REAT Haryana (2026.07.02) in Emaar India Limited vs Poonam Goel & Anr. [Appeal No.946 of 2024 ] held that;
This Tribunal is of the considered opinion that the allottees are entitled to delay possession charges under Section 18 of the Act on account of delayed delivery of possession by the promoter. The obligation of the promoter to hand over possession within the agreed timeline is a fundamental contractual as well as statutory obligation. Failure thereof attracts the consequences contemplated under Section 18 of the Act.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Wing Commander Arifur Rahman Khan & Aleya Sultana and Others v. DLF Southern Homes Private Limited (now known as Begur OMR Homes Private Limited) and Others, (2020) 16 SCC 512, held that an allottee is not precluded from claiming compensation for delay in handing over the possession after execution of registered sale deed in his favour.
But the submission of the developer is that the purchaser forsakes the remedy before the consumer forum by seeking a Deed of Conveyance. To accept such a construction would lead to an absurd consequence of requiring the purchaser either to abandon a just claim as a condition for obtaining the conveyance or to indefinitely delay the execution of the Deed of Conveyance pending protracted consumer litigation.
A perusal of the scheme of the Act reveals that while the legislature has specifically prescribed period of limitation for filing appeals under Section 44 and for other specified proceedings, no period of limitation has been prescribed for filing a complaint before the Authority under Section 31 of the Act.
It is settled principle of statutory interpretation that where the legislature has consciously provided limitation in certain provisions and omitted the same in others, such omission cannot be supplied by judicial interpretation. Consequently, no limitation period can be imported into Section 31 of the Act by implication.
The Act neither incorporates nor makes applicable the provisions of the Limitation Act to complaints instituted before the Authority. In the absence of any express legislative mandate, the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to defeat a remedy created under a legislation enacted for protection of allottees and regulation of the real estate sector.
The provisions of the Limitation Act, which the legislature did not incorporate in the Act, 2016, cannot be imported into it by analogy. An enactment being the will of the legislature, the paramount rule of interpretation, which overrides all others, is that a statute is to be expounded ‘according to the intent of them that made it’.
The will of the Legislature is the supreme law of the land, and demands perfect obedience. If the Legislature willfully omits to incorporate something of an analogous law in a subsequent statute, or even if there is a casus omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plain and unambiguous, the Court is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation, by analogy of implication, something what is thinks to be a general principle of justice and equity.
Excerpts of the Order;
This order shall dispose of the above-mentioned appeals, as common questions of law and facts are involved therein. However, the facts have been extracted from Appeal No. 946 of 2024.
# 2. Challenge in the present appeal is to order dated 13.08.2024 passed by the Authority1. Operative part thereof reads as under:
“H. Directions of the Authority:
40. Hence, the authority hereby passes this order and issue the following directions under section 37 of the Act to ensure compliance of obligations cast upon the promoter as per the functions entrusted to the Authority under Section 34(f) of the Act of 2016:
i. The respondent shall pay interest at the prescribed rate i.e. 11% per annum for every month of delay on the amount paid by the complainant from due date of possession i.e. 16.11.2016 till the date of offer of possession i.e. 31.05.2019 (inadvertently mentioned in the proceeding of the day as 11.12.2019) after obtaining occupation certificate plus two months or actual handing over of possession whichever is earlier as per proviso to Section 18(1) of the Act read with rule 15 of the rules. Also an amount which has already been given by the respondent as credit compensation shall be deduced/adjusted towards the delay possession charges to be paid by the respondent.
ii. The rate of interest chargeable from the allottees by the promoter in case of default shall be charged at the prescribed rate i.e. 11% by the respondent/ promoter which is the same rate of interest which the promoter shall be liable to pay the allottees, in case of default i.e., the delayed possession charges as per section 2(za) of the Act.
iii. The respondent is directed to pay arrears of interest accrued, if any, after adjustment in statement of account within 90 days from the date of this order as per rule 16(2) of the rules.
41. Complaint stands disposed of.
42. File be consigned to the registry.”
# 3. It appears that a project in the name and style of “Gurgaon Greens” was floated by the appellant-promoter in Sector 102, Gurugram. The respondents were allotted a unit measuring 1650 square feet therein vide allotment letter dated 28.01.2013. Buyer’s agreement was executed between the parties on 22.04.2013. Total sale consideration of the unit was Rs.96,40,123/-. The allottees remitted an amount of Rs.98,39,686/-. According to agreement, due date of possession was 16.11.2016. Occupation Certificate was granted to the project on 30.05.2019. Immediately thereafter, offer of possession was made on 31.05.2019. Unit handover letter was issued on 11.12.2019. Conveyance deed was executed on 03.02.2020. As there was delay in handing over possession of the unit, the allotees preferred a complaint on 15.09.2022 before the Authority at Gurugram seeking delay possession charges along with ancillary reliefs.
# 4. After hearing rival contentions of the parties, the Authority disposed of the complaint and issued directions, as reproduced in paragraph 1 of this order.
# 5. The promoter has assailed the impugned order on several grounds, primarily on the ground that no claim for interest on account of delay in delivery of possession could be maintained after the execution of the Conveyance Deed, as all contractual obligations stood discharged upon execution thereof, except those relating to structural defects or other defects covered under Section 14(3) of the Act. It has been submitted that in terms of Section 2(10) of Indian Stamp Act, 1989, the concluded contracts cannot be re-opened by reference to the relevant terms of the conveyance deed reproduced in the grounds of appeal. The claim for interest on account of delay could not be raised once the possession of the unit was handed over on 11.12.2019 and conveyance deed executed on 03.02.2020. The appellant stood discharged of all obligations under various provisions of the Act. No cause of action would survive after execution of the conveyance deed. It has also been emphasied that because delay compensation of Rs.1,88,575/- was accepted, the allottees were estopped from raising any claim in that regard. It is alleged that there was concealment of payment on account of delay compensation already received.
# 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the allottees argued that even after execution of the conveyance deed and handing over of the possession, the allottee continues to retain the status of an ‘allottee’ under the Act and does not cease to be so merely because he/she has become a purchaser by virtue of the conveyance deed. Finally, it has been contended that if at all the allottees are held entitled for payment of interest, the same has to be calculated from due dates of receipt of payment. Attention of this Tribunal is invited to certain clauses of Flat buyer agreement wherein, the construction was agreed to be completed within a period of 36 months with grace period of 5 months from the date of start of construction. The said obligation was not fulfilled by the builder despite the fact that periodic payments were made and rather certain increased payments were realized from the allottees. The agreed date for delivery of possession was 16.11.2016, however, offer of possession was made on 31.05.2019; even that was not valid offer of possession because stringent conditions to pay certain amount which were not part of the agreement were imposed. Even by that date, the period was delayed by approximately three years. The promoter charged penalty @ 24% p.a. in the event of delay in payment by the allottees which was also unfair and illegal. Finally, exact measurement of the unit was not disclosed. On these premises, counsel for the allottees submitted that the relief granted by the Authority was legal and justified.
# 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and given careful thought to the facts of the case.
# 8. Admittedly, the allottees in all the appeals are in possession of their respective units and conveyance deeds have also been executed in their favour.
# 9. Having considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record, this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that the allottees are entitled to delay possession charges under Section 18 of the Act on account of delayed delivery of possession by the promoter. The obligation of the promoter to hand over possession within the agreed timeline is a fundamental contractual as well as statutory obligation. Failure thereof attracts the consequences contemplated under Section 18 of the Act.
# 10. The contention that execution of conveyance deed or delivery of possession extinguishes the rights of the allottees under the Act cannot be accepted. The Scheme of the Act makes it abundantly clear that the status of allottee does not stand obliterated merely because title has been conveyed. Any other interpretation would defeat the beneficial object of the legislation and permit promoter to evade liability despite admitted deficiencies or delays.
# 11. Karnataka High Court in RERA Appeal No. 7 of 2021- M/s Total Environment Building Systems (P) Ltd. v. Mr. Verghese Stephen, decided on 11.03.2022, relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Wing Commander Arifur Rahman Khan & Aleya Sultana and Others v. DLF Southern Homes Private Limited (now known as Begur OMR Homes Private Limited) and Others, (2020) 16 SCC 512, held that an allottee is not precluded from claiming compensation for delay in handing over the possession after execution of registered sale deed in his favour.
# 12. The relevant observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Wing Commander Arifur Rahman Khan’s case (supra) are reproduced below:
"35. The flat purchasers invested hard-earned money. It is only reasonable to presume that the next logical step is for the purchaser to perfect the title to the premises which have been allotted under the terms of the ABA. But the submission of the developer is that the purchaser forsakes the remedy before the consumer forum by seeking a Deed of Conveyance. To accept such a construction would lead to an absurd consequence of requiring the purchaser either to abandon a just claim as a condition for obtaining the conveyance or to indefinitely delay the execution of the Deed of Conveyance pending protracted consumer litigation.
36. It has been urged by the learned counsel of the developer that a consequence of the execution of the Deed of Conveyance in the present case is that the same ceases to be a transaction in the nature of "supply of services" covered under the CP Act 1986 and becomes a mere sale of immovable property which is not amenable to the jurisdiction of Consumer Fora. In Narne Construction (P) Ltd. v. Union of India ((2012) 5 SCC 359), this Court distinguished between transfer of a piece of immovable property and housing construction or building activity a simple carried out by a private or statutory body falling in the category of "service" within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (o) of the CP Act 1986. This Court held that:
"8. Having regard to the nature of transaction between the appellant Company and its customers involved much more than a simple transfer of a piece of immovable property it is clear the same constitutes "service" within the meaning of the Act. It was not the case that the appellant Company was selling the given property with all its advantages and/or disadvantages on "as is where is" basis, as was the position in State [UT of Chandigarh) v. Amarjeet Singh ((2009) 4 SCC 660]. It is a case where a clear-cut assurance was made to the purchasers as to the nature and extent of development that would be carried out by the appellant Company as a part of package under which a sale of fully developed plots with assured facilities was made in favour of the purchasers for valuable consideration. To the extent the transfer of site with developments in the manner and to the extent indicated earlier was a part of the transaction, the appellant Company has indeed undertaken to provide a service. Any deficiency or defect in such service would make it accountable before the competent Consumer Forum at the instance of respondents." consumers like the developer in the present case has undertaken to provide a service in the nature of developing residential flats with certain amenities and remains amenable to the jurisdiction of Consumer Fora. Consequently, we are unable to subscribe to the view of the NCDRC that flat purchasers who obtained possession or executed Deeds of Conveyance have lost their right to make a claim for compensation for the delayed handing over of the flats."
# 13. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court, the contention raised by the promoter that the complaint instituted by the allottees was not maintainable after execution of the Conveyance Deed, is liable to be rejected.
# 14. We find no illegality or perversity in the impugned order and the same is upheld. Consequently, present appeals stand dismissed being devoid of merit.
# 15. Before parting with the matter, this Tribunal deems it appropriate to make certain observations on the issue of limitation in proceedings arising under Section 18 of the Act.
# 16. The preliminary objection regarding limitation raised by the promoter deserves to be rejected. The proceedings in the present matter have been instituted under the Act. A perusal of the scheme of the Act reveals that while the legislature has specifically prescribed period of limitation for filing appeals under Section 44 and for other specified proceedings, no period of limitation has been prescribed for filing a complaint before the Authority under Section 31 of the Act. It is settled principle of statutory interpretation that where the legislature has consciously provided limitation in certain provisions and omitted the same in others, such omission cannot be supplied by judicial interpretation. Consequently, no limitation period can be imported into Section 31 of the Act by implication.
# 17. It is also well-settled that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to proceedings before special Tribunals or authorities unless such applicability is expressly provided by the statute creating the forum. The Act neither incorporates nor makes applicable the provisions of the Limitation Act to complaints instituted before the Authority. In the absence of any express legislative mandate, the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to defeat a remedy created under a legislation enacted for protection of allottees and regulation of the real estate sector.
# 18. Similar view has been expressed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in MA No. 173 of 2023—Smt. Nidhi Sao v. Greenearth Infraventures Private Limited, decided on 16.04.2026. Relevant paragraph thereof is reproduced hereunder:
“19. It is pertinent to mention here that from the language of the Act 2016, the intention of the legislature to exclude the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act is manifestly clear. The provisions of the Limitation Act, which the legislature did not incorporate in the Act, 2016, cannot be imported into it by analogy. An enactment being the will of the legislature, the paramount rule of interpretation, which overrides all others, is that a statute is to be expounded ‘according to the intent of them that made it’. The will of the Legislature is the supreme law of the land, and demands perfect obedience. If the Legislature willfully omits to incorporate something of an analogous law in a subsequent statute, or even if there is a casus omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plain and unambiguous, the Court is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation, by analogy of implication, something what is thinks to be a general principle of justice and equity. To do so ‘would be entrenching upon the preserves of Legislature’, the primary function of a Court of law being jus dicere and not jus dare.”
# 19. Accordingly, the objection regarding limitation is devoid of merit and is hereby rejected. The complaint before the Authority is held to be maintainable and liable to be adjudicated on merits.
# 20. The amount of pre-deposit made by the promoter in the aforesaid appeals, along with interest accrued thereon, be remitted to the Authority for disbursement to the parties as per their entitlement, subject to tax liability, if any.
# 21. Copy of this order be sent to parties/their counsel and the Authority.
# 22. Files be consigned to the records.
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