay interest to allottees from 01.07.2017 till actual date of possession. Closer examination of the said Orders reveals that the facts in above cases are different with reference to the date of possession in their respective agreements for sale and therefore mechanically applying the effective date for interest from those Orders does not reflect application of mind on the part of the Authority to the specific facts and circumstances in the Complaint of the allottee. In the present case, the due date of possession is 31.12.2015 and therefore the default of failure to handover possession of the subject flat by the Promoter to Allottee starts from 01.01.2016. by the Authority has no basis. It is therefore evident that the Authority has adopted a casual, non-serious approach contrary to the provisions of RERA while adjudicating the controversy raised in the Complaint. The impugned Order holds the view contrary to the aforesaid provisions of RERA, the same is found unsustainable in the eyes of the law and hence calls for interference in the Appeal filed by the Allottee. We accordingly answer the issue in the affirmative. Therefore, the effective date of awarding interest as determined


35).  With discussions and observations recorded hereinabove, as Allottee is not found responsible for the delay in completion of the project, the Allottee is entitled to interest for delay in possession under section 18 of RERA. Consequently, we proceed to pass the following Order:


ORDER

1. Appeal No.AT006000000052402120 is dismissed.


2. Appeal No.AT00600000005294212L is allowed with the following directions:

(i) In modification of direction given in para 10 of the impugned Order dated 03.09.2020 relating to grant of interest for delay in possession, the Promoter is directed to pay interest to Allottee, on the amount received by the Promoter from Allottee towards consideration of the subject flat prior to handing over of the subject flat, at the rate of SBI's highest Marginal Cost Lending Rate (MCLR) plus 2% with effect from 01.01.2016 till the date on which the Promoter offered possession of the subject flat to Allottee i.e.15.07.2020. The Promoter shall pay the interest amount within 30 days of this order. 


3. Parties shall bear their own cost.


4. Copy of this Order be communicated to the Authority and respective parties as per Section 44(4) of RERA, 2016.


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Wednesday, 11 September 2024

V.C. Thangamagan Vs. K. Ganesh and Anr. - Section 18 makes it clear that in addition to the remedy that may be given to a party by the authority under the RERA Act, he can resort to other remedies. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted by virtue of Section18 read with Section 79.

 HC Madras (2024.08.14) in V.C. Thangamagan Vs. K. Ganesh and Anr. [(2024) ibclaw.in 854 HC, C.R.P.(PD).No.3275 of 2024 and C.M.P.No.17519 of 2024] held that; 

  • Section 18 itself specifically states that this remedy is “without prejudice to any other remedy available”. This makes it clear that an option is given to the allottee either to proceed under the RERA Act or approach the regular Civil Court etc. The respondents/plaintiffs has elected to approach the Civil Court for recovery of money. The Civil Court’s jurisdiction is plenary, unless and until it specifically excluded, by a legislation.

  • Section 18 makes it clear that in addition to the remedy that may be given to a party by the authority under the RERA Act, he can resort to other remedies. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted by virtue of Section18 read with Section 79.

  • In the said judgment, a Division Bench of this Court had specifically held that the provisions of Sections 12, 14, 18 and 19 would apply only in case of projects registered with the authority under the Act. In this case, the project being less than 500 sq.meters is exempted by virtue of Section 3(2).

  • Applying the judgment of the Division Bench to the facts of this case, the learned Trial Judge has rightly come to a conclusion that the RERA Act is not a bar for filing a suit for recovery of money.


Excerpts of the Order;

This Civil Revision Petition arises against the order passed by the learned XVII Additional City Civil Court at Chennai in I.A.No.6 of 2023 in O.S.No.1874 of 2022, dated 09.02.2024.


# 2. O.S.No.1874 of 2022 was presented as an under chapter suit. It is not in dispute that the petitioner/defendant took out an application for leave to defend and the leave was also granted. He has filed a detailed written statement. Thereafter, he has filed an application in I.A.No.6 of 2023 seeking for the Court to decide the preliminary issue and to reject the plaint. This application is based on Sections 9 and 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Trial Judge received a counter from the respondents/plaintiffs and dismissed the application. Against which, the present petition is filed.


# 3. Heard Mr.G.Ramadurai, learned Counsel for the civil revision petitioner.


# 4. Mr. G.Ramadurai would submit that_

(i) The City Civil Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to deal with the suit as the property is situated within the jurisdiction of Kancheepuram district;

(ii) The suit is barred by virtue of Section 79 read with Section 18 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (for brevity ‘RERA Act’).


# 5. Expanding this argument, he would submit that when an authority has been created to deal with an issue between the developer and customer, the appropriate remedy is only before the authority created under the RERA Act and not before the Civil Court.


# 6. For decision on rejection of plaint, the cause of action has to be decided on the basis of a reading of the plaint alone. The defence of the petitioner/defendant is totally irrelevant for that purpose. Paragraph No.17 of the plaint specifically pleads that the respondent/plaintiff had agreed to purchase a flat from the petitioner/defendant at Chennai. He would plead that he had paid a sum of Rs.11,00,000/- to the petitioner/defendant in Chennai. Apart from that, the petitioner/defendant is residing within the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court at Kodambakkam in Chennai. Therefore, the argument with respect to territorial jurisdiction can be put an end since the respondents/plaintiffs has specifically pleaded that a part of the cause of action is within the jurisdiction of this Court. Further, a plaint cannot be rejected for want of territorial jurisdiction. This is clear from Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petitioner/defendant would have to prove when he takes a plea on objection of territorial jurisdiction that the Court does not have jurisdiction, but also has to prove consequent failure of justice. Section 21(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure demands both to be satisfied. The objection should have been taken at the earliest available opportunity. In this case, the earliest available opportunity for the petitioner/defendant was when he filed an application for leave to defend. This plea was not taken at that stage and therefore, it is not open to the petitioner/defendant to raise that objection after he has enjoyed the benefit of leave to defend being granted and after having filed a written statement on merits of the case.


# 7. Insofar as the plea on Sections 79 and 18 is concerned, a mere glance at Section 18 would show that in case the promoter fails to complete the project or fails to give possession of an apartment as agreed upon, he will be liable to pay to the allottee, the amount received by him for the sake of the said apartment together with compensation. Section 18 itself specifically states that this remedy is “without prejudice to any other remedy available”. This makes it clear that an option is given to the allottee either to proceed under the RERA Act or approach the regular Civil Court etc. The respondents/plaintiffs has elected to approach the Civil Court for recovery of money. The Civil Court’s jurisdiction is plenary, unless and until it specifically excluded, by a legislation.


# 8. As pointed out above, Section 18 makes it clear that in addition to the remedy that may be given to a party by the authority under the RERA Act, he can resort to other remedies. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted by virtue of Section18 read with Section 79.


# 9. Apart from that, the learned Trial Judge has rightly appreciated the position of law laid down by this Court in C.M.S.A.Nos.23 and 24 of 2023, dated 20.09.2023. In the said judgment, a Division Bench of this Court had specifically held that the provisions of Sections 12, 14, 18 and 19 would apply only in case of projects registered with the authority under the Act. In this case, the project being less than 500 sq.meters is exempted by virtue of Section 3(2). Applying the judgment of the Division Bench to the facts of this case, the learned Trial Judge has rightly come to a conclusion that the RERA Act is not a bar for filing a suit for recovery of money.


# 10. In the light of the above discussion, I do not find any reason to interfere with the order of the learned Trial Judge. This Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.

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Tuesday, 10 September 2024

Dharmendra Sharma v. Agra Development Authority - In Debashis Sinha v. R.N.R. Enterprise (2023) [(2023) 3 SCC 195], this Court held that possession offered without the requisite completion certificate is illegal, and a purchaser cannot be compelled to take possession in such circumstances.

 SCI (2023.09.06) in Dharmendra Sharma v. Agra Development Authority [Civil Appeal Nos.2809-2810 Of 2024] held that; 

  • In Debashis Sinha v. R.N.R. Enterprise (2023) [(2023) 3 SCC 195], this Court held that possession offered without the requisite completion certificate is illegal, and a purchaser cannot be compelled to take possession in such circumstances.

  • On the other hand, the ADA, despite making an offer of possession in 2014, did not fulfil its statutory obligations by providing the requisite completion certificate and firefighting clearance certificate, both of which are essential for a valid and lawful offer of possession. The absence of these documents, which were also not furnished before the NCDRC, unquestionably vitiates the offer of possession made by the ADA..


Excerpts of the Order;

# 1. Civil Appeals 2809-2810 of 2024, by the appellant filed under Section 23 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (CPA), read with Order XXIV of the Supreme Court Rules, assail the correctness of the final judgment and order dated 15.09.2023 passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) in CC No.600/2020 as also the order dated 30th October, 2023 passed on the Review Application No.335/2023. By the aforesaid orders, the NCDRC allowed the CC No.600/2020 partly to the extent that it directed refund of the entire amount deposited by the Complainant (appellant) (except non-judicial stamp paper worth Rs.3,99,100/- deposited on 15.02.2014) along with interest @9% p.a. from the date of the complaint i.e. 11.07.2020 till the date of refund within a period of two months from the date of the order. 


# 2. Further, Civil Appeal No. 6344 of 2024 has been filed by the Agra Development Authority 3 assailing the correctness of the same judgment of the NCDRC dated 15.09.2023 partly allowing the complaint. 


# 3. The appellant -Dharmendra Sharma had applied for allotment and purchase of an apartment (residential flat) in the category of Super Deluxe 2 on 28.07.2011 and had deposited the booking amount of Rs.4,60,000/- along with the application. This application was submitted pursuant to an advertisement issued by the ADA for a group housing project lodged in the name of ADA Heights, Taj Nagari, Phase II at Fatehabad Road, near Taj Express Way, Ring Road, Agra. The allotment was done by lottery system on 29.08.2011 whereby the appellant was allotted Flat No.DT-1/1204 which was communicated vide letter dated 19.09.2011, according to which the tentative price of the apartment was Rs.56,54,000/- which could be deposited in 24 equal quarterly instalments or could be paid in full with certain other relaxations. The appellant, opted for full payment and accordingly vide letter dated 21.10.2011, attached two cheques, one by the appellant of Rs.6.94 lakhs and the other of Rs.45 lakhs issued by the LIC Housing Finance Limited. Possession was to be given within six months under the scheme. 


# 4. Upon completion of six months, the appellant requested for possession vide communication dated 03.04.2012. Apparently, the construction was not completed and, in any case, not ready for delivery of possession, as such no possession was delivered even after six months. The appellant thereafter received a communication dated 04.02.2014 offering possession subject to further payment of Rs.3,43,178/- along with non-judicial stamp paper for execution of the deed amounting to Rs.3,99,100/-. The demand so raised was under the following three heads: i) Rs.84,300/- for solar system; ii) Rs.46,878/- as leased premium; and iii) Rs.2,12,000/- for covered parking area. 


# 5. On receipt of the said letter, the appellant visited the site as also the office of ADA on 15.02.2014. He deposited the non-judicial stamp papers as required of Rs.3,99,100/-. But after inspection of the site, he found various deficiencies in the construction which were reported to the Assistant Engineer of the ADA with the request that once the deficiencies are removed, he may be communicated for taking over possession. ADA sent reminders dated 22.09.2014 and 20/21.11.2014 for depositing the balance amount of Rs.3,82,748/-. The appellant, on the other hand, was demanding for completion certificate. There is a further communication by the ADA dated 17.01.2018 demanding an amount of Rs.6,11,575/- and for taking possession after depositing the same and getting the deed executed. On the other hand, the appellant, vide communication dated 02.04.2018, requested for waiver of interest on the balance amount and also sought confirmation whether the flat was ready for physical possession. 


# 6. It was thereafter that the appellant along with letter dated 04.06.2019, sent a cheque dated 01.06.2019 for Rs.3,43,178/- and again requested for confirmation of the date of possession. The ADA encashed the said cheque but did not inform any date for handing over possession. It looks like the appellant got the loan transferred to the State Bank of India  whereupon the SBI is writing letters demanding the title deed of the apartment vide communications dated 14.03.2017, 25.06.2019 and 19.10.2019. These communications further mention that in case the title deed is not deposited, then penal interest @2% p.a. would be levied. The appellant again reiterated his earlier request for waiver of interest on balance amount vide reminder dated 18.09.2019 and again requested for confirmation whether the flat was ready for physical possession. The appellant again visited the office of ADA on 23.11.2019 and requested for completion certificate and firefighting clearance certificate, which were not provided. He again visited the site and found that the apartment was not in a habitable condition. The appellant thus proceeded to institute a complaint before the NCDRC on 10.07.2020 alleging deficiency in service as also unfair trade practice on the part of ADA. 


# 7. The ADA filed its reply in which the amounts as deposited by the appellant, as noted above, were admitted. Further, according to ADA, the construction was ready and possession was offered on 04.02.2014 along with demand of Rs.3,43,178/- which the appellant did not pay and continued to  claim for waiver of interest and had ultimately paid the said amount on 04.06.2019 vide cheque dated 01.06.2019. According to ADA, after adjustment there was still an outstanding amount of Rs.4,71,159/- as on 05.02.2021. It was also stated in the written statement that in 2011, at the time of allotment, the tentative price was Rs.56,54,000/- and under Clause 45 of the Registration and Allotment Rules, it was clearly mentioned that the price could vary upto 10%. Further, according to ADA, the demand raised by the letter dated 04.02.2014 of solar system, lease premium and car parking were apart from the cost of the flat and not due to increased cost. The appellant had unnecessarily delayed payment of the demand raised on 04.02.2014. It was also stated in the written statement that out of the 582 apartments built under the project in question, except for 20 allottees, all other allottees had taken possession. The ADA further pleaded that the complaint was barred by time and secondly, that as the total payment made by the appellant was Rs.59,97,178/-, as such it would not fall within the pecuniary limit of the NCDRC, and therefore, the complaint was liable to be dismissed for the above two reasons also. 


# 8. The parties led their evidence. The NCDRC rejected technical objections raised by the ADA regarding limitation as also the pecuniary jurisdiction. In so far as the limitation is concerned, the NCDRC held that as subsequent demand and reminders were sent by the ADA and the ADA even accepted the cheque of Rs.3,43,178/- in 2019, it was not open for the ADA to raise the plea of limitation. In so far as the pecuniary jurisdiction is concerned, the NCDRC held that the claim was of more than Rs.2 crores as such the said objection was also not sustainable. The NCDRC, however, held that the additional demand made by the ADA vide communication dated 04.02.2014 although was other than additional cost of 10% which was permissible but, in any case, it was within the 10% admissible clause, as such could not be held to be illegal. The NCDRC also held that if the possession was delayed beyond two years, the appellant would be entitled for a refund but in the present case, Clause 27 of the Registration and Allotment Rules would not be applicable. The NCDRC further held that although the appellant had deposited the nonjudicial stamps worth Rs.3,99,100/- on 15.02.2014 but he continued to delay payment of additional demand of Rs.3,43,178/- and was continuously requesting for waiver of interest resulting into the presumption that he was avoiding payment of the balance amount. On such finding the NCDRC denied to grant interest from the date of deposit but made it applicable from the date of the filing of the complaint. In so far as the deficiency in construction was concerned, the NCDRC found that only bald allegations have been made by the appellant and he never made any effort to get a report from the Commissioner and allowed the apartment in question to remain locked for six years. 


# 9. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record and in view of the above findings, the complaint was partly allowed by the NCDRC on 15.09.2023. 


# 10. The appellant preferred a Review Application which was dismissed by the NCDRC by its order dated 30th October, 2023. In the Review Application also, the NCDRC reiterated that the review was liable to be rejected as while offering possession, the ADA vide letter dated 04.12.2014 had made a further demand which amount was not deposited within the time and it was only deposited in 2019 and that too without interest and the complaint was made after six years and, therefore, the appellant would not be entitled to interest from the date of deposit. 


# 11. In the two appeals filed by the appellant, the relief claimed is to the extent that the payment of interest be awarded from the date of deposit while refunding the same and not from the date of the complaint. Whereas in the appeal filed by the ADA, it is submitted that in view of the fact that the petition had been filed after six years from the date of offering possession, as such it was barred by limitation and also as the amount deposited was only Rs.59,91,000/- i.e. less than Rs.1 crore, the complaint ought to have been filed before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and the NCDRC would have no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the complaint with a value of less than Rs.1 crore. 


# 12. We have heard Shri Vipin Sanghi, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant and Shri Sudhir Kulshreshtha, learned counsel for the ADA in all the three appeals. 


# 13. The facts as recorded above are not disputed. Even the NCDRC did not find any contradiction in the factual aspect. The only issue is as to whether the possession as offered on 04.12.2014 should be taken as a valid offer of possession even if there was no completion certificate and also whether the firefighting clearance certificate was available with the ADA or not. Despite specific requests and demands by the appellant for providing the completion certificate and firefighting clearance, the ADA failed to produce the same. Senior Counsel for the appellant has relied upon the following judgments in support of his submission that offer for possession would be invalid where the completion certificate and firefighting clearance certificate have not been obtained by the developer i.e. ADA: 

  • (a) Debashis Sinha & Ors. vs. R.N.R. Enterprise [ (2023) 3 SCC 195] 

  • (b) Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Limited vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2019) 8 SCC 416] 

  • (c) Treaty Construction vs. Ruby Tower Cooperative Housing Society Ltd.[(2019) 8 SCC 157] 

It is then submitted that even before the NCDRC the completion certificate and the firefighting clearance certificate could not be produced by the respondent -ADA. 


# 14. It is also submitted on behalf of the appellant that under the provisions of RERA Act, 2016 as also the UP (Promotion of Apartment and Ownership and Maintenance) Act, 2010 offer of possession would be valid only after a developer obtains the completion certificate, which had not been done so far by the developer ADA in the present case. On behalf of the appellant, it is also argued that the demand of Rs.3,43,178/- along with alleged offer of possession dated 14.02.2014 was totally unjustified and illegal. It was also submitted that the appellant having deposited the amount of approximately Rs.60 lakhs and that too after taking loan from financial institutions, cannot be deprived of counting the interest from the date of deposit rather than from the date of filing of the complaint. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed upon the following judgments: 

  • (a) Ghaziabad Development Authority vs. Balbir Singh [(2004) 5 SCC 65] 

  • (b) Rishab Singh Chandel & Anr. vs. Parsvnath Developers Ltd. & Anr. [Civil Appeal No.3053 of 2023] 

  • (c) Lucknow Development Authority vs. M.K.Gupta [(1994) 1 SCC 243] 

  • (d) Marvel Omega Builders Pvt. Ltd. vs. Shri Hari Gokhale & Ors. [(2020) 16 SCC 226] 

  • (e) Experion Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Sushma Ashok Shierror [(2022) 6 SCALE 16]. 


# 15. On such submissions it was prayed by the appellant that his appeals be allowed and the interest be awarded from the date of deposit and to that extent the impugned judgment and order of NCDRC be modified. Further that the appeal filed by the respondent be dismissed. 


# 16. Having considered the submissions of both parties, we are of the opinion that both have contributed to delays at various stages. The respondent ADA raised an objection that the complaint was barred by limitation, claiming that the complaint was filed on 10.07.2020, well beyond the statutory limitation period prescribed under Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, which mandates that a complaint must be filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action arises. ADA argued that the offer of possession made on 04.02.2014 should have triggered the limitation period. However, the NCDRC, in its impugned order, rightly rejected this argument by considering that the respondent ADA issued reminders to the appellant on 22.09.2014, 21.11.2014, and 17.01.2018. Additionally, ADA accepted the appellant's payment of Rs. 3,43,178/- on 20.06.2019 without any reservations. Given these facts, the NCDRC correctly applied Sections 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which extend the limitation period where part payments or acknowledgments are made. Consequently, the cause of action continued to exist, and the filing of the complaint in July 2020 is within the limitation period. 


# 17. This Court concurs with the NCDRC's reasoning and affirms that the complaint was not barred by limitation. The ongoing interactions between the parties, including ADA's acceptance of part payment in 2019 and the reminders sent, effectively extended the limitation period under established legal principles. However, while the complaint is within limitation, we also recognize that the appellant delayed making the balance payment of Rs. 3,43,178/- for over five years, from 2014 to 2019. This delay was largely due to the appellant’s requests for a waiver of interest, which, while understandable, contributed significantly to the delay in finalizing the transaction. 


# 18. In light of these circumstances, while the appellant is entitled to a refund along with interest, it would be inequitable to award interest from the date of the original payment in 2011 given the appellant’s role in the delay. 


# 19. The respondent ADA has also challenged the pecuniary jurisdiction of the NCDRC, contending that the total payment made by the appellant amounted to Rs. 59,97,178/-, which was less than Rs. 1 crore. As such, ADA argued that the complaint should have been filed before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and not the NCDRC, which has jurisdiction over matters exceeding Rs. 1 crore as per Section 21(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. This Court finds no merit in ADA’s argument. The NCDRC, in its impugned order, correctly observed that the claim made by the appellant was not limited to the deposit amount alone but also included compensation for mental agony, harassment, and loss of income, which brought the total claim well above Rs. 1 crore. In consumer disputes, the value of the claim is determined not just by the amount deposited but by the aggregate relief sought, which includes compensation and other claims. Therefore, the NCDRC rightly held that it had the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, and this Court affirms that finding. 


# 20. The appellant’s key contention regarding the absence of the completion certificate and firefighting clearance certificate merits serious consideration. The appellant consistently raised this issue, asserting that a valid offer of possession cannot be made without these documents. Section 4(5) of the UP Apartment (Promotion of Construction, Ownership & Maintenance) Act, 2010 and Section 19(10) of the RERA Act, 2016 mandate that a developer must obtain these certificates before offering possession. Despite the appellant's repeated requests, ADA failed to produce these certificates, rendering its offer of possession incomplete and legally invalid.


# 21. The appellant has rightly cited relevant precedents to bolster this argument. In Debashis Sinha v. R.N.R. Enterprise (2023) [(2023) 3 SCC 195], this Court held that possession offered without the requisite completion certificate is illegal, and a purchaser cannot be compelled to take possession in such circumstances. The Court in that case held: 

  • “20. Finally, we cannot resist but comment on the perfunctory approach of Ncdrc while dealing with the appellants' contention that it was the duty of the respondents to apply for and obtain the completion certificate from KMC and that the respondents ought to have been directed to act in accordance with law. The observation made by Ncdrc of the respondents having successfully argued that it was not their fault, that no completion certificate of the project could be obtained, is clearly contrary to the statutory provisions. 

  • 21. Sub-section (2) of Section 403 of the KMC Act was referred to by Ncdrc in the impugned order [Debashis Sinha v. R.N.R. Enterprise, 2020 SCC OnLine NCDRC 429] . Sub-section (1) thereof, which finds no reference therein, requires every person giving notice under Section 393 or Section 394 or every owner of a building or a work to which the notice relates to send or cause to be delivered or sent to the Municipal Commissioner a notice in writing of completion of erection of building or execution of work within one month of such completion/erection, accompanied by a certificate in the form specified in the rules made in this behalf as well as to give to the Municipal Commissioner all necessary facilities for inspection of such building or work. 

  • 22. Section 393 mandates every person, who intends to erect a building, to apply for sanction by giving notice in writing of his intention to the Municipal Commissioner in such form and containing such information as may be prescribed together with such documents and plans. Similarly, Section 394 also mandates every person who intends to execute any of the works specified in clause (b) to clause (m) of sub-section (1) of Section 390 to apply for sanction by giving notice in writing of his intention to the Municipal Commissioner in such form and containing such information as may be prescribed. 

  • 23. It is, therefore, evident on a conjoint reading of Sections 403, 390 and 394 of the KMC Act that it is the obligation of the person intending to erect a building or to execute works to apply for completion certificate in terms of the Rules framed thereunder. It is no part of the flat owner's duty to apply for a completion certificate. When the respondents had applied for permission/sanction to erect, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Buildings Rules, 1990 (hereafter “the 1990 Rules” for short) were in force. Rule 26 of the 1990 Rules happens to be the relevant Rule. In terms of subrules (1) to (3) of Rule 26 thereof, the obligation as cast was required to be discharged by the respondents. Evidently, the respondents observed the statutory provisions in the breach.” This position is supported by other decisions, including Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) and Treaty Construction (supra), where the absence of these certificates was found to constitute a deficiency in service. In the present case, the ADA’s failure to provide the required certificates justifies the appellant’s refusal to take possession. This strengthens the appellant’s claim for additional compensation to compensate for the delay caused by ADA’s breach of its statutory obligations. 


# 22. This Court is of the considered view that both parties have exhibited lapses in their respective obligations. On the one hand, the appellant, despite having paid the tentative price of Rs. 56,54,000/- in 2012, failed to remit the additional amount of Rs. 3,43,178/-, as demanded by the ADA, even after being repeatedly reminded. Instead, the appellant persistently sought a waiver of the penal interest on the delayed payment, eventually settling the amount only on 04.06.2019, a significant delay that cannot be overlooked and that too without the interest component which had further accrued over a period of about five years. On the other hand, the ADA, despite making an offer of possession in 2014, did not fulfil its statutory obligations by providing the requisite completion certificate and firefighting clearance certificate, both of which are essential for a valid and lawful offer of possession. The absence of these documents, which were also not furnished before the NCDRC, unquestionably vitiates the offer of possession made by the ADA.


# 23. In light of the aforementioned observations and taking into account the shortcomings on the part of both the appellant and the ADA, this Court deems it appropriate to provide a compensation of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Fifteen Lakhs only) apart from what was awarded by the NCDRC. Therefore, apart from the refund of the entire amount deposited by the appellant @ 9% interest per annum from 11.07.2020 till the date of refund, the ADA is directed to pay an additional amount of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Fifteen Lakhs only) to the appellant. The entire amount should be rendered to the appellant within three months of this order. We also order the ADA to return the non-judicial stamp worth Rs. 3,99,100/- back to the appellant. 


# 24. Furthermore, we refrain from imposing any exemplary costs on either party, recognizing that both have contributed to the situation at hand. It is also to be noted that the ADA, being a civic body tasked with serving the public and operating on a non-profit basis, should not be unduly penalized in a manner that could impede its functioning. 


# 25. The Civil Appeals 2809-2810 of 2024 are disposed of accordingly. 


# 26. The appeal filed by the ADA i.e. Civil Appeal No.6344 of 2024 stands dismissed, as its primary arguments regarding both limitation and pecuniary jurisdiction are found to be without merit. 

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