Sunday, 20 April 2025

Genesis Comtrade Pvt. Ltd. vs. Opulent Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd. - The Applicants, having taken possession of their units since 2021, do not fall within the class of financial creditors under Section 5(8)(f) of the IBC. Their claim for interest based on a RERA order, though enforceable in a civil forum, does not translate into a financial debt under the Code.

 NCLT ND-II (2025.04.17) in Genesis Comtrade Pvt. Ltd. vs. Opulent Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd. [ (2025) ibclaw.in 381 NCLT, IA 1796(ND)/2024 in CP No.: IB 304(ND)/2022] held that.

  • Hon’ble NCLAT in Puneet Kaur vs. K.V. Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 390  of 2022, wherein it has been held that extinguishment of the homebuyer’s claim shall only occur after approval of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority and that claims of homebuyers reflected in the records of the corporate debtor must be dealt with appropriately in the resolution plan.

  • Hon’ble NCLAT in “Pooja Mehra v. Nilesh Sharma”, vide judgment dated 19.04.2024, has emphatically held that claims filed belatedly, after substantial lapse of time, especially in cases where the allottee has been in possession, cannot be entertained so as to defeat the object and timeline of the CIRP under the IBC.

  • The Applicants, having taken possession of their units since 2021, do not fall within the class of financial creditors under Section 5(8)(f) of the IBC. Their claim for interest based on a RERA order, though enforceable in a civil forum, does not translate into a financial debt under the Code.


Excerpts of the Order;

# 1. This Application is filed under Section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 read with Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016, by Mr. Yogesh Kumar Gupta & Anr., (“Applicant”) against M/s Bliss Equity Private Limited Mr. Devendra Umrao, “Resolution Professional” M/S. Opulent Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd (“Corporate Debtor”) seeking the following reliefs: 

  • “a) Condone the delay in filing claim and direct the Respondent to admit claim of the Applicants in the category of ‘financial creditor in a class’ corresponding to Unit No. 014 (Marriott Tower); and/or 

  • b) Direct the Respondent to restore electricity connection of Unit No. 014 (Marriott Tower); and/or

  • c) Pass any other Order(s)/ Direction(s) which this Hon’ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the facts of the present matter.”


# 2. A brief background of the Corporate Debtor is that the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor was commenced on 12.07.2022 by this Adjudicating Authority the Applicant was appointed as IRP and subsequently as confirmed as RP. Presently, a Resolution Plan submitted by Amtex Infrastructure has already been approved by the committee of creditors in its 8th meeting of creditors held on 08.07.2023 with 100 percent votes and same has been filed before this Bench by way of IA 4608/2023 which is pending for adjudication before this Tribunal.


# 3. Ld. Counsel for the Applicant has made the following submissions: 

a) The Applicants are genuine allottees of residential flat no. 014, upper ground floor, Mariott tower, admeasuring 500 sq. ft., in the real estate project being developed by the corporate debtor under the name and style of ‘Urbtech 168’s Xaviers’ situated at Sector 168, Noida (“Flat”), as evidenced by the Allotment Letter dated 01.06.2013. [@ pp. 28-47]  

b) As per Annexure-B (Part-II & III) of the said allotment letter, the allotment was made against a total sale consideration of ₹32,22,500/- under a construction-linked payment plan. [@ p. 46]. 

c) The corporate debtor raised a demand letter dated 10.04.2018 acknowledging that the total receivable amount was ₹28,00,634/-, of which ₹26,46,191/- had already been received from the Applicants, and raising an additional construction-linked demand of ₹1,54,443/- [@ p. 48].

d) Subsequently, on 11.06.2018, within two months, the corporate debtor issued an outstanding statement demanding ₹12,82,538/- from the Applicants, which was contrary to the agreed payment plan. The said demand included components such as 5% of BSP, 25% of PLC, and 100% of car parking, EEC, FFC, IMFS, lease rent, and electrification charges—amounts which were payable only at the time of offer of possession as per the allotment letter. [@ pp. 46-47]. The actual total of these amounts was ₹5,27,500/-, however, an inflated demand was made, also including two-year AMC charges and other arbitrary amounts not part of the agreed sale price breakup.

e) The Applicants challenged the said demand dated 11.06.2018 before UP RERA and also claimed delayed possession charges under the RERA Act. UP RERA, vide its order dated 07.08.2019, quashed and set aside the said demand and directed the corporate debtor to raise a fresh demand letter in accordance with the order, provide occupation certificate, deliver possession of the flat, and register a conveyance deed in favour of the Applicants. It was also directed that any demand raised must be first adjusted against the delayed possession charges payable by the corporate debtor. The said order was passed prior to the commencement of CIRP and is binding on the corporate debtor / resolution professional. [operative para of translated RERA Order @ pp. 67-68].

f) In compliance with the RERA order, the corporate debtor issued a possession letter dated 22.10.2021, and the Applicants were compelled to take possession of the flat on 01.11.2021 on an "as-is-where-is" basis, without an occupation certificate. However, no delayed possession charges were paid and no new demand letter was issued. [@ p. 69].

g) The corporate debtor was admitted into CIRP vide order dated 12.07.2022, and the public announcement was made on 16.07.2022. The Committee of Creditors approved the resolution plan on 08.07.2023. However, approval of the resolution plan is still pending before this Hon’ble Adjudicating Authority in IA/4608/2023.

h) The Applicants were not aware of the CIRP proceedings and, in the absence of payment of delayed possession charges, filed a contempt/non-compliance petition before UP RERA. Vide Order dated 26.08.2022, UP RERA directed issuance of a recovery certificate against the corporate debtor under Section 40 of the RERA Act and instructed the District Collector to execute the same. However, since the corporate debtor had already entered CIRP, no amount could be recovered through these proceedings. [@ p. 77].

i) The Applicants became aware of the CIRP only on 25.09.2023 when their electricity connection was disconnected by the resolution professional. Initially, they filed their claim inadvertently in Form-B instead of Form-CA, which was not considered as it was sent to the wrong email ID. They thereafter filed a revised claim in Form-CA via email dated 05.03.2024 to the designated email ID of the resolution professional. However, the resolution professional rejected the claim solely on the ground of delay, resulting in the present application being filed. [Form-B @ pp. 87-91, Form-CA @ pp. 93-103, RP’s rejection @ p. 105].

j) The resolution professional, in its reply, has already verified that the Applicants are undisputed allottees of the flat in question and are in physical possession of the unit. [RP’s Reply @ paras 31 & 36-39]. Admittedly, the resolution plan has not yet been approved by this Hon’ble Adjudicating Authority.

k) Therefore, it is submitted that the present belated claim of a genuine homebuyer may be condoned and accepted, as it is squarely covered by the judgment of Hon’ble NCLAT in Puneet Kaur vs. K.V. Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 390  of 2022, wherein it has been held that extinguishment of the homebuyer’s claim shall only occur after approval of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority and that claims of homebuyers reflected in the records of the corporate debtor must be dealt with appropriately in the resolution plan.

l) In September 2023, post commencement of CIRP, the resolution professional disconnected the electricity connection of the Applicants and has filed an outstanding statement dated 28.05.2024 as Annexure A [RP’s Reply @ p. 20], which is identical to the outstanding statement dated 11.06.2018 issued by the erstwhile management of the corporate debtor, which has already been quashed and set aside by UP RERA vide order dated 07.08.2019.

m) It is reiterated that the resolution professional cannot raise any demand contrary to the allotment letter or the UP RERA order and, in the absence of an occupation certificate for the tower, no such demand is legally enforceable. The project consists of five towers, of which four have received occupation certificates. It is only the Mariott Tower, in which the Applicants' flat is located, that still lacks an occupation certificate. Therefore, no payment is due from the Applicants until a valid offer of possession is made post receipt of occupation certificate.

n) Further, the resolution professional is bound by the UP RERA’s direction that any such demand must first be adjusted from the delayed possession charges payable to the Applicants, which they have also claimed in Form-CA to the extent of approximately ₹11 lakhs. It is submitted that the resolution professional has also included ₹7 lakhs purely as interest, without any adjudication or presence of an interest clause.

o) It is a settled position of law that a resolution professional does not have adjudicatory powers and is only tasked with collation of claims. It is also submitted that the electricity connection in question is a prepaid meter which requires recharge payments in advance by the Applicants themselves. Electricity, being an essential service, cannot be denied to the Applicants for their residential flat. 

p) It is also submitted that the issues regarding amounts receivable under various heads from allottees and payment of delayed possession charges to allottees will be dealt with by the resolution applicant under the resolution plan. The resolution professional cannot unilaterally make such decisions or impose demands on the allottees without the express approval of the Committee of Creditors, which is not the case herein.

q) Finally, it is submitted that no fresh maintenance charges have been levied by the resolution professional and that the same outdated 2018 pre-CIRP outstanding statement, which has already been quashed by UP RERA, has simply been reproduced, and the demands made therein have already been adjudged null and void.


# 4. In reply to the contentions raised by the Ld. Counsel for the Applicant, the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent has putforth the following submissions:

a) The claim of the Applicant in Form CA cannot be admitted as the Applicants are already in possession of their allotted unit since the year 2021.

b) The Respondent received the claim from the Applicants on 05.03.2024 and responded to the same on 07.03.2024, stating that the Resolution Plan had already been approved by the Committee of Creditors in its eighth meeting held on 08.07.2023 and the same is pending approval before this Tribunal.

c) The Respondent submitted that he has strictly verified the claim of the Applicants in accordance with Regulation 14 of the IBBI (CIRP) Regulations, 2016 on the basis of the records of the Corporate Debtor. Upon perusal of the Form CA submitted on 05.03.2024, and from the records of the Corporate Debtor as well as the Applicants’ own submission in the said form, it is evident that the Applicants have been in possession of their respective units since 2021 and have been enjoying peaceful possession since then.

d) Accordingly, the Respondent, vide email dated 29.03.2024, further informed the Applicants that their claim had been filed after substantial delay. Furthermore, since the Applicants are in possession of their respective unit and only seek registration of sale deed in their favour— which presently cannot be executed due to the lack of an Occupancy Certificate for the said 'Mariott Tower', which is a statutory prerequisite— the same shall be taken care of by the Successful Resolution Applicant after approval of the Resolution Plan by this Tribunal. Hence, the claim for registration of the sale deed cannot be admitted and treated at par with other homebuyers. (Refer Pg 105–106 of the Application)

e) The Respondent further placed reliance on the recent judgment dated 19.04.2024 of the Hon’ble NCLAT in the case of Pooja Mehra v. Nilesh Sharma (RP for Dream Procon Pvt. Ltd.), where the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal, while examining the validity of the homebuyer’s claim, dismissed an appeal for condonation of delay of 552 days in filing a claim and, in Para 103 of the said judgment, held that, “The Appellant was sleeping over his rights. A person who sleeps over his rights ought not be given any indulgence.” The Hon’ble NCLAT emphasized that the objective of the IBC is to ensure economic rehabilitation of the corporate debtor and hence adherence to timelines is crucial to prevent delayed claims.

f) The Respondent submitted that the Applicants are claiming interest of Rs. 11,72,535/- for delay in delivery of possession from 31.11.2016 till 01.11.2021, based on the order of UP RERA dated 07.08.2019. However, as per Section 3(10) of the IBC, a “creditor” includes a decree-holder. Thus, by virtue of the RERA order, the Applicants may be deemed decree-holders for claiming such interest, but this does not bring them within the category of 'creditors in class' i.e., allottees, as indicated in their Form CA. 

g) The Respondent submitted that the project of the Corporate Debtor comprises five towers, out of which Occupancy Certificates for all except Tower ‘Mariott’ had already been issued by NOIDA prior to commencement of CIRP. The project is being maintained as a going concern. h) The Applicant, in late 2023, approached the maintenance office at the project site and informed that he has been in possession of the unit since 2021. He requested installation of an electric meter. The maintenance agency requested a possession certificate and a No Dues Certificate. Upon receiving only the possession certificate, the agency installed and activated the electricity meter on the assurance that the No Dues Certificate would be submitted within two days. However, the Applicants failed to furnish the No Dues Certificate.

i) Upon reviewing the records, the Respondent found that the Applicant had not made complete payment toward the agreed sale consideration as well as pending maintenance dues. Therefore, the Applicants were advised to clear their dues for uninterrupted electricity supply. (Annexure A of Reply) 

j) The Respondent stated that the maintenance agency collects maintenance from all homebuyers in possession of their units to ensure the Corporate Debtor remains a going concern. Thus, if the Applicants are in peaceful possession since 2021, they are required to submit the No Dues Certificate, including payment of maintenance charges, as per other similarly placed allottees. However, the Applicants categorically stated to the Respondent’s representative that they are unwilling to pay maintenance charges unless the sale deed is executed in their favour. 

k) The Respondent further submitted that the Applicants have approached the Hon’ble RERA under Section 63 of the RERA Act after the imposition of moratorium by this Hon’ble Tribunal on 26.08.2022. As per the settled legal position, any civil proceedings instituted after the commencement of CIRP are barred during the moratorium period, and any judgment, decree, or order passed therein cannot be executed. (Refer Pg 70–78 of the Application)


# 5. We have heard the learned counsels appearing for both the parties at length and have carefully considered the submissions made on their behalf. After a thorough examination of the case, including the arguments advanced by both sides and the evidence presented, it is an admitted position that the Applicants have been in possession of their respective units since the year 2021 and have continued to enjoy peaceful possession thereof. 


# 6. The Resolution Professional has verified the claims submitted on 05.03.2024 in accordance with Regulation 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, and duly responded vide communication dated 07.03.2024. Upon scrutiny of the documents submitted by the Applicants themselves, it is evident that the possession of the allotted units was handed over and accepted in the year 2021. In further correspondence dated 29.03.2024, the RP informed the Applicants that their claim had been filed after substantial delay and pertained not to delivery of possession, but solely to the execution of the sale deed, which is currently not feasible owing to the absence of an Occupancy Certificate for the Mariott Tower—a statutory prerequisite.


# 7. The crux of the Applicants’ claim being the registration of sale deed does not fall within the ambit of a ‘financial debt’ under Section 5(8)(f) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, particularly where possession has already been delivered. The concept of a ‘debt’ within the meaning of Section 5(8)(f) read with Section 3(11) of the Code mandates the existence of a liability or obligation in respect of a claim which is due and payable. In the present case, since possession stands delivered, there exists no surviving financial obligation entitling the Applicants to a payment or refund.


# 8. The Applicants have further relied upon an order dated 07.08.2019 passed by the Hon’ble UP RERA, claiming an amount of Rs. 11,72,535/- towards interest for delayed possession. While it is true that the said order confers upon them the status of decree-holders as per Section 3(10) of the IBC, the debt arising therefrom is not a financial debt within the meaning of Section 5(8)(f). Consequently, they cannot be classified as ‘creditors in class’ under the Code.


# 9. We also find substance in the submission of the RP that the claim for delayed interest is based on a decree passed prior to the commencement of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), but was sought to be enforced only after the commencement of CIRP and during the moratorium imposed by this Tribunal on 26.08.2022. It is well-settled that no proceedings for execution of a decree can be instituted or continued during the moratorium period under Section 14 of the IBC.


# 10. Additionally, the claim regarding disconnection of electricity is not germane to the CIRP and does not constitute a claim against the corporate debtor under the Code. The Applicants themselves approached the maintenance office in 2023 seeking electricity supply, and the same was offered conditional upon production of a 'no dues' certificate. Despite being in possession since 2021, the Applicants failed to produce the requisite documents or clear the

dues. Their contention that payment shall be made only upon execution of the sale deed cannot be accepted, as maintenance charges are essential to keep the project a going concern and are required to be paid by all occupants uniformly.


# 11. The reliance placed by the Applicants on the decision in “Puneet Kaur v. K.V. Developers” is entirely misplaced. In the facts of the present case, possession has been delivered and the Applicants are in enjoyment of their units since 01.11.2021. Hence, the foundational requirement for classification as a financial creditor—being unpaid dues on account of undelivered possession— does not exist. Furthermore, the Hon’ble NCLAT in “Pooja Mehra v. Nilesh Sharma”, vide judgment dated 19.04.2024, has emphatically held that claims filed belatedly, after substantial lapse of time, especially in cases where the allottee has been in possession, cannot be entertained so as to defeat the object and timeline of the CIRP under the IBC. 


# 12. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in the present application. The Applicants, having taken possession of their units since 2021, do not fall within the class of financial creditors under Section 5(8)(f) of the IBC. Their claim for interest based on a RERA order, though enforceable in a civil forum, does not translate into a financial debt under the Code. Moreover, the reliefs sought with respect to sale deed execution and restoration of electricity are beyond the purview of this Tribunal during CIRP. Accordingly, the application bearing IA No. 1796(ND)/2024 in CP IB 304(ND)/2022 stands dismissed.


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Friday, 18 April 2025

Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Limited & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. - Constitutional validity of status of Allottees as Financial Creditors

 Supreme Court of India (09.08.2019) in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure  Limited & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. [WP (C) No. 43 of 2019] while upholding the constitutional validity of status of allottees as financial creditors, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made several important findings and rulings;


1. Economic Legislation

# 15. ……  that the legislature must be given free play in the joints when it comes to economic legislation. Apart from the presumption of constitutionality which arises in such cases, the legislative judgment in economic choices must be given a certain degree of deference by the courts.


2. Raison d’être (Most important reason) for the Insolvency Code (Second Amendment) Act of 2018

# 18. It can be seen that the Insolvency Law Committee found, as a matter of fact, that delay in completion of flats/apartments has become a common phenomenon, and that amounts raised from home buyers contributes significantly to the financing of the construction of such flats/apartments. This being the case, it was important, therefore, to clarify that home buyers are treated as financial creditors so that they can trigger the Code under Section 7 and have their rightful place on the Committee of Creditors when it comes to making important decisions as to the future of the building construction company, which is the execution of the real estate Project in which such home buyers are ultimately to be housed. 


# 19. Shri Shardul Shroff, whose dissent was provided to us in the form of an e-mail, after finding that self financed home buyers may be financial creditors, but a home buyer who is a borrower is not, then went on to state:

  • “8. If the home buyers have taken loans from banks, then it is such lenders who should be on the table on the CoC as special status creditors.

  • 9. Our report ought to be altered to the extent that home buyers financiers should be treated as unsecured financial creditors and they should be representatives of the home buyers. There should be no direct right given to home buyers to be on the CoC.”

Even the dissent of Shri Shroff recognises that in the case of home buyers, who have taken loans from banks, such banks ought to be on the Committee of Creditors. If such banks ought to be on the Committee of Creditors as representatives of the home buyers, and they are to vote only in accordance with the home buyer’s instructions, why should the home buyer himself then not be on the Committee of Creditors, and why should it make any difference as to whether he has borrowed money from banks in order to pay instalments under the agreement for sale or whether he does it from his own finances? These matters have not been addressed by the dissenting view which in principle, as we have seen, supports home buyers who have taken loans as against home buyers who have used their own finances. Perhaps the real reason for Shri Shroff’s dissent is the fact that unsecured, as opposed to secured, financial creditors are being put on the Committee of Creditors. If there is otherwise good reason as to why this particular group of unsecured creditors, like deposit holders, should be part of the Committee of Creditors, it is difficult to appreciate how such a group can be excluded.”


3. Whether Explanation added to section 5(8)(f) is clarificatory or can enlarge the scope?

# 40. ……….   In real estate projects, money is raised from the allottee, being raised against consideration for the time value of money. Even the total consideration agreed at a time when the flat/apartment is non-existent or incomplete, is significantly less than the price the buyer would have to pay for a ready/complete flat/apartment, and therefore, he gains the time value of money.

# 67. ………  Thus construed, there can be no difficulty in stating that the amounts raised from allottees under real estate projects would, in fact, be subsumed within Section 5(8)(f) even without adverting to the explanation introduced by the Amendment Act.

# 84.  ……..  In the present case, it is clear that the deeming fiction that is used by the explanation is to put beyond doubt the fact that allottees are to be regarded as financial creditors within the enacting part contained in Section 5(8)(f) of the Code.

# 86. We, therefore, hold that allottees/home buyers were included in the main provision, i.e. Section 5(8)(f) with effect from the inception of the Code, the explanation being added in 2018 merely to clarify doubts that had arisen.


4. RERA Vs. IBC

# 22. ……   Under Section 88, the provisions of RERA are in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for time being in force and under Section 89, RERA is to have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force.

# 24. It is significant to note that there is no provision similar to that of Section 88 of RERA in the Code, which is meant to be a complete and exhaustive statement of the law insofar as its subject matter is concerned.

…….Given these circumstances, it is a little difficult to accede to arguments made on behalf of learned senior counsel for the Petitioners, that RERA is a special enactment which deals with real estate development projects and must, therefore, be given precedence over the Code, which is only a general enactment dealing with insolvency generally. From the introduction of the explanation to Section 5(8)(f) of the Code, it is clear that Parliament was aware of RERA, and applied some of its definition provisions so that they could apply when the Code is to be interpreted.

# 28. It is clear, therefore, that even by a process of harmonious construction, RERA and the Code must be held to co-exist, and, in the event of a clash, RERA must give way to the Code. RERA, therefore, cannot be held to be a special statute which, in the case of a conflict, would override the general statute, viz. the Code.

# 29. As a matter of fact, the Code and RERA operate in completely different spheres. The Code deals with a proceeding in rem in which the focus is the rehabilitation of the corporate Debtor. This is to take place by replacing the management of the corporate debtor by means of a resolution plan, …….    so that the corporate debtor may be pulled out of the woods and may continue as a going concern ,thus benefiting all stakeholders involved. …….. On the other hand, RERA protects the interests of the individual investor in real estate projects by requiring the promoter to strictly adhere to its provisions.


5. Remedies for home buyers

# 24. ….. The fact that RERA is in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, also makes it clear that the remedies under RERA to allottees were intended to be additional and not exclusive remedies.

# 86. ii. The RERA is to be read harmoniously with the Code, as amended by the Amendment Act. It is only in the event of conflict that the Code will prevail over the RERA. Remedies that are given to allottees of flats/apartments are therefore concurrent remedies, such allottees of flats/apartments being in a position to avail of remedies under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, RERA as well as the triggering of the Code.


6. Constitutionality of homebuyers as financial creditors

# 40. It is impossible to say that classifying real estate developers is not founded upon an intelligible differentia which distinguishes them from other operational creditors, nor is it possible to say that such classification is palpably arbitrary having no rational relation to the objects of the Code.

# 42. The presumption that the legislature has understood and correctly appreciated the need of its people and that the amendment to the Code is directed to problems made manifest by experience, as was pointed out by the Insolvency Law Committee findings (supra) demonstrates that the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to the Amendment Act has not been displaced by the Petitioners.

# 45. ……..  A reading of these paragraphs will show these very objects are sub-served by treating allottees as financial creditors. The Code is thus a beneficial legislation which can be triggered to put the corporate debtor back on its feet in the interest of unsecured creditors like allottees,

# 86. i. The Amendment Act to the Code does not infringe Articles 14, 19(1)(g) read with Article 19(6), or 300-A of the Constitution of India.


7. Trigger-happy allottees igniting the process of removal of the management

# 50. ………  We may mention here that once this prima facie case is made out, the burden shifts on the promoter/real estate developer to point out in their reply and in the hearing before the NCLT, that the allottee is himself a defaulter and would, therefore, on a reading of the agreement and the applicable RERA Rules and Regulations, not be entitled to any relief including payment of compensation and/or refund, entailing a dismissal of the said application. At this stage also, it is important to point out, in answer to the arguments made by the Petitioners, that under Section 65 of the Code, the real estate developer can also point out that the insolvency resolution process under the Code has been invoked fraudulently, with malicious intent, or for any purpose other than the resolution of insolvency. This the real estate developer may do by pointing out, for example, that the allottee who has knocked at the doors of the NCLT is a speculative investor and not a person who is genuinely interested in purchasing a flat/ apartment. They can also point out that in a real estate market which is falling, the allottee does not, in fact, want to go ahead with its obligation to take possession of the flat/apartment under RERA, but wants to jump ship and really get back, by way of this coercive measure, monies already paid by it. Given the above, it is clear that it is very difficult to accede to the Petitioners’ contention that a wholly one-sided and futile hearing will take place before the NCLT by trigger-happy allottees who would be able to ignite the process of removal of the management of the real estate project and/or lead the corporate debtor to its death.


# 86. We, therefore, hold that allottees/home buyers were included in the main provision, i.e. Section 5(8)(f) with effect from the inception of the Code, the explanation being added in 2018 merely to clarify doubts that had arisen.


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Axis Bank Limited Vs. Value Infracon India Private Limited - It is the Home Buyer who should be considered as ‘Financial Creditors’ of the ‘Corporate Debtor’ whether he has self financed his flat or has exercised his choice of taking a loan from the Bank.

 NCLAT (20.12.2021) in Axis Bank Limited Vs. Value Infracon India Private Limited [I.A. No. 1502 of 2020 & I.A. No. 1503 of 2020 in  Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency No. 582 of 2020] held that;

  • The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. & Anr.’ has observed as follows:-

  • " . . .This being the case, it was important, therefore, to clarify that home buyers are treated as financial creditors so that they can trigger the Code under Section 7 and have their rightful place on the Committee of Creditors when it comes to making important decisions as to the future of the building construction company, which is the execution of the real estate Project in which such home buyers are ultimately to be housed.  . . .

  •   . . .If such banks ought to be on the Committee of Creditors as representatives of the home buyers, and they are to vote only in accordance with the home buyer’s instructions, why should the home buyer himself then not be on the Committee of Creditors, and why should it make any difference as to whether he has borrowed money from banks in order to pay instalments under the agreement for sale or whether he does it from his own finances ?"

  • It is clear from the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. & Anr.’ (Supra) that it is the Home Buyer who should be considered as ‘Financial Creditors’ of the ‘Corporate Debtor’ whether he has self financed his flat or has exercised his choice of taking a loan from the Bank.


Excerpts of the Order;

# 7. The central point in this Appeal is whether the Appellant/M/s. Axis Bank can be considered as a ‘Financial Creditor’ on account of its having sanctioned and released housing loans to some of the allottees who have purchased Flats/units in the Project floated by the ‘Corporate Debtor’.

 

# 8. It is not disputed that M/s. Axis Bank has sanctioned loans to 44 Home Buyers/Allottees who have purchased units/Flats, in the Project floated by the ‘Corporate Debtor’. Home Buyers were included as ‘Financial Creditors’ vide Amendment dated 06.06.2018.

 

# 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras 18 and 19 in ‘Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. & Anr.’ (Supra) has observed as follows:-

  • “18. It can be seen that the Insolvency Law Committee found, as a matter of fact, that delay in completion of flats/apartments has become a common phenomenon, and that amounts raised from home buyers contributes significantly to the financing of the construction of such flats/apartments. This being the case, it was important, therefore, to clarify that home buyers are treated as financial creditors so that they can trigger the Code under Section 7 and have their rightful place on the Committee of Creditors when it comes to making important decisions as to the future of the building construction company, which is the execution of the real estate Project in which such home buyers are ultimately to be housed. 

  • 19. Shri Shardul Shroff, whose dissent was provided to us in the form of an e-mail, after finding that self financed home buyers may be financial creditors, but a home buyer who is a borrower is not, then went on to state:

- “8. If the home buyers have taken loans from banks, then it is such lenders who should be on the table on the CoC as special status creditors.

-  9. Our report ought to be altered to the extent that home buyers financiers should be treated as unsecured financial creditors and they should be representatives of the home buyers. There should be no direct right given to home buyers to be on the CoC.”

  • Even the dissent of Shri Shroff recognises that in the case of home buyers, who have taken loans from banks, such banks ought to be on the Committee of Creditors. If such banks ought to be on the Committee of Creditors as representatives of the home buyers, and they are to vote only in accordance with the home buyer’s instructions, why should the home buyer himself then not be on the Committee of Creditors, and why should it make any difference as to whether he has borrowed money from banks in order to pay instalments under the agreement for sale or whether he does it from his own finances? These matters have not been addressed by the dissenting view which in principle, as we have seen, supports home buyers who have taken loans as against home buyers who have used their own finances. Perhaps the real reason for Shri Shroff’s dissent is the fact that unsecured, as opposed to secured, financial creditors are being put on the Committee of Creditors. If there is otherwise good reason as to why this particular group of unsecured creditors, like deposit holders, should be part of the Committee of Creditors, it is difficult to appreciate how such a group can be excluded.” (Emphasis Supplied)

 

# 10. It is clear from the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. & Anr.’ (Supra) that it is the Home Buyer who should be considered as ‘Financial Creditors’ of the ‘Corporate Debtor’ whether he has self financed his flat or has exercised his choice of taking a loan from the Bank.

 

# 11. Additionally, we are of the considered view that as per Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013 every security interest has to be registered with the Registrar within 30 days of its creation and admittedly no ‘charge’ has been created against any of the property of the ‘Corporate Debtor’ in favour of the Appellant. It is not denied that there is no registered ‘charge’ created on the asset or property as contemplated under Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013. Further, there is no submission made on behalf of the Bank as to whether any steps were taken under Section 78 of the Companies Act, 2013. The ratio of ‘Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd.’ Vs. ‘Mr. Samir Kumar Bhattacharya and Anr.’ passed by this Tribunal in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 830 of 2019 regarding “Registration of charge” is squarely applicable to the facts of this case.

 

# 14. The relevant clause of the tri-partite Agreement entered into between the Home Buyers, the developer and the Appellant/M/s. Axis Bank is reproduced as hereunder:-

  • “It is agreed by and between the parties to this Agreement that in case if the BORROWER fails to honour the commitment, the developer/BUILDER shall inform the BANK and the BANK shall have the right to pay the Sale consideration and get it registered either in BANK's name or its nominee. Likewise in the event the Borrower defaults in payment of instalments then, in such an event also, the Bank shall have the right to inform about such default on the part of the Borrower to the Builder and shall accordingly have the right to write to the Builder cancellation of Agreement executed between the Builder and the Borrower, where after the Bank shall have the right to pay the Sale consideration and get the subject property registered either in the Bank's name or in the name of the Bank's nominee.”

 

# 15. It can be seen from the material on record that Axis Bank had rendered financial assistance for the purpose of booking units in the Project floated by the ‘Corporate Debtor’ and had a tie-up with the ‘Corporate Debtor’ for procuring business from the Home Allottees. The Home Loan Agreements in these cases were made individually by the Borrowers. As per standing instructions, the money in the account of the Home Allottees was disbursed automatically to the ‘Corporate Debtor’. Tri-partite Agreement is only by way of security that the developer would withhold the allotment in the event of default by the allottee. The Bank had sought security by creating mortgage of the residential units for the loans availed by the Home Buyers and the ‘Corporate Debtor’ had given permission for the same to enable the Home Buyer to procure financial assistance.

 

# 16. From the aforenoted clause in the tri-partite Agreement entered into between the Home Buyer, the Axis Bank and the ‘Corporate Debtor’, it is evident that in case of any default by the Borrower, the Bank would have the right to write to the builder for cancellation of Agreement executed between the developer and the Borrower, whereafter the Bank shall have the right to pay the sale consideration and get the subject property registered. There is no material on record to evidence that any such cancellation has taken place. The Home Loan Agreement read with the Demand Letters and the Allotment Letter clearly specify that when there is a ‘default’ on behalf of the Home Allottee a penalty interest would have to be paid by the allottee to the Bank. Therefore, the ‘default’ aspect is to be seen vis-a-vis the Home Allottee and the Appellant Bank only. It is contended by the Respondent that though the Allotment Letter shows that the payments were construction linked, the Bank released the entire amount prior to completion of construction.

 

# 17. Be that as it may, we are of the considered view that this subject matter cannot be viewed from such a narrow compass. It is definitely not the scope and objective of the Code to include Banks/Financial Institutions which have advanced loans to Home Buyers to be considered as ‘Financial Creditors’ and included in the CoC, specifically in the light of the fact the liability to repay the Home Loan is on the individual Home Buyers. This would defeat the very spirit and objective of the Code aiming at Resolution and maximisation of the assets of the ‘Corporate Debtor’. Presence of a mere tri-partite Agreement does not change the character of the amount borrowed by the Home Buyer vis-a-vis the Bank and vis-a-vis the ‘Corporate Debtor’. Viewed from any angle, the Appellant cannot be included as a ‘Secured Financial Creditor’ in this case and hence we find no reasons to interfere with the well-reasoned Order of the Adjudicating Authority. 

 

# 18. From all the aforenoted reasons, this Appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. No Order as to costs. The corresponding I.A No. 1502 of 2020 & I.A. No. 1503 of 2020 are also disposed of.

 

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HDFC Bank Ltd. vs Atul Kumar Kansal and Ors. - We thus, are of the view that remedy of the Appellant is against the M/s Nayanika Holdings Pvt Ltd with whom loan agreement was executed by deposit the title deed. The Appellant cannot raise any objection in the resolution plan or with regard to unit. We do not find any error in the order of Adjudicating Authority,

 NCLAT (2025.04.08) in HDFC Bank Ltd. vs Atul Kumar Kansal and Ors. [(2025) ibclaw.in 266 NCLAT, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 549 of 2025] held that;

  •  We thus, are of the view that remedy of the Appellant is against the M/s Nayanika Holdings Pvt Ltd with whom loan agreement was executed by deposit the title deed. The Appellant cannot raise any objection in the resolution plan or with regard to unit. We do not find any error in the order of Adjudicating Authority, 


Excerpts of the Order;

08.04.2025 Heard Learned Counsel for the Appellant as well as Learned Counsel for the Respondent. This Appeal has been filed against an order dated 07.03.2025 by which order Adjudicating Authority has considered and rejected the objection filed by I.A. No. 3778 of 2022 by the HDFC Bank. The Appellant’s case is that Appellant has mortgage with units having super areas 8702 sq. ft. at sixth floor of Universal Business Park, with regard to which conveyance deed was executed in favour of M/s Nayanika Holdings Pvt Ltd on 14.10.2015. It is submitted that the Appellant having mortgage over the said units, the said unit could not be made part of the resolution plan and the only prayer of the Appellant is that the said unit be excluded from the resolution plan.


Learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that in the present case, the plan was earlier approved by the Adjudicating Authority in 2021 and matter was remitted to the Committee of Creditors for consideration of claim of certain Financial Creditor including Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. Subsequently, after the said plan has been approved. It is submitted that Appellant has no locus to file any objection.


Learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that the remittance by the Adjudicating Authority was limited to be purpose of the consideration of the claim of Financial Creditor and thereafter the plan was approved. We have considered submission of the Appellant and perused the record.


Appellant claims having mortgage rights on the units which was sold to M/s Nayanika Holdings Pvt Ltd on 14.10.2015. The conveyance deed which was executed, there was no Tripartite Agreement between the Corporate Debtor M/s Nayanika Holdings Pvt Ltd and the bank. The agreement which is the basis of the claim is the loan agreement executed by M/s Nayanika Holdings Pvt Ltd in favour of the HDFC Bank. The Adjudicating Authority in paragraph 26 of the order has made following observations:

  • 26. As can be seen from the aforesaid documents enclosed by the Applicant Bank with the IA, the loan agreement as well as the document recording the mortgaging of the unit no. 618-626 located at 6th Floor of Universal Business Park was executed between the Applicant Bank and Nayanika Holdings, and was not a tripartite agreement involving the Corporate Debtor. Apparently, as per the stand taken by Applicant itself, it is not open for this Tribunal to determine the disputed issue between the Applicant and Nayanika Holdings. It is for the Applicant to resort to the remedy available to it before the appropriate forum in accordance with law to seek its relief. We find merit in the contention of the RP that the Applicant Bank has no locus to object to a resolution plan which already stands approved by the CoC. Furthermore, as already noted in the order dated 11.06.2021 of this court, no other issue would be raised by any objector nor decided by CoC. In the wake, I.A. 3778/2022 stands dismissed.”


The Appellant when is not the unit holder or any rights in the units except the mortgage right cannot be heard in asking to exclude the unit. When the units were taken consideration in the resolution plan and resolution plan was approved by the unit holders, who either had conveyance deed or builder buyer’s agreement. The Adjudicating Authority has rightly observed that the Applicant bank has no locus to object to the resolution plan which already stand approved by the Committee of Creditors. The Adjudicating Authority has also noticed that by an earlier dated 11.06.2021 of Adjudicating Authority, no other issues were allowed to be raised by an objector apart from claim of Financial Creditors. We thus, are of the view that remedy of the Appellant is against the M/s Nayanika Holdings Pvt Ltd with whom loan agreement was executed by deposit the title deed. The Appellant cannot raise any objection in the resolution plan or with regard to unit. We do not find any error in the order of Adjudicating Authority, rejecting the application. However, this shall not preclude the Appellant to take such remedy in law as permissible against the M/s Nayanika Holdings Pvt Ltd.


The Appellant has also relied on judgment of this Tribunal in Deepak Sakharam Kulkarni vs. Manoj Kumar Agarwal in 2024 SCC OnLine 2562, he is relied on paragraph 176 and 218. The observations made by this Court, was in respect of the person who was claiming right in the units and those units were included in the plan to which the Corporate Debtor had no rights, in the above background the observations in paragraph 176 and 218 has been made and the said judgment does not come to the aid of the Appellant in the facts of the present case.


The Appeal is dismissed.

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